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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the relationship between conflict, economic growth, state capacity and 
natural resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. It contributes to the limited research in this area and 
empirically examines these relationships using different econometric models. The first 
empirical chapter uses a panel dataset that covers the period 1997 - 2013 to analyse the effects 
of economic growth on conflict in Nigeria using the negative binomial model. The findings 
support the direct relationship between economic growth and conflict in Nigeria. Controlling 
for other factors, the results indicate that increase in growth rate - measured by annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita - decreases the expected number of conflicts.  
The study finds no evidence of a relationship between levels of wealth in a state and 
the incidence of conflicts. The analysis controls for factors such as spill-over effects from other 
states and year and state effects. Finally, to address potential concerns that economic growth 
could be a cause of conflict or that other unobserved factors could confound the relationship 
between economic growth and conflict, the chapter employs instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation using percentage change in rainfall as an instrument. The results with the IV 
estimation are similar to the results without IV in terms of both sign and significance, indicating 
that the negative effect of economic growth on conflicts is not due to reverse causality or 
omitted variables. For robustness checks, a Panel Autoregressive model (PVAR) is also 
employed. 
The second empirical chapter analyses the effect of conflict on state capacity in Sub-
Saharan Africa. State capacity is measured in terms of fiscal and legal capacity. It also looks at 
the effects of internal and external conflicts on state capacity. The chapter adopts the Ordinary 
least squared (OLS) and the system generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimation 
methods to analyse the panel data consisting of 49 Sub-Saharan countries over the period 2000 
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- 2015. The results suggest that conflicts have a negative and significant effect on state capacity. 
However, when military expenditure is used as a proxy for state capacity it is found that conflict 
strengthens state capacity. The results are consistent with theoretical argument that internal 
conflicts polarise societies and make it more difficult for governments to reach a consensus in 
investing in state capacity, while external conflicts mobilise domestic population against a 
common enemy thereby helping in state capacity building. 
Finally, the third empirical chapter examines the effect of natural resources on conflict 
onset and duration using discrete choice models with a dataset covering the period 1980 -2016. 
The results on the duration analysis show that natural resources prolong duration of conflicts. 
However, it is found that not all natural resources prolong duration of conflicts. Oil production 
does not seem to affect duration, whereas oil reserves and gas production lengthens the 
duration. The findings from the onset analysis show that both production and reserves of natural 
resources increase the risk of conflict onset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Conflicts, State capacity, Economic growth, Natural resources, Discrete choice 
models, Negative binomial models, Panel data  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Investigating the economic causes of onset and duration of conflicts1 has gained increasing 
attention from academics and policy makers alike in recent years (World Bank, 2016). 
Conflicts lead not only to human suffering but economic cost.2 According to Blattman and 
Miguel (2010), the proportion of countries involved in conflicts increased steadily through the 
last half of the twentieth century, peaking in the 1990s. Of the regions of the world, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) had nearly a third of its countries involved in active conflicts. Studies 
into conflicts and aspects of economic development in the region are therefore topical. 
Sambanis (2001) points out in a survey of the literature on the topic that empirical work has 
demonstrated that there is an association between poverty, slow growth, and an increased 
likelihood of conflicts and their prevalence.
  
On a wider scale, conflicts can cause trade 
disruptions, human displacements, refugee flows, and a rise in criminal and terrorist networks 
among other economic consequences of armed conflicts (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Cerra 
and Saxena, 2008; World Bank, 2011).  
Conflict has been documented as unfavourable to economic growth and development in 
the empirical literature. However, the reverse may be the case, leading to complications in the 
analysis (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2005; Devitt, 2012; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Polachek, 
2012). Many countries in SSA, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, Uganda, 
Burundi, Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau have, in recent years, been affected by conflicts (Afolabi, 
                                                          
1 Conflicts in this study is defined as armed conflict that occurs in a country. This includes wars and civil conflicts, 
with the exclusion of non-violent conflicts. Conflict treated as armed one includes insurgents seeking territorial 
secession or autonomy, or rebels aiming at control of the central government. It also includes ethnic wars, 
religiously motivated conflicts, territorial conflicts between groups, and revolutionary conflicts, in which 
insurgents aim for major social transformation. 
2 It is estimated that armed conflicts have resulted in three times as many deaths as interstate wars since World 
War II (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
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2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). While the number of violent conflicts, particularly, inter-state 
ones, may be declining in the region, internal conflicts - ranging from guerrilla war to genocidal 
ones - are still prevalent. These include recent insurgencies in the Western and Eastern SSA 
countries, such as, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Mauritania 
that are causing disruptions to the economies of the nations with ripples felt throughout the 
region. They have resulted in destruction of lives and property and internal displacement of 
people, which led to a region-wide refugee crisis and consequently to poverty and disease, 
proliferation of small arms and weapons, human and drug trafficking, illegal exploitation of 
natural resources and lawlessness (Afolabi, 2009; Annan, 2014; Collier, 2016; Sambanis, 
2001). It is reported that SSA accounted for 29 out of 43 global civil conflicts recorded during 
the 1980s and the 1990s (Miguel, 2004). In addition, the number of conflicts that broke out on 
the continent during the 1990s and early 2000s is higher than in anywhere else in the world and 
in 2011.3 Consequently, by 2011, the highest concentration of peace operations in the world 
was in Africa.4   
 
1.2 Motivation of the Research 
This thesis focuses mainly on Sub-Saharan Africa, which, as mentioned in Section 1.1, 
accounts for most of the conflicts in the world. Although, economic growth has been recorded 
in SSA in recent years (World Bank Annual Report, 2017), the growth is uneven across the 
countries with considerable variation throughout the region. Furthermore, a related economic 
issue is that the region still faces high public debt, poverty and low job creation.  
                                                          
3 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook 2012. Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
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There is a vast amount of literature on conflict, its different dimensions, and how it affects 
the performance of an economy. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that conflict hinders growth 
and the intensity of conflict is crucial to economic growth. Collier and Hoeffler (2002), 
however, argue that poor economic performance of the countries is among the main causes of 
conflicts in the region. Humphreys (2005) suggests that conflicts in Africa are generally 
consistent with the greed and grievance theory. The theory argues that development of 
conflicts can be attributed to greed and grievance of part of the population, but emphasises that 
countries with natural resources are more susceptible to conflicts, particularly where the 
resources are easily accessible and lootable. A review of the extant literature suggests that 
research in this area has been unable to reach a consensus on the relationship between conflict 
and economic growth. This is primarily what this thesis sets to address by focussing on Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, Gurr (1970) and Gurr and Duval (1973) posit an inverse relationship 
between economic growth and conflicts, arguing that periods of short-term declines in 
economic conditions lead to a rise in development of more conflicts. Olzak (1992) argues that 
both economic growth and decline can lead to conflicts. He states that, for example, periods of 
economic growth could also lead to an increase in conflicts; this is the case when fortunes for 
the disadvantaged increase, as they will come to compete with those just above them. Olzak 
(1992) also posits that declines in economic conditions could lead to an increase in ethnic 
violence through the effect of economic scarcity, which will intensify competition between 
groups. Several other scholars have argued that economic growth may lead to greater instability 
and conflict (Huntington, 1968; Ake, 1974; Harms and Zink, 2005). Their arguments suggest 
that economic growth may lead to an increase in violence. This may be as a result of inequality 
in wealth distribution or an increase in the ‘utility distance’ between any pair of groups, which 
may lead to conflict (Esteban and Ray, 1999). Finally, some argue that economic conditions 
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appear to have no effect on conflicts at all. For example, Horowitz (2001) reports deadly riots 
and conflicts in countries experiencing good times while there are no conflicts when growth 
declines. This suggests that the relationship is very much unclear and demands empirical 
investigation, since it is theoretically evident that there is no exact relationship between 
economic performance and conflicts. This is the second motivation for this study. 
Countries in SSA are endowed with natural resources and access to these natural resources 
can lead to developments of conflicts.5 The situation becomes complicated when access to 
these natural resources becomes the reason for conflict or is used to fuel conflicts. Collier 
(2001) avers that a substantial number of armed conflicts have a strong link to natural resource 
exploitation, in which either licit or illicit exploitation helped to trigger, intensify, or sustain 
conflicts.6 For example, the rebel groups Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone 
and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (known by its Portuguese acronym 
UNITA) used revenues derived from diamond mining to fund their rebellions against their 
respective governments (Collier, 2003). In Pakistan and Bolivia, violent protests broke out over 
the distribution of water while, in the Middle East, disputes over oil fields in Kuwait, among 
other issues, led to the first Gulf War (Collier, 2003). This thesis therefore also, as its third 
motivation, aims to examine the effect of natural resources on the onset and duration of conflict 
in SSA.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Natural resources in the region include; oil, gas, diamonds, iron ore, copper, natural gas, gold, platinum and 
land mass amongst other precious metals.   
6 Illicit exploitation here is illegal exploitation of natural resources while licit is lawful or legal extraction of 
these resources. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
This thesis consists of six chapters, three of which are empirical, and which quantitatively 
examine the relationship between conflict, economic growth, state capacity and natural 
resources using country-specific and cross-country data. To achieve the objectives of this 
study, the empirical investigations are centred on the following questions in a bid to offer some 
insights into the area.   
Does economic growth have a statistically significant effect on the number of conflicts at the 
state level in Nigeria? This is answered by the first empirical chapter, Chapter 3. 
 
Does conflict affect the state capacity of Sub-Saharan African countries? This question is 
addressed in Chapter 4. The chapter further explores the question:  
Which type of conflict (internal or external) has a higher impact on state capacity in Sub-
Saharan Africa?  
 
Do natural resources cause the onset of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa? Does the type of 
natural resource matter in starting or prolonging a conflict in the region? 
These are questions that are dealt with in Chapter 5. 
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1.4 Main Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis contributes to the conflict literature as well as the literature on the relationship 
between conflicts and economic growth. Despite the increase in economic growth in the last 
few years, SSA is still experiencing a significant number of conflicts.7 The main contributions 
of the thesis lie in its empirical findings found in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, examines Nigeria’s economic growth performance 
and its impact on conflicts in the country for the period 1997 - 2013. For better insight, this 
research analyses this relationship using state level data. Nigeria is the largest economy and 
the most populous country in the region. The results from the analysis show that economic 
growth at the state level has a negative impact on conflict in the country. The results are robust 
across a range of specifications such as temporal lags and state and year fixed effects. The 
analysis also contributes to the literature by estimating the model using instrumental variables 
(IV) and Panel Vector Autoregressive Models (PVAR) to account for the possibility that 
growth may be endogenous. The effect of growth on conflict continues to be negative and 
statistically significant.  Specifically, the PVAR estimations reveal that there is time effect on 
the impact of growth on conflict.  
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 4, contributes to the literature by examining how 
internal and external conflicts affect state capacity in SSA.8 The existing literature suggests 
that these two types of conflicts may have opposing effects in the development of state capacity. 
The proposition is that internal conflicts deteriorate state capacity while external conflicts have 
a contrasting effect on state capacity measured as military expenditure. This could be as a result 
of the government seeking to strengthen its military base to fight international wars.  For 
                                                          
7 The region recorded an increase from 1.36% in 2016 to 2.6% in 2017. It is projected that the growth could 
increase to 3.2% by the end of 2018 (World Bank, Economic Global Prospects). 
8 Conflicts are categorised as internal if all conflicts occurred within the country during the sample period while 
external conflicts are conflicts that involve two or more independent countries. 
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example, based on cross-country analysis, Besley and Persson (2009) provide empirical 
evidence that supports this view. They show that the incidence of external wars is associated 
with stronger states, while the incidence of internal wars is associated with the opposite effects. 
Using panel data analysis and dynamic panel GMM estimation techniques, this chapter looks 
into the main determinants of these conflicts and their effects on state capacity for a sample of 
SSA countries. Specifically, the chapter constructs and uses an index that measures state 
capacity.9  
Finally, countries rich in natural resources appear to be engaged in armed civil conflict 
more often than resource-poor countries (Lujala, 2010). Although there is ample evidence that 
this may be the case, there is less agreement on why resource-rich countries descend into 
conflicts. Two main lines of explanation have emerged: first, natural resources, especially those 
that are easily exploited, provide motivation and means for rebel uprisings. Greedy rebels may 
use conflict to satisfy their material aspirations (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). The other 
line of explanation sees a causal link through the state; abundant natural resources lead to poor 
policy choices and a weak state, exposing the society to violent conflict. The second part of 
Chapter 5 examines the impact of natural resources in prolonging conflict or increasing the risk 
of conflict by considering both renewable and non-renewable natural resources such as land 
area, agricultural land, oil, gas, hydrocarbon and rents from resources. Examining both 
renewable and non-renewable resources offers an explicit interpretation of the effects of natural 
resources on conflict in SSA.  
 
 
                                                          
9 State capacity is measured in two ways – fiscal capacity and legal capacity. Fiscal capacity is proxy using tax 
revenue and military expenditure while legal capacity is proxy using rule of law, regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness. A fiscal and legal capacity index is created using equal weights for the variables.   
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1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a general literature review of 
the theoretical and empirical works on the relationship between conflicts, economic growth 
and state capacity. The literature review surveys the existing literature on effect of conflict on 
economic growth and vice versa. In addition, a literature review on state capacity and conflict 
is provided given the different schools of thought on the topic. The chapter also incorporates 
different methodological approaches to estimate the impact of economic growth on state 
capacity and conflict. Chapter 3 examines the effect of economic growth on conflict in Nigeria 
using state level data. This chapter considers the relationship between growth and conflict in 
36 states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory of the country. This study uses a panel 
data approach that incorporates state and year fixed effects.  
Chapter 4 assesses the effects of conflict on state capacity, where both effects of internal 
and external conflicts are analysed. The chapter considers the issue by categorising the 
countries into weak and strong as suggested in the literature. Chapter 5 discusses the conceptual 
issues related to natural resources and conflict onset and duration. It then addresses the 
relationship using discrete choice models (logit estimation) and Weibull distribution for 
conflict duration analysis.  
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. It summarises the findings from the three 
empirical chapters and revisits the research questions the thesis is set to address. It also 
highlights the contributions and limitations of the research and offers suggestions for future 
work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review - Conflict, Economic Growth and State 
Capacity: Theory and Evidence 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Research on conflict has been approached in various ways and with different definitions. There 
is apparently no universally accepted definition of the term conflict. The first apparent 
difficulty is whether it is a situation or a variety of behaviour (Rahim, 2010) or an intrinsic and 
inevitable part of the existence of human beings (Francis, 2006). Nevertheless, there are 
attempts to define conflict. For example, Wallensteen (2007) defines conflict as a social 
situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire scarce resources at the 
same time. Wright (1990) states that the word conflict is derived from the Latin word meaning 
‘to strike together’. Laue (1990) argues that conflict may arise when wants, needs and beliefs 
between two or more parties struggle to agree.  
Chung and Megginson (1981), Carrell et al. (1997), and Dubrin (2005) contend that 
conflict happens whenever disagreements exist in a social situation over issues of substance or 
whenever emotional antagonisms create frictions between individuals or groups. They agree 
that conflict persists when both sides refuse to come to an agreement and when connecting with 
the other party is impossible. Consequently, the dominant view is that conflicts are largely the 
expression of mutually opposing interests between individuals and/or groups in a society. 
Therefore, there is the need to conceptualise conflict along a continuum that ranges from 
interpersonal and dormant conflicts at one end to violent and disruptive conflicts among groups 
at the other. The continuum helps us to grade conflicts based on its intensity (non-violent or 
violent, less severe and protracted or severe and protracted). This allows conflict to be treated 
as either non-violent or violent. 
10 
 
 
The majority of the conflict sub-section falls under violent conflict, while riots/protest can 
either be violent or non-violent. Violent conflict can lead to major destruction in the economy, 
which in turn causes slow economic growth.  From the view point of civil conflicts, three major 
theories or approaches are proposed in the literature. However, it needs to be stressed that 
although they offer some useful insights into the causes and nature of civil unrest, none of them 
is exhaustive on the nature and dimensions of the phenomenon. These are theories that:  
(i) place emphasis on the failure of the social contract as the principal driver of conflict;  
(ii) highlight private incentives, and consider conflict as motivated by private interests 
in hopes of exploiting the gains arising from it; and  
(iii) highlight group stimuli, which underscore conflict as driven primarily by disparities 
in social and political resource distribution between and among groups with 
common affinity in religion, ethnicity or other bonds.  
For the purposes of this study, conflict that has been categorised as violent conflict and includes 
civil and international wars, ethnic and religious fights and violent riots. 
 
2.2 Economic Growth and Conflict 
Economic theory is ambiguous about the relationship between conflict and economic growth. 
On one hand, conflicts disrupt capital and manpower which decreases growth in the economy. 
On the other hand, conflicts mobilise the work force, increasing effort and enhancing 
productivity (Polachek and Sevastianova, 2010). A country experiencing little or no growth 
might experience high levels of conflict due to its members fighting for a better standard of 
living, among many other reasons. Alternatively, the depletion of resources during wars may 
be one reason why some countries fail to sustain adequate economic growth, because economic 
growth affects a population’s well-being. This question concerning how war relates to growth 
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is important from a policy perspective, though it is plagued with endogeneity problems from 
the empirical point of view.   
The most widely-accepted relationship between economic growth and conflict posits 
that high-income countries are less likely to experience civil wars than low-income countries. 
Findings are almost entirely consistent in direction – growth, prosperity and development 
reduce the risk of civil war (Dixon, 2009). According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), a life in 
poverty makes people more frustrated and thus more likely to rebel. Poverty also increases the 
available recruits - rebels - because of high amounts of unemployed and dissatisfied youth. The 
number of rebels should decline as the economic opportunity costs of rebellion increases. In 
richer states, time devoted to production, rather than rebellion and appropriation, pays more 
than in poor states (Sambanis, 2003). 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) also find that higher income per capita reduces the likelihood 
of conflict. However, their argument is that income per capita is a general proxy for a country`s 
financial, administrative and security capacity. If the regime is weak, rebels have higher 
chances of success. They further establish that it also captures the quality of infrastructure and 
central administrative penetration into rural societies where grievance and separatist sentiment 
may arise. However, Buhaug and Rød (2006) find only a marginally significant effect on 
territorial (separatist) conflict.  
 
2.2.1 Empirical Literature on Economic Growth and Conflict 
Economic growth may affect conflict through several channels. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 
2001 and 2002), in their studies, find that young men are more likely to take up arms when 
income opportunities are worse for them in agriculture or in the formal labour market, relative 
to their expected income as a fighter. The authors argue that conflicts are fundamentally driven 
12 
 
 
by such economic opportunities rather than by political grievances —for example, repression 
against particular social groups. They find that slow income growth, low per capita income, 
natural resource dependence (proxied by primary commodity exports), lower male enrolment 
in secondary education, rebel military advantages (proxied by dispersed population), and total 
population are all significantly positively associated with the onset of civil conflict. They also 
find that democracy does not reduce the probability of the onset of conflict, which they take as 
further support for the view that civil conflicts are not driven by political grievances.  
Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that lower GDP per capita is significantly associated with 
the onset of a civil war; they argue that the key channel linking poverty and civil war is a low 
repressive capability resulting from weak militaries and poor roads. Using novel geographic 
data, they also emphasise the role of rough terrain—captured by the percentage of the country 
that is mountainous—in sustaining insurgencies. The authors also found that ethnic diversity 
does not contribute to the onset of conflict. Miguel et al. (2004) suggest that GDP growth is 
significantly negatively-related to the incidence of civil conflict in SSA during the period 1981 
- 1999 across a range of regression specifications, including some with country fixed effects. 
They found that the relationship between GDP growth and the incidence of civil conflicts is 
extremely strong; a five-percentage-point drop in annual economic growth increases the 
likelihood of a civil conflict (at least 25 deaths per year) in the following year by over 12 
percentage points. This amounts to an increase of more than one-half in the likelihood of civil 
conflict. However, they found that the impact of income shocks on civil conflict is not 
significantly different in richer, more democratic and more ethnic diverse African countries or 
countries with a range of different political institutional characteristics.   
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2.3 State Capacity and Conflicts 
Typically, state capacity is linked to the Theory of Political Opportunity Model presented by 
Tilly (1978). This model uses state capacity as the main explanatory factor, in which a state 
can either repress or accommodate a rebellion. If rebels know that the state is capable to repress 
a planned rebellion, they are less likely to be rebellious.10 If the state has the capacity to 
accommodate different interests and grievances through institutionalised channels like party 
systems, the motivation for conflict and rebellion will be lessened (Tilly, 1978). If a state 
chooses to repress a rebellion, the state must have the capacity to identify the rebels and 
determine the form of coercion to apply. Despite its pedigree and the various interpretations in 
the social sciences literature, state capacity is a relatively lesser-known concept in the 
economics literature in part because it is complex to define and measure.  
According to Hendrix (2010), state capacity can be categorised into three broad 
dimensions: first, military capacity; second, administrative capacity; and third, quality and 
coherence of political institutions. Military capacity is typically the state’s capability to repress 
rebellions and is often measured as military personnel per capita or military spending per capita 
(Hendrix, 2010). Administrative capacity can be measured in multiple ways: the quality of the 
service provided by the state during a government change; the ability to commit to private 
investors; or the state’s ability to collect revenue from the society, monitor the population, 
identify and find potential rebels together with collecting information (Hendrix, 2010). Quality 
of political institutions defines state capacity as the degree to which democratic and non-
democratic features are intermingled in the political system. In the extant literature, the most 
common measure used to capture institutional coherence is the Polity Index (Gurr, 1974; 
Hegre, et al., 2001; Marshall and Jaggers, 2009).  
                                                          
10 Rebels here referred to as armed groups who either want to take over the government or an existing territory.  
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Besley and Persson (2010) define state capacity as a state’s ability to effectively 
implement policies, which is similar to the definition of economic and legitimate capacity. One 
of the other dimensions to a state capacity is the ability to create policies and enact these 
policies – extractive and legitimate capacity. If a state lacks funding, it can be challenging to 
provide the population with their basic needs and demands. Administration of the state 
becomes difficult when resources are scarce and arguably it becomes a vicious circle when 
revenue from tax, resource rents, grants and foreign aid plummets as a consequence of bad 
management. A recent interest in the economic literature is the distinction between legal and 
fiscal state capacity. Legal capacity refers to issues such as the availability of contracting 
institutions (i.e., institutions supporting private contracts) and property rights institutions (i.e., 
institutions constraining government expropriation). Cardenas et al. (2010) propose fiscal state 
capacity as the capacity which deals with questions such as the ability to raise revenue from 
the society - usually measured by the total taxes as a share of GDP.  
The extant literature has also examined different dimensions of state capacity, including 
military, administrative/bureaucratic, political, institutional, and economic capacity (De Rouen 
and Sobek, 2004; De Soysa and Fjelde, 2010; Englehart, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fjelde 
and De Soysa, 2009; Henderson and Singer, 2000; Suzuki and Krause, 2005; Taydas, et al., 
2010; and Thies, 2010). One common feature of the existing conceptualisation of state capacity 
is the importance of the coercive (and to some extent the administrative) capacity of the state, 
which reflects the ability of the state to deter violent challenges to its authority (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Henderson and Singer, 2000). Against this 
background, state strength is associated with the degree to which the state can exert power over 
its citizens.  
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2.3.1 Types of State Capacity 
2.3.1.1 Weak and Strong State Capacity  
Due to the lack of consensus in evaluating state capacity in each of its core area of responsibility 
has required the need for scholars to refer to weak states by using a host of adjectives such as 
‘failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘failing’ and even ‘collapsed’. This is used to differentiate between countries 
suffering from a wide variety of capacity gaps. Although there is no universally accepted 
definition of weak states, the general agreement is that such countries that lack the capacity 
and/or will to perform core functions of state effectively are weak. These states or countries do 
not have sufficient bureaucratic penetration into society and efficient institutions of coercion 
like police and military forces. They are expected to face numerous difficulties in enforcing 
laws, imposing order, and maintaining peace among the citizens. They also experience 
numerous challenges in monitoring, discouraging, and suppressing opposition, which create 
conditions that are conducive for insurgents to recruit non-combatants to their forces. The 
legitimacy of a regime is dependent on its performance; if the state is able to produce and 
deliver economic and social goods at the level its subjects expect, or at least as its rulers 
promise, it should have no legitimacy problem. However, if the state cannot adequately steer 
the economic system, this is likely to result in a decline in its legitimacy. With legitimate 
capacity, the state can effectively steer activities without the necessity of constantly deploying 
coercion. Without legitimacy, the state would find it much more difficult to extract resources 
from the society and would have to bear much higher costs in maintaining law and order 
(Habermas, 1976).  
Hironaka (2005) defines state weakness as an ineffective bureaucratic and political 
system. The issue with this definition is that it merely reiterates the definition of a state in a 
slightly different language rather than identifying actual underlying antecedents: what, in this 
context, is the state other than a bureaucratic and political system? What constitutes military 
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and police capabilities or reach of government institutions and in what sense are these things 
weak? Kocher (2010) attempts to answer these questions and points to at least five distinct 
understandings of the strong/weak state dimension, several of which have sub-types.  There is 
no reason to presume that the list is exhaustive of all possible accounts that refer to the 
characteristics of the state, but it is a plausible list. 
First, strong states have been identified with centralisation, which can be either 
territorial or administrative. Territorially decentralised states have assets that are separated 
from state cores either by water or by the territory of other states; strong states are territorially 
unified. In decentralised states, these units may raise independent taxes, directly elect executive 
or legislative bodies, or carry out independent public policies in few or many domains. Both 
federal states and states with systems of indirect rule may be considered decentralised. 
Second, state strength has been theorised as wealth (Kennedy, 1987), “latent power” 
(Mearsheimer, 2001), or high fiscal capacity (Skocpol, 1985), the last of which may include 
the ability to tax or to borrow. The rationale is straightforward: accomplishing policy goals of 
almost any kind requires resources. States that are better able to acquire resources, either 
because more resources are available or because they are better at tapping them, generally will 
be more successful at achieving their policy goals. This measurement of “strength” leads 
directly to a general class of theories that ascribe political instability or violence to exogenous 
income shocks caused by war, population pressure, changes in rainfall or fiscal dependence on 
volatile natural resource income (Humphreys, 2005).   
Third, strength is related to a professional and autonomous bureaucracy, including 
military officer forces. Professionalisation is rooted in the methods of credentialing and 
selection (school degrees and competitive examinations, for example) and the philosophy of 
the bureaucrat. Autonomous officials are salaried and they cannot appropriate their offices and 
attached assets as personal property or pass them down to heirs. Weak or failing states have 
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been identified by some contemporary scholars with neo-patrimonialism,11 or the systematic 
privatisation and exploitation of public positions and resources (Reno, 1998).  Such states are 
termed predacious in the sense that they extract resources from society without providing 
corresponding public benefits. A related deviation from bureaucratic rationalism involves 
systematically directing state resources and offices toward real or fictive clans. In effect, states 
without a professionalised bureaucracy lack autonomy and neutrality with respect to social 
groups. The state becomes an object of competition rather than an agent in the service of 
society. 
Fourth, strength may be theorised as a relative lack of institutional restraint on the 
regime. A political system in which many actors have an effective veto over policy 
implementation may find it hard to get anything accomplished. Autocrats, in particular, face 
fewer checks on their executive discretion than elected officials. Consequently, they are free to 
resort to a range of policy options (including repression) that their democratic counterparts do 
not have available to the same degree. This conception of “strength” has declined along with 
the fortunes of authoritarian states during the so-called “Third Wave” of democratisation. 
However, it is often revived in popular and journalistic discourse when discussing, for example, 
the governing agility of the Chinese leadership or Vladimir Putin’s revitalisation of the Russian 
polity. A number of empirical studies of conflict have identified an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between regime type and civil war, indicating that the most authoritarian states are 
fairly resistant to the outbreak of civil wars (Vreeland, 2008).  
Fifth, international relations sometimes define strong state capacity in terms of the 
quantity and quality of military assets or “capabilities”: soldiers, tanks, naval vessels, and 
                                                          
11 Neo-patrimonialism is the vertical distribution of resources that gave rise to patron-client networks based 
around a powerful individual or party. Once argued to be necessary for unification and development after 
decolonisation, these regimes have supplanted the role of the inherited colonial institutions for the benefit of a 
few individuals. It is significant nowadays because it affects almost all Sub-Saharan states to differing degrees 
and is not regarded as corrupt behavior by the population, who rely on the system for their own survival.  
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munitions (Kocher, 2010).  This view of strength is highly intuitive; big, expensive armies win 
wars and deter would-be aggressors. The logic of the argument can be extended to encompass 
non-military security forces such as police. Domestic groups that might otherwise see 
opportunities to capture the state or detach territories from it are likely to be deterred or defeated 
quickly before large-scale challenges can develop. Strong states are also referred to as high 
capacity states that are able to provide public goods such as human security, medical and health 
care, and the social and physical infrastructure that promote human development (Rotberg, 
2003). Weak states, also known as low capacity states, are limited in their ability to provide 
these goods, leading to low social trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), low development levels 
or even state failure (Rotberg, 2004; Skocpol, 1979). Strong states are also known to possess 
high levels of socio-political cohesion that are directly correlated with consolidated 
participatory democracies, strong national identities, and productive and highly developed 
economies.  
The political domain in Sub-Saharan African countries have been viewed as a big-man 
rule regime. Big-man rule conventionally describes the relationships between patron and client 
in a patrimonial system, with an emphasis on the personal – sometimes almost transcendent – 
power of the patron and the distance between leader and subject. Notorious leaders like Mobutu 
Sese Seko, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and Daniel Arap Moi are frequently cited as examples, 
but the concept of the big-man applies equally well to contemporary leaders.12 The essence of 
the patron–client relationship is that patrons provide material resources, services, and 
opportunities – to which they as big-men have access but others do not – to their followers in 
exchange for loyal support and allegiance (McCauley, 2012). The relationship ensures that 
subjects have their welfare needs met directly, and that big men enjoy the authority and 
                                                          
12 For example, David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2012) characterize the current Rwandan regime as 
a patrimonial, big man state. 
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legitimacy necessary to maintain power. Some scholars suggest this relationship could be 
traced to precolonial norms that encouraged elites with uncertain time horizons to capitalise on 
their positions of influence.13 Others highlight the importance of exogenously-imposed 
colonial borders that, when coupled with extractive institutions, resulted in states not 
representative of nations, but rather of varied and often competing sub-national units. The 
solution was a kind of ‘nationalist bargain’, whereby new leaders made great promises of 
support and welfare to their constituents, in exchange for loyalty to the state, personified by 
the leader himself (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  
Conflict and political instability are often common features in developing countries as 
weak government institutions experience stagnation and hopelessness (Besley and Persson, 
2010).  One of the consequences of the colonial period experienced by African countries was 
that the colonial powers hired mostly Europeans to run the colonies and their regime was very 
bureaucratic (Van de Walle, 2001). When independence came to African countries between 
the late 1950s and the 1980s, few natives had any experience or training in running a state or 
even a university degree. This changed drastically through the next decades, but still scholars 
claim that state capacity has actually deteriorated since the independence of African countries, 
leading to development of weak states in the continent (Van de Walle, 2001). Corruption, lack 
of research and technology innovations, low morale and legitimacy problems, along with 
shortages of (and outdated) equipment and technology are also part of the picture. Brain drain 
and better paid jobs in the private sector leave the public sector without enough qualified 
candidates, and normal government tasks like tax collection and statistical service barely 
function. Essential services like communications, electricity, education and transportation 
systems are neglected as a result of the state being weak and incapable to perform these 
functions. This, however, is not the current state in most African countries; there are varying 
                                                          
13 See Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The politics of the belly (Longman, London, 1993). 
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degrees of weakness in state capacity. In addition, weak states usually experience all the 
symptoms of economic underdevelopment: dualistic and poorly integrated mono-economies, 
heavy debt burdens, low or negative growth rates, high inflation and unemployment, low levels 
of investment, and massive social inequalities. However, weak states are not excluded from 
periods of economic growth such as were enjoyed by Botswana, Uganda, Nigeria and South 
Africa in the 1990s and early 2000. However, by comparison with the developed states in 
Western Europe or North America, they lag significantly behind in economic growth.  The 
question then arises of what constitutes a strong state and a weak state in the context of SSA 
countries.  
Rice and Patrick (2008) developed an index of state weakness in developing countries. 
The authors define weak states as countries that lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfil 
the four sets of critical government responsibilities. Which are: fostering an environment 
conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining 
legitimate, transparent and transparent political institutions; securing their populations from 
violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their 
population. About 141 developing countries in the sample were ranked according to their 
relative performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, security and social welfare.  
State weakness is therefore measured as a state’s effectiveness in delivering on these four 
critical dimensions.   
The state weakness index is based on 20 indicators to show a balanced picture of how 
each country performs or fails to perform along multiple dimensions.14 Each indicator score is 
standardised and aggregated, creating an individual score which is then averaged over the four 
main categories to obtain an overall score for state weakness ranging from 0.0 (failed state) to 
                                                          
14 The indicators are listed in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
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10.0 (strong state). The 20 indicators provide a multifaceted yet user-friendly measure of each 
state’s performance profile. The individual indicator scores also allow useful comparisons 
between states on each dimension of state performance. Their results show that failed and 
critically weak states are geographically concentrated in SSA. Though only one-third of the 
141 countries examined were in SSA, 23 out of the 28 critically weak states are in the region.  
There are, of course, high performers in the region, including Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles 
and South Africa.  
The index provides policymakers with tools to examine and better understand the 
unique dynamics and drivers of performance in each country and, in principle, to tailor and 
target their policy interventions.  Appendix B provides each country’s index and the scores 
obtained in the four basket categories. It has also been colour-coded based on each county’s 
relative weakness. Such an index may be viewed as an approximation of each country’s 
weakness relative to other developing countries. In line with this measurement of state 
weakness, this study assumes that all states in the region are weak and do not differentiate 
between weak or strong states in SSA. The data sample and empirical analysis in this chapter 
make no differentiation between each state’s relative weaknesses, categorising them as 
critically weak, as a failed state, as a weak or as a top performer in the state weakness index.15  
According to Jackson (2002), states are dynamic in nature and a weak state now may 
become a strong state in later years or vice-versa; some states lie somewhere between strong 
and weak, having some of the characteristics of a strong state — for example, effective 
institutions and a strong economy — but lacking others, such as an enduring sense of national 
identity, or legitimacy. Botswana, for example, possesses some characteristics of a strong state: 
relatively effective state institutions, a growing economy, and participatory politics, but weak 
                                                          
15 Rice and Patrick, (2008) developed an index of state weakness for 141 developing countries. 
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in providing sound social welfare to its citizens. The country is clearly further along the scale 
towards state strength than is Sierra Leone, which lacks any of these characteristics. Many 
other researchers have considered African countries as weak states (Cottingham, 1974; Jackson 
and Rosberg, 1982; Cruise O’Brien, 1991). A possible extension to this study is to classify 
weak and strong states in Africa by developing a new index, following on from the Brookings 
index with new and updated data so as to establish any differences in country performance. 
Another possible extension is to empirically examine the different categories of weakness and 
how these influence state capacity, this is, however, beyond the scope of this study.  
 
2.3.2 State Capacity and Conflicts 
The onset of conflict implies not only that there is substantial motivation for organised 
rebellion, but that there is also adequate opportunity for it (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre 
and Sambanis, 2006). In other words, conflict onset indicates that the state lacks the capacity 
to effectively deter, or otherwise prevent, a violent challenge to its monopoly over the use of 
force. Fearon and Laitin (2003) attribute armed rebellion to a set of structural conditions that 
reduce the opportunity costs of insurgency, thereby increasing its likelihood. They find that 
mountainous terrain and low economic development, proxied by GDP per capita, significantly 
increase the probability of conflicts. While rough terrain poses a challenge to the capability of 
state forces to find and defeat insurgents, GDP per capita is treated as a direct indicator of the 
financial and administrative resources that can be effectively mobilised for counter insurgency 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Although a robust predictor of conflict, GDP per capita as a catch-
all measure fails to capture the multidimensional theoretical conceptions of state capacity. 
Hence, others have sought to refine the definitions for and measures of its underlying 
components (Hendrix, 2010).  
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Boulding (1989) posits a useful framework for considering and organising conflict and 
state capacity by identifying three distinct dimensions of state power: threat, economic, and 
integrative, or ‘the stick, the carrot, and the hug’ respectively. Threat power characterises a 
state’s capacity to deter potential rebels via the credible threat of forceful retaliation. Military 
strength, the competencies and reach of the police, and intelligence forces are particularly 
important here (Herbst, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (1998) similarly argue that economically 
developed states - which have the resources necessary to fight rebellion - are more capable of 
snuffing out and deterring insurgency, using the relative political capacity (RPC) measure as 
an indicator of the state’s administrative reach. 
Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) investigated the relationship between conflict and state 
capacity by suggesting three conceptually and empirical notions of state capacity. These 
notions signify different ways in which peace can be secured, which are - coercion, co-optation 
and cooperation. Coercion is proxied as the ability to extract large taxes, co-optation as the 
relative size of government spending or level of public goods provision, and cooperation as the 
degree of trust economic agents have in state institutions. They find that public spending is 
significant in enabling strong environments and that good institutions contribute to peaceful 
periods in a society. Their results suggest that it is beneficial to look at peace as co-produced 
and not just originating from coercive ability of the states. They also found that good 
governance can be obtained by states that are able to elicit cooperation by credibly committing 
to providing collective goods and securing property rights and the private market. Also, states 
that pay back a larger share of the productive assets of society in the form of state spending 
seem to manage peace much better than those that simply have more coercive capacity for 
collecting a super-normal amount of taxes. 
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Beyond forcing compliance by threat of violence, the state may also buy the loyalty of 
those who would otherwise find it in their best interest to challenge state power via strategic 
redistribution of goods and resources in exchange for submission (Boulding, 1989; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003). The economic power resides in the financial capacity of the state to 
confront potential rebel threats with cash and services, and has been found to effectively do so 
(Fjelde and de Soysa, 2009). For example, redistribution in the form of unemployment benefits 
(MacCulloch, 2004) or spending on education (Thyne, 2006) can reduce the public’s 
preference for, and the actual risk of, violence against the state. In short, greater economic 
capacity allows the state to both alleviate the grievances of the impoverished (Buhaug, 2006) 
and still maintain the flow of special benefits to its primary base of support necessary to retain 
power.  
Boulding’s (1989) third dimension of state capacity, integrative power, is interpreted 
by Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) as ‘the ability to develop legitimacy and invoke relations of 
loyalty and trust to secure cooperation of societal actors and groups’. Using contract intensive 
money (CIM) as a proxy, they find that it, too, serves to significantly reduce the probability of 
civil war. Similarly, research finds democracy and political stability – which promote 
cooperation and trust – associate negatively with conflict (Hegre et al., 2001; Reynal-Querol, 
2002), in contrast to political instability, which can provide fertile ground for rebellion 
(DiGiuseppe et al., 2012). Institutions that provide for greater economic freedom, and that 
make a government’s commitment to uphold property rights more credible, may have a 
predominant role in ensuring societal trust and peaceful development (Fjelde and de Soysa, 
2010; North and Weingast, 1989). 
Thyne (2006) examined conflict onset in relation to public goods (education) provided 
by the government. Investment in public services is one way the government can signal that it 
cares about the population. This can be achieved through a variety of ways, such as increased 
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spending for water sanitation, securing basic health needs, or providing a strong system of 
education.  According to Thyne (2006), educational investment can reduce grievances in its 
ability to create economic development and social equality. A number of research articles 
support the claim that education leads to economic growth (Adeola 1996; Granato et al., 1996). 
In addition to creating economic growth, recent studies have found that education leads to more 
equitable economic growth than other sources of income, such as natural resource development 
(Birdsall, 1998; Hojman, 1996; Londono, 1996; Reynolds, 1996; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 
1993).  
Taydas and Peksen (2012) also argue that higher levels of social welfare spending by 
the government will reduce the likelihood of civil conflict onset. It is believed that it takes a 
conscious effort from the government to maintain a state of peace and this can have an impact 
on public finances. The state’s effort to increase spending might influence conflict onset in a 
number of ways but two in particular may be crucial. First, the government’s commitment to 
redistribute income has an important effect on the perception and preferences of social actors 
towards the state. In return for productive social welfare policies, political leaders gain public 
loyalty, compliance, and support; they also have an easier time pursuing their agendas. This 
strategy - namely government commitment to redistributing in favour of the poor - was used 
by rulers in the west in the 19th century to increase the legitimacy of governments and to 
prevent revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000).  
The second and more indirect connection stresses the role of social spending in 
promoting economic development, decreasing the impact of poverty, and undermining the 
opportunity structure for rebellion. The authors found that welfare spending is a significant 
indicator of conflict onset. Increase in social welfare reduces the incidence of conflict in the 
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sample examined.16 The analysis was extended to include public spending and military 
expenditure. Previous research on public expenditure suggests that generally government 
expenditure could have a peace-inducing impact and that higher levels of government spending 
decrease the risk of civil conflicts (Acemoglu, 2005; Fjelde and de Soysa, 2009). This belief 
originates from the fact that total government consumption is the broadest measure of 
government intervention and contributes to economic development. Burgoon (2006) suggests 
that although some public expenditure does not serve redistributive or welfare goals (e.g. 
defence spending), they still affect the social rights of citizens, particularly in developing 
countries where clearly social welfare is not developed. He finds no statistically significant 
relationship between military expenditure and the emergence of internal conflicts, but that the 
welfare spending remained statistically significant.  
Likewise, Thies (2010) examines the relationship between state capacity and civil 
conflict onset from the primary commodities view point. The focus of the article shifts from 
typical civil conflict literature - where the incentives of rebel and rulers are revenue seeking in 
nature - to examine if primary commodities solely affect state capacity or indirectly impact on 
state capacity via conflict onset. Since primary commodities are lootable and taxable, both 
rulers and rebels are likely to be drawn to them as sources of revenue. Rather than assume the 
state is a function of per capita income that serves to constrain rebels, state capacity is modelled 
as a function of its fiscal size and strength. A two-equation model is developed to capture the 
simultaneity of civil war and state capacity. The results show that all measures of state capacity 
are not significantly related to civil conflict. He finds, however, that civil conflict disrupts the 
normal pattern of revenue extraction even when the extraction includes non-tax revenue.   
Dincecco and Katz (2012) analyse the relationship between state capacity and long-run 
economic performance for 11 European countries over 4 centuries. The argument for using 
                                                          
16 Their sample consists of 153 countries for the period 1975-2005. 
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only European countries lies in Europe being deemed as the birth place of modern economic 
growth. They argue that sovereign governments in European history typically faced two key 
political problems: fiscal fragmentation and absolutism. Although the rulers had weak authority 
over taxation, they had strong control over expenditures. Under this equilibrium, revenues were 
low, and executives typically spent available funds on military explorations rather than on 
public services with broad economic benefits. Dincecco and Katz (2012) claim that the 
implementation of uniform tax systems at the national level – “fiscal centralisation” – enabled 
European states to effectively fulfil their extractive role. This revolution naturally occurred 
swiftly and permanently from 1789 onward.  
Similarly, it is argued that the establishment of parliaments that could monitor public 
expenditures at regular intervals – called “limited government” – enabled them to effectively 
fulfil their productive role. This typically occurred decades after fiscal centralisation over the 
nineteenth century. By the mid-1800s, most European states had achieved modern levels of 
extractive and productive capabilities, implying that they could gather large tax revenues and 
effectively channel funds toward non-military public services. These critical improvements in 
state capacity are believed to have strong positive performance effects. Their results show that 
the state performance is largely dependent on extractive and productive capabilities. The results 
are also robust to a range of specifications, controls and sub-samples. This, therefore, suggests 
that, a key element in building state capacity is by the extractive and productive capabilities of 
the government.  
Centeno (1997 and 2002) and López-Alves (2000) explore the role of wars in state 
formation in Latin America. A major insight in their contributions is that external and internal 
wars are two distinct types of conflict with potentially opposing effects in the development of 
state capacity. While external wars are moments of unity and consensus that facilitate the 
decision to invest in state capacity, internal wars are, by definition divisive and destructive. 
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The implication of this proposition is that external and internal wars have opposite effects on 
state capacity. Stubbs (1999) claims that war (or the threat of) has been an important factor in 
moulding state institutions in the most successful economies of East Asia (namely, Japan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), while Desch (1996) 
looks into the cases of China, Cuba, Israel, and South Korea to conclude that their threatening 
external environments have resulted in stronger states. 
Cardenas et al. (2010) however, argues that there might be possible reserve causality 
driving the results of earlier cross-country analysis. They argue that conflicts can be reduced 
or eliminated by increasing military confrontations - which is achieved though increases in 
taxation and greater state capacity - and that internal conflicts deteriorate state capacity both at 
the cross-country and within-country levels, and that intense conflicts have a stronger negative 
impact. They found no effect of external conflicts on state capacity.  
The majority of the conclusions on state capacity and conflict - except for Cardenas et 
al. (2010) have been reached using cross-sectional data which has limitations.17  One primary 
reason why cross-sectional data might be inappropriate is that state capacity can be persistent 
over time, much like institutional measures. This suggests that present state capacity is highly 
correlated with past state capacity. Also, past state capacity may have driven the country’s 
decision to engage in previous conflicts, such that a stronger state may be more likely to fight 
wars with another state or states, while internal groups may be more likely to challenge the 
state if it is weak (Cardenas, 2010). This, therefore implies that the persistent nature of state 
capacity cannot be ignored, because it could lead to biased estimates of earlier conflicts; a 
potential reverse causality issue arises when effects of past state capacity are not acknowledged 
in the econometric specification.  
                                                          
17 The authors adopt a panel data approach for countries in Latin America. 
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2.4 Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The problem of violent internal conflict in Africa is severe. It has been judged to be “the most 
warring region on the planet” (Jackson, 2000; Van Tongeren, 1999). Nearly a third of Africa’s 
conflicts have started since the late 1980s; indeed, Africa is experiencing a much greater rate 
of increase in the number of conflicts than other regions, except for countries in the Middle 
East who are facing a long period of civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). Half of Africa’s 
states are in some form of conflict, affecting 20% of the continent’s population. In mid-2001, 
serious internal conflict continued in Western Sahara, Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leone, 
Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Uganda, Angola, and the Comoros. Many other African states face political 
instability, high levels of domestic political violence, or growing secessionist or rebel 
movements such as Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Kenya, Central African Republic, 
Djibouti, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria. Also, the ethnic violence conflict erupted after the 
2007 Kenyan presidential election and the many religious and communal conflicts between 
different ethnic groups in Nigeria. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border war is also causing major 
distress for the communities who live around the border.  
Some researchers of African conflict (Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1991; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Msabaha, 1991; and Obasanjo, 1991) argue that conflict in Africa stems primarily from 
crises of national governance and from the failure of governmental institutions to mediate 
conflict. Some others believe the conflicts are as a result of the region’s colonial past (Cohen, 
1995; Duala-M’Bedy, 1984; Okoyo, 1977). Cohen (1995) asserts that the sources and 
consequences of Africa’s internal conflicts have their roots in colonialism, the subsequent 
processes of de-colonisation and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of nation building. He 
also suggested that the de-colonisation process was flawed. In many countries, the 
contradictions of the colonial state were passed on to the independent states through a defective 
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process of de-colonisation. He argues that conflicts, recurring instability, and bad governance 
in Rwanda and Burundi can be traced back to the hasty and unprepared granting of 
independence by Belgium in 1960.  The major wars in Angola and Mozambique also occurred 
as a result of panic de-colonisation from a revolutionary and chaotic Portugal in 1974 - 1975. 
Extant literature on conflicts in Africa appears to view the conflicts mainly in general 
terms as ethnic motivated conflicts or intra-national conflicts. This view holds good to some 
extent, but it is far from being the general trend. However, these two classifications may have 
stemmed from the views of western knowledge of the composition of African societies. It is 
important to understand that the conflicts in Africa go beyond these classifications and that 
there are different roots and causes of conflicts in the region. Arguably, there have been a few 
inter-state conflicts, some of which include the: 
(i) Nigeria - Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi peninsular since the 1970s.  
(ii) Algeria - Morocco conflict over the Atlas Mountains area in October 1963. 
(iii) Eritrea - Ethiopian crisis between 1962 and 1979. 
(iv) Somalia - Ethiopia dispute of 1964 - 1978 over the Ogaden region which borders 
both countries. 
(v) Chad - Libya crisis of 1980- 1982 
(vi) Kenya - Somalia border war of 1963 -1967 in which Somalia aimed at recovering 
its lost territories including the Northern frontier district of Kenya 
(vii) Tanzania - Uganda crisis in 1978 - 1979). 
(viii) Eritrea - Ethiopia border war, 1998 – 2000, 2007 – 2008, 2016 - present) 
Internal conflicts or intra-states conflicts, on the other hand, often occur due to a number 
of reasons. These reasons could range from several underlying factors such as climate, 
inequality, weak institutions, inadequate political system, religion, ethnicity and natural 
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resources.18 These conflicts could be government authorities against an opposition group or 
between two opposing groups (Eminue, 2004).19 Over the years, Sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced different forms of conflict that could be broadly categorised as internal or external 
conflicts. However, the region has also experienced a third type of conflict: internationalised 
internal armed conflict. Such conflicts - which are essentially civil war - have varying degrees 
of external involvement. Examples include the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Angola and Sierra Leone (Aremu, 2006).  
There are several processes by which internal conflicts may be transformed into wider 
international conflicts. First, they can become a threat to international peace and security when 
the fighting spills over into neighbouring states or when refugee-flows upset regional stability. 
Second, external states are often directly or indirectly drawn into the conflict through support 
links to the various sides of the conflict, supplying weapons, training, or other materials. Third, 
sub-state actors - such as rebel movements, militias or warlords - often receive financial and 
political support from diaspora communities or ethnic kinfolks separated by international 
borders. Lastly, the international community may decide to send in a peacekeeping force, or 
take such an active interest in the fighting that it becomes a matter of international concern. 
Rarely can internal conflicts remain isolated from the wider international system, and 
separating their internal and external aspects is not straightforward when internal actors seek 
external sponsors and when external actors are constrained by the necessity of using and 
accommodating to local agents. 
The primary challenge posed by Africa’s conflicts lies in their internally driven 
character. As mentioned earlier, inter-state conflicts are also quite common in the region. Fights 
over border boundaries have resulted in large scale armed conflict. For example, border 
                                                          
18 Some inter-state conflicts arise as a result of arguments over land especially land with natural resources. 
19 Internal conflict may also be seen as one in which armed violence occurs primarily within the borders of a 
single states (David, 1997). 
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disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia - a relatively simple border conflict - have been 
transformed into a wider regional conflict involving Kenya, Somalia and Libya, and have taken 
on many of the characteristics of internal conflicts. Africa’s internal conflicts pose particular 
conflict management challenges, not least because they tend to be more intense and intractable 
than inter-state ones. Empirical studies demonstrate that they tend to be more severe and costly 
in terms of loss of lives and refugees than inter-state conflicts (Jackson, 1998). For example, 
since 1960, a full third of Africa’s conflicts are mainly internal ones (Jackson, 2000). In the 
same period, 10 major conflicts alone claimed the lives of between 3.8 and 6.8 million people 
(Van Tongeren, 1999), and, in total, an estimated 8 million Africans have lost their lives as a 
direct result of war - 5 and a half million of whom were civilians (DFID, 2000).  
With respect to health, Alderman, et al. (2009), in analysing data for Zimbabwe, find 
that greater exposure to civil war has a negative effect on child height. Bundervoet et al. (2009), 
focusing on Burundi, find that an additional month of war decreased children’s height for age 
z-scores by 0.05 standard errors compared to non-affected children. Arcand and Wouabe 
(2009) find that conflict intensity worsened child health during and after the conflict in Angola. 
There is also micro evidence for the effects of conflict on education. Akresh and de Walque 
(2008) show that the armed conflict in Rwanda had a negative effect on schooling outcomes, 
with exposed children completing half a year less. De Walque (2004) discusses how civil 
conflict in Cambodia had a lasting impact on educational attainment, mostly because of the 
collapse of the education system. These results indicate that conflict can have profound 
negative effects on human capital, thereby sustaining poverty and slowing down economic 
recovery. 
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Table 2.1 Notable Sub-Saharan African Conflicts 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict Name Dates Estimated Fatalities Intervening Parties 
Congo conflict 1960—1965  110 000 UN Force, USA,  
Soviet Union, Belgium  
African territories - 
Portugal 
1961—1975  
 
100 000+  
 
South Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, 
Zaire  
Eritrea—Ethiopia 1965—1993 450 000—1 
Million 
Soviet Union, Italy,  
China, Libya, Sudan,  
Somalia  
Nigeria—Biafra  
 
1967—1970 1 million+ Britain, France,  
Soviet Union  
Angolan conflict 1975—2002 300 000— 500 000 Soviet Union, Cuba, South 
Africa, USA, Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
 
 
Mozambique conflict 1976—1992 450 000 —1 
Million 
Soviet Union, Zimbabwe,  
Tanzania, Malawi,  
France, Britain, South  
Africa  
Ugandan Civil War 1981—1986 100 000—500 000 Sudan, Britain, 
Tanzania, North 
Korea, Libya 
Second Sudan Civil 
War 
1983—2005 500 000 —1.9 
Million 
USA, Libya, China, 
Iraq, Iran, Uganda 
Somalia Civil War 1988— 1990 300 000—400 000 USA, Libya, Ethiopia, 
UN Force 
Burundi ethnic  
conflict  
1988—1993 250 000+ Rwanda, Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Liberian Civil War 1989—1997 200 000+ Libya, Ivory Coast, 
Burkina Faso, 
ECOWAS Force, 
Sierra Leone 
Rwanda Civil War 1990—1993 800 000+ France, Zaire, 
Uganda, Burundi 
Sierra Leone Civil  
War  
1991— 2002 100 000 + Liberia, mercenaries, 
Britain, ECOWAS 
Force, UN 
Democratic Republic  
of Congo Civil War  
1996—2003 1 million + Rwanda, Burundi, 
Uganda, Angola, 
Zimbabwe 
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Table 2.1 Contd. Notable Sub-Saharan African Conflicts, 1960-present 
Notes: Adapted from Jackson (2000) and extended from 2000 to 2018 by using Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED Database)  
 
 
2.4.1 Types of Conflicts 
There is no single correct interpretation of the different types of conflict in Africa or anywhere 
else in the world. Each conflict has its own unique set of circumstances and causes. However, 
there are different trends and patterns of conflict in different regions and historical eras. The 
challenge for government is to understand the conflicts and put measures in place to prevent 
these conflicts. In SSA, there are different types of conflict, but three distinct categories are 
most evident in the region. They are:  
(a) Factional wars  
Factional wars are fluid by nature. There is rarely a defined front line and fighting is frequently 
opportunistic rather than strategic. Warfare is low tech and small arms are the main weapons. 
Such wars are not costly and can easily be sustained without external support. Frequently, these 
conflicts move rapidly from the original cause to revolve around the exploitation of 
commercial, mineral and natural resources. Factions will seek to involve, exploit and control a 
significant proportion of the civilian population in order to sustain the conflict. Countries 
Nigeria – Boko Haram 2010 - present 5000+ Cameroun, British 
Forces 
DR Congo (Zaire) 2013 - 2017 999+ none 
Burundi 2003 - 2015* 25-999  
South Sudan 2013 - present   
Northern Mali conflict 2012 - 2017 5000+  
Nigeria – Conflict in 
Niger Delta 
2016 - 2017 2300+  
Islamist Insurgency in 
Mozambique 
2015 - 2018   
Boko Haram in 
Cameroun 
2017 - present 3000+  
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currently affected by factional warfare are Somalia, Liberia (internally), Uganda (internally) 
Namibia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan and potentially Cote D’Ivoire. 
(b) Genocide and ethnic based conflict 
Ray (2011) postulates what is known as the fractionalisation index. This index is used as an 
independent variable in several empirical studies on conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004). But the empirical connection 
between fractionalisation and conflict is missing or at best weak. Another approach of 
examining fractionalisation is pursued by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) who conduct 
the first empirical study relating conflict to ethnic polarisation, drawing on the earlier 
theoretical work of Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999). Their contribution is important because it 
provides econometric support for the proposition that deep cleavages along large group lines 
might affect conflict. However, Esteban et al. (2012) investigate the complex relationship 
between ethnic divisions and conflict and what the notion of ‘division’ entails. They argue that 
ethnic divisions’ conflict typically happens as a result of individuals or groups wanting either 
a public good - which is ideological or religious supremacy - or political power or private good, 
such as oil resources or mining revenues.   
The last decade has seen the re-emergence of genocide and ethnically based conflict. 
Centrally directed and involving the poisonous use of propaganda, these conflicts spread like 
wildfire and leave a huge death toll, massive displacement, fear and confusion. Ethnic and 
genocidal fighting tends to be extremely low tech using knives, machetes and occasionally 
small arms. A distinguishing characteristic is the speed with which genocidal attacks take place 
and the high degree of central organisation and planning involved. The eastern region in 
Nigeria recently experienced a low-grade genocide where herdsmen killed and massacred a 
significant amount of local residents who were mostly Christian farmers over grazing rights. 
Burundi is also at immediate risk of genocide. The potential similarly exists in the Democratic 
36 
 
 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in the Kivu region. A number of other countries, most notably Cote 
d’Ivoire are experiencing outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence (DFID, 2001). 
(c) Regional conflict 
African countries are plagued with regional conflicts, where the onset of a conflict on one 
region leads to conflict in another region (Annan, 2014). Arrous and Feldman (2013) find that 
civil conflict onsets are more likely in regions with the following traits: low levels of absolute 
welfare in terms of education; strong relative deprivation with regard to household assets; 
strong intraregional inequalities; and combined presence of natural resources and relative asset 
scarcity. The consecutive conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo may be seen as having certain continuity. When a particular 
conflict appears to be settling down, another one begins feeding the incessant flows of refugees, 
displaced persons, and even combatants moving from one war to another.  
Throughout the 1990s, Guinea - a neighbouring country to Liberia - received a record 
inflow of refugees. With nearly a half million Liberians and Sierra Leoneans counted by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guinea has topped the ranks of African host 
countries since 1999.  However, Guinean authorities have long had very little control over their 
own territory. Their failings were especially obvious in the forested areas of the country, the 
site of many refugee camps. The Guinean government proved unable to prevent the 
militarisation of these camps, from which Liberian and Sierra Leonean combatants increased 
the raids against troops loyal to Charles Taylor, who had managed to take power in Monrovia 
in the meantime.20 The Taylor administration ordered its own forces to strike back in Guinea, 
forcing several hundred thousand Guineans to flee their villages. These Guineans, “displaced” 
in their own country, had initially not had much to do with power struggles in neighbouring 
                                                          
20 Charles Taylor was a former Liberian President. He served from August 1997 to August 2003. He was accused 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
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states. The opposing forces in these conflicts were encouraged to be self-sustaining through the 
exploitation of natural resources. Similarly, the war in the DRC involved the armed forces of 
eight countries, and the DRC sought to take the war back into Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. 
The Sudan conflict has retained its strong regional dimension.  
 
2.4.2 Causes of Conflicts 
(a) Weak states and state collapse 
The weakening and collapse of state institutions has caused internal and regional conflicts. 
Collapse of a state arises out of a long and degenerative process; it is usually not a sudden 
occurrence. Unable or unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain popular support, 
governments begin to operate through coercion, corruption, and the cult of the “strong” leader 
to secure political power and control of economic resources (DFID, 2001). In spite of the 
obvious deficiencies of such governments, the principle of state sovereignty usually allows 
them to maintain the authority as the head of state – and thus international recognition - and all 
other benefits attached to the position. The degenerative process of the state can also deteriorate 
the security sector and the judicial system.  
The state finds itself unable to provide basic social services or security to its people. 
The erosion of infrastructure completes the breakup of the state. This is usually accompanied 
by a violent competition for power between different groups and factions, who sometimes 
identify themselves in ethnic terms. One faction may predominate over time but this does not 
necessarily result in the resolution of the conflict; rather, it may lead to a failed state. When 
this happens, state building will be a complex task. The process of holding elections can easily 
become a vehicle not for democratisation, but for the consolidation of personal and abusive 
rule, as happened in Charles Taylor’s Liberia. Migdal (1988) emphasise that one of the major 
difficulties of developing countries is that the states are often too weak and lack the capacity 
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to raise revenue and govern effectively. State capacity building and weak institutions are major 
concepts in the development policies of a number of African countries. The ability to raise 
enough taxes to build infrastructures, protect property rights, and increase private income is 
still a major issue in the region. Also, the high rate of corruption, the inability to enforce legal 
proceedings, and the mismanagement of taxes raised by government officials plagues quite a 
number of the countries in the region (Meredith, 2005). International data suggests that the 
ability to raise revenue from advanced tax systems is strongly positively related to the ability 
to support markets as well as to the level of economic development (Besley and Persson, 2009). 
Contemporary studies of African politics, however, attribute the weak states to changes 
in political rules introduced into Africa as the trailing edge of a global third wave of 
democratisation (Bratton and Van deWalle, 1997; Ndegwa, 2001). They conclude that the 
dynamics of confrontation and bargaining among various political actors has led to the opening 
of different paralysed regimes in the 1990s. African states are plagued with different regime 
types, from virtual democracy (Diamond, 1987) to semi democratic regimes (Gyimah-Boadi, 
2004) to semi-authoritarian regimes (Ottaway, 2003). In recent years, a number of African 
governments have moved forward with new-style programs to build public sector capacity. 
These programs are characterised with reforms in the public sector, such as efficient and 
effective management systems, enforcing law and order, combatting corruption in the society 
and large investments in the national army (Levy and Kpundeh, 2004). 
In addition, societies with weak government institutions and few checks and balances 
are likely to be more prone to armed conflict. Democratic governments are expected to be more 
able to mitigate conflicts than any other regime type. The reasons could be: first, in democratic 
political systems, citizens are informed by independent mass media about the state of their 
environment and economy, as well as by government policies, thus subjecting their 
government’s actions to close scrutiny; second, they also have the opportunity to express freely 
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their opinions (Payne, 1995); third, through electoral mechanisms opposition parties are free 
to seek redress to their grievances21 and express their preferences without state repression. A 
working electoral system also provides political leaders with incentives to satisfy their citizen’s 
demands if they wish to retain power. Arguably, if democratic political leaders are responsive 
to a larger winning coalition and lack sufficient resources to reward their comparatively large 
group of supporters with private goods, then they have to resort to the provision of public goods 
– including economic prosperity – to ensure continued political support and, thus, their survival 
in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).22 
(b) Economic decline and economic shock 
Many African countries have undergone a process of steep economic decline over the past three 
decades (Ndulu, et al., 2007). This is partly as a result of conflict itself, coupled with corruption 
and bad economic management. The region’s economic decline is also a consequence of large 
national debt and unfavourable terms of trade with the rest of the world. As a result of the 
economic decline, governments find themselves unable to provide jobs, better wages and 
improved public services. This may lead to young men becoming disillusioned, frustrated and 
marginalised consequently leading to armed conflicts and looting of natural resources to make 
financial gains.  Negative shocks to the economy can take various forms, ranging from natural 
disasters to shifts in terms of trade and commodity prices. The Ethiopian famine of 1974 was 
the main factor in the overthrow of Haile Selasse’s government and the violence that ensued. 
Famine can cause mass displacement, increasing pressure on scarce resources.23  
                                                          
21 Reynal-Querol (2002) argues that what matters for conflict is not necessarily the degree of democracy but rather 
the type of democracy. She shows that proportional representation systems have a lower probability of 
experiencing a civil war than majoritarian ones because such systems are likely to be more inclusive and hence 
curb grievances. 
22 There are numerous studies, (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; 
Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002) on the relationship between political institutions and intrastate conflict with the 
majority focusing on the effects on democracy on civil conflict onset.  
23 Haile Selassie was crowned emperor in 1930 but exiled during World War II after leading the resistance to the 
Italian invasion. He was reinstated in 1941 and sought to modernize the country over the next few decades through 
social, economic and educational reforms. He ruled until 1974, when famine, unemployment and political 
opposition forced him out of office. 
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(c) Presence and Discovery of Natural Resource 
Africa accommodates two types of resource-based conflict: wars of resource scarcity and wars 
of abundance (Le Billion, 2000). The most common conflicts of scarcity relate to the control 
of land and water rights. In both cases, the crucial element is how competing interests for those 
resources are managed. Countries whose economies are dependent on natural resources - such 
as oil and minerals - face a higher risk of conflict. In these wars of abundance, groups compete 
for control of these resources, which become the “prize” for controlling the state and can lead 
to coups, as in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Unfair exploitation and poor management of 
resource-rich regions can also lead to secession. The role of the private sector is critical in wars 
of abundance, as belligerents rely on its capacity to exploit and commercialise the resources.  
(d) Resource Scarcity 
Homer-Dixon (1994) distinguishes between three kinds of resource scarcity that can increase 
the risk of violent conflict: 
Environmental change, which refers to a human-induced decline in the quantity or quality of 
a renewable resource that occurs faster than it is renewed by natural processes;  
Population growth, which reduces a resource per-capita availability by dividing it among 
more people; and unequal resource distributions, which concentrates resources in the hands 
of a few people and subjects the rest to greater scarcity. This often results when property 
rights that govern resource distribution change as a result of large-scale development projects 
or new technologies that alter the relative values of resources.  
A number of countries in the region have relatively high natural resource endowments. 
However, these high natural resources may increase loot-seeking (rent) activities and perhaps 
explain the high corruption in the region. This further exacerbates conflict due to ethnic 
diversity; and, as Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue dependence on natural resources strongly 
increases the risk of civil war in Africa (Lewis, 2007). There are the resource-rich countries 
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(e.g. Nigeria, South Africa) and resource-poor ones (e.g. Somalia, Mali). Oil exporting 
countries include Angola, Chad, Congo Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Ghana, Sudan and Nigeria. These countries have different legal origins based on their colonial 
history, with French and English being the common legal origins. Arguably, these legal origins 
have impact on the effectiveness of the government (Besley and Persson, 2009). Likewise, the 
countries are in different stages of development; most of them are low income, a few are 
medium-income, while none are in the high-income group (World Bank, 2007).  Table A.1 in 
Appendix A provides a short analysis of the structure of SSA economies.  
Abundance of natural resources is seen as an important factor in the incidence of civil 
conflict (Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 
2005). Empirical studies also conclude that a country’s wealth gained from excessive natural 
resource leads to slow-growth, rent-seeking, corruption and rebel looting, all of which can 
generate or prolong civil war. This development is what is also partly known as ‘‘resource 
curse.’’ For example, diamonds are often seen as a major source of rebel financing in conflicts 
such as those in Sierra Leone and Angola.24 Oil wealth has also been associated with civil 
conflict onset, either through the effect of weakening state apparatuses or by raising the prize 
for state capture (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  
According to Le Billon (2001), resource dependence is also associated with greater 
socioeconomic inequalities. A relevant question would be whether regional welfare 
inequalities follow the same pattern as the distribution of natural resources in a country, that 
is, whether people in resource-rich regions enjoy more social welfare than people in resource-
poor regions, this is often not the case. For instance, the oil-rich Niger Delta in Nigeria is one 
                                                          
24 Angola is the third largest producer of diamonds in Africa while Sierra Leone produces a large amount as 
well. 
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of the poorest, least developed and least reciprocated regions for its contributions to national 
wealth (Ikelegbe, 2001).  
The majority of regions in SSA provide examples that regional inequality can be a 
strong motivation for rebellion when a region is a source of natural resource wealth but receives 
little of the bounty. In Chad, the resource-rich southern regions have called for greater 
autonomy as they demand to receive more of the revenues from the oil discoveries in their part 
of the country.  The oil has been seen to fuel southerners’ ambitions for a federalist state, if not 
for outright separation (Humphreys, 2005). Another example is the conflict between the 
Senegalese government and the Movement des Forces De´mocratiques de Casamance 
(MFDC). The Casamance region is endowed with more natural resources than the rest of the 
country. The Dioula people believe that they do not benefit from the richness of the region 
because they feel discriminated against with regard to education policies and land allocation 
decisions (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005; Minority Rights Group International 1997).  
(e) Religion and the politics of religious conflicts 
Religious intolerance has been identified as a major source of violence in societies, existing as 
long as the history of mankind and permeating all forms of human civilisations (Gofwen, 
2004). Religion could serve, and has indeed served, as an instrument of social harmony in many 
civilisations. Paradoxically, however, it has also served as a motivation for violence, hence its 
indication in some literature as a ‘double-edged sword’ (Maregere, 2011; Obasi, 2009). 
Research into the link between religion and conflict has been growing in academic literature. 
It is often depicted as a trigger factor in many other forms of conflict.  
Theoretically, religious factors have been linked to conflict. First, from a socio‐
psychological point of view, diverse religious identities - similar to ethnic and other social 
identities - form a group identity and can result in escalating inter‐group dynamics. Research 
demonstrates that people often privilege in‐group members over outgroup members (Stewart, 
43 
 
 
2009). As a result, violent escalation becomes more probable. Second, religious identities are 
special; they are connected to particular religious ideas. Such religious ideas are shared values 
and norms legitimised by a sublime source, and therefore it might be argued that they are hardly 
subject to negotiation and compromise given their accepted supernatural origin (Horowitz, 
2009; Svensson and Harding, 2011). This can also entail a higher propensity for violent 
behaviour by religious actors; non‐believers and adherents to different religious traditions 
might be converted by force, and heretics may have to be punished.  
Third, religion – or more precisely, religious factors – might be understood as a possible 
mobilisation resource for and in conflicts. This idea is by no means incompatible with the 
former two ideas, but this theoretical branch stresses the role of leaders in the organisation of 
collective action (De Juan, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2000). In order to mobilize followers, 
leaders can choose from different identities, such as religious, ethnic or other social identities. 
Sometimes, religion may be the most rational choice for them. Basedau et al. (2011) establish 
link between religion and conflict using the mobilisation hypothesis.  They argue that religious 
structures such as overlapping ethnic and religious identities are prone to mobilisation; once 
politicised and escalation to violent conflict becomes probable.  
Due to religion being at the heart of a community’s value system in most parts of the 
world, people who practice a different religion can be easily labelled as worthless (Goldstein, 
1994). A threat to one’s beliefs is also a threat to one’s very being and that may be the reason 
why some people are willing to fight for their religious beliefs. Religious beliefs and extremism 
of these beliefs has led to destruction of nations as well as intra-state conflicts. An example of 
this is Syria. Most religious groups teach that war is wrong, and some religions teach that 
violence should be used as a last result while others believe violence of any form is wrong. The 
question that stems from these urgings is thus: are religious differences a cause for conflicts or 
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merely a character of the conflict? Or is religion an instrument used to mobilise the population 
for conflict?  
Tuscany (2004) suggest that religious factors enhance the difficulty in managing 
conflicts; this worsens the violence against the civilian population - leading to more intense 
conflicts - and decrease the chance that these types of conflicts might be peacefully settled 
through negotiated agreements. Overall, religious factors tend to play a more descriptive role 
in explaining the escalation and termination (or lack thereof) of armed conflicts than in 
explaining why they start. Sells (2003) distinguishes between ‘religion identity’ (religion as a 
cultural phenomenon) and ‘religious identity’ (religion as an ideological phenomenon). 
Religious influence can help mobilise nonviolent movements for democracy and regime 
change (Nepstad, 2011). In general, earlier quantitative research on religion and conflict has 
been somewhat skewed toward studying religion as a factor leading to conflicts, but not 
examining cases where religion might not be a factor in the conflict but plays an important role 
in peace building, though some work on this has emerged in recent years (Powers, 2010).  
Religious conflicts are based on the assumption that at least one side has raised explicit 
demands from the onset of the conflict relating to religious issues. Conflicts over the role of 
religion in society or the state are likely to emerge between different religions, especially if the 
religions in question claim to possess universal validity. Furthermore, militants might be 
motivated by specific religious rewards to be gained from participating in acts of violence. In 
fact, some studies have found positive evidence that conflicts fought along religious lines may 
be more intense and endure longer than other conflicts that are not fought along such 
parameters.  
(f) The politics of religious conflicts 
Religion may also be understood as a possible mobilisation resource for and within conflicts. 
This theoretical strand stresses the role of leaders in the organisation of collective action. In 
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order to mobilize followers, leaders can choose from different possible identities; under 
specific conditions, religion may be the most rational choice for them to make. The 
politicisation of religion might increase the risk of a violent escalation of a conflict taking place, 
even if the conflict is actually principally rooted in political or socioeconomic problems 
(Hasenclever and De Juan, 2007). Basedeau et al. (2013), show that religious overtones in 
armed conflict do not necessarily depend on religious politicisation. Ultimately, it is the elites 
themselves who have to convince believers that they should engage in a particular type of 
behaviour. These recent academic approaches emphasize the importance of looking not only 
at interfaith relations but also at the relationship between the religious groups (and their leaders) 
and the conflict parties. Basedau et al. (2011) find that inter-religious armed conflict is 
particularly likely when religious and ethnic identity boundaries run parallel to each other; 
religious polarisation is dangerous when combined with pre-existing social tensions and 
perceived discrimination against a particular group or groups. 
(g) Ethnicity and Inequality 
Esteban and Ray (2011), present a link between conflict and measures of dispersion such as 
income inequality and ethnicity. The model allows for conflict over private goods and public 
goods. The authors result is that the equilibrium level of conflict can be described by a weighted 
average of a particular inequality measure (the Gini coefficient), and the fractionalisation index 
should be closely related to conflict. The authors develop a theoretical view of conflict across 
groups with different levels of cohesion, allowing for such “public” and “private” prices as 
well as different mixes of those prices. They show that equilibrium intensity of conflict is 
linearly related to three measures of distribution only; polarisation (P), fractionalisation (F), 
and a Greenberg-Gini index of ethnic difference (G). The weight of each index in explaining 
conflict and its intensity depends on the particular nature of each conflict. The appropriate 
choice of division depends on the nature of the conflict—whether it is over public or private 
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goods - and the extent of cohesion within the groups that are engaged in conflict. The results 
obtained shows that ethnic polarisation will influence conflict if the prize is public and group 
cohesion is high, and ethnic fractionalisation will influence conflict if the prize is private (and 
group cohesion, once again, is high).  
Finally, the Greenberg-Gini difference index becomes relatively important in 
explaining conflict if group cohesion is low. The weights in the linear combination match up 
to the relative importance of public and private goods in the conflict prize. Specifically, the 
impact of polarisation increases with conflict over public goods, while the impact of 
fractionalisation increases with the private component of conflict. The Esteban-Ray framework 
also tells us that the importance of the three indices depends on the extent of within-group 
cohesion present in intergroup conflict. In particular, when there is no cohesion at all, the well-
known free-rider problem dominates, and all conflict vanishes when the population is large. 
The authors’ fractionalisation index is mostly used as an independent variable in several 
empirical studies on conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel et al., 2004), but the empirical 
connection between fractionalisation and conflict is missing or at best weak.  
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) pursue another approach of examining 
fractionalisation conducting the first empirical study relating conflict to ethnic polarisation, 
drawing on the earlier theoretical work of Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999). Their contribution is 
important because it provides econometric support for the proposition that deep cleavages 
along large group lines might affect conflict. Østby, et al., (2009) also present hypotheses on 
socioeconomic welfare link to conflict. The authors uncover that absolute deprivation in terms 
of education leads to enhanced conflict risk in a region. 
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(h) Polarisation and Fractionalisation  
These two terms are used to determine the incidence of conflict. Some scholars have used this 
measure to determine how intense or low a conflict can be within groups and between groups 
of people. Esteban and Ray (2008) explain the two measures in theory.  
Fractionalisation 
A fractionalisation index F (mostly used in research papers) is intended to capture the degree 
to which a society is split into distinct groups. The measure has been widely used in studies 
that attempt to link ethnic diversity to conflict, public goods provision, or growth (Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003).  Let 𝑛𝑖 be the share of the population belonging to group i, i = 1,…,G. The 
fractionalisation index is defined as the probability that two randomly chosen individuals 
belong to different groups. The probability that an individual of group i is chosen is 𝑛𝑖. Hence, 
if that probability is matched with someone from another group, the probability then becomes 
𝑛𝑖(1 − 𝑛𝑖). It follows that the probability that any two individuals belong to different groups 
is:  
𝐹 = Σ 𝑛𝑖(1 − 𝑛𝑖) = 1 − Σ 𝑛𝑖
2    (2.5) 
F is a strictly concave function of each population share. From this firm concavity we can 
derive the following properties of F:  
(a) any transfer of population from a group to a smaller one increases F;  
(b) for a given number of groups, G, F is maximised at the constant population distribution 
over these groups; 
(c) over the set of constant distributions F increases with the number of groups; and  
(d) the split of any group with population n into two new groups with n’ and n”, n’ + n” = n, 
increases F. 
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Polarisation 
Polarisation is conceptualised in Esteban and Ray (1994) as the sum of interpersonal 
“antagonisms.” Antagonism results from the interplay of the sense of group identification 
(group size) and the sense of alienation with respect to members of other groups (inter-group 
distance, bij) Esteban and Ray’s (1994) polarisation measure P can be written as  
𝑃(𝜎, 𝑏) =  Σ𝑖∑𝑗≠1 𝑛𝑖
1+𝜎𝑛𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑗                (2.6) 
where b is the matrix of inter-group distances and σ is a positive parameter that captures the 
extent of group identification. The authors derive restrictions on σ that bound it both above and 
below (Duclos et al., 2004). A situation of particular relevance that could occur is when 
individuals in each group feel equally alien towards all groups other than their own. 
Properties of polarisation include: 
(a) a transfer of population from a group to a smaller one increases P if both groups are 
larger than 1/3. If the two groups are smaller than 1/3 the equalisation of populations 
will bring P down; 
(b)  for any given number of groups, P is maximized when the population is concentrated 
on two equally sized groups only;  
(c)  over the set of uniform distributions P decreases with the number of groups, provided 
that there are at least two groups to begin with; and 
(d) the split of a group with population n into two groups with n’ and n”, n’ + n” = n, 
increases P if and only if n ≥ 2/3. The distinction between the two sets of properties 
clearly shows that the two measures behave quite differently from each other, except 
when there are just two groups. The difference is that fractionalisation is maximal when 
each individual is different from the rest, while polarisation is maximal when there are 
only two types of individual. 
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(h) Climate-related Conflicts 
Despite growing research effort, the relationship between climate change and conflict remain 
uncertain. Nel and Righarts (2008) and Besley and Persson (2011) suggest that climate 
disasters increase the risk of armed conflict. Slettebak (2012), on the other hand, finds that if 
anything, climate-related disasters seem to reduce the risk of armed conflict onset. Notably, all 
three studies are susceptible to unobserved country heterogeneity in the sense that the 
distribution of natural disasters across countries probably is non-random. The use of fixed 
effects transformation may be used to solve this econometrics challenge as proposed by 
Bergholt (2012).  
Arguably, most existing studies linking the two variables focus on the role of 
precipitation in explaining conflict incidence, finding past conflict in Africa more likely in drier 
years (Miguel et al., 2004). Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) using - SCAD data - examined the 
effect of deviations from normal rainfall patterns on civil conflict as well as civil unrest for the 
past twenty years. They find that wetter and drier than normal conditions are associated with 
both civil conflicts and civil unrest.25  Zhang et al. (2001) suggest that climate change affects 
conflict through its effects on agricultural productivity. Theisen et al. (2012), using various 
drought measures, do not find any effect of drought on civil conflict in Africa during the 1960 
- 2004 period. Hendrix and Glaser (2007) examine the impact of short-term climate change 
(inter-annual variability in rainfall) on the onset of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. They 
find that positive changes in rainfall significantly decrease the risk of conflict in the following 
year. Arguably, armed conflict is more likely to occur in states where existing institutions and 
mechanisms for conflict resolution cannot provide people with the assurance that climate-
induced economic problems will be resolved without recourse to violence (Koubi et al., 2012). 
                                                          
25 A new dataset, the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), provides highly useful information on low 
levels of violence in African countries (e.g. demonstrations and riots) in recent years 
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Formal institutions that help enforce commitments inter-temporally can ease commitment 
problems in situations in which each individual or group’s effort to increase its own well-being 
reduces the well-being of others (Powell, 2006). 
Most African countries remain highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture for both 
employment and economic production, with agricultural products accounting for more than 
50% of the GDP and up to 90% of employment across much of the continent (World Bank 
Report, 2009).  Thus research interest on the role of precipitation is interesting, but is 
inconclusive on changes in conflict risk, as climate models disagree on both the sign and 
magnitude of future precipitation change over most of the African continent (Christensen et 
al., 2007). This uncertainty confuses efforts aimed at building a more comprehensive 
understanding of the human costs of climate change and planning appropriate policy responses. 
 
2.4.3 Internal and External Conflicts 
Internal conflicts are defined as conflicts that occur within the state, either between two 
opposition groups or between the government and an opposition group. A conflict is considered 
active and included in the data when there are at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year. 
Conflicts are also categorised based on their intensity level. Conflicts with 25 battle-related 
deaths - but less than 1000 - are minor conflicts, while those with at least 1000 battle-related 
deaths are categorised as wars (UCDP, conflict data). Conflicts with a minimum of 1000 battle 
deaths in a single year have afflicted a third of all nations; this internal conflict is also persistent 
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010). The proportion of countries involved in civil conflict at a single 
point in time increased steadily through the last half of the twentieth century, peaking in the 
1990s at over 20%.  
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The international community can also get involved by supporting one of the parties 
engaging in conflict, either by providing training or aid or sending peacekeeping forces to the 
area (Jackson, 2002).  Internal conflict can also be a direct result of political instability, lack of 
infrastructures, and consequences of a weak or failed state. Often times, these conflicts can be 
the result of a deliberate creation of war economies, which is beneficial for both local and 
external actors. Ethnic intolerance - as mentioned in Section 2.4.2 - could also result in internal 
conflicts. A prominent article by Easterly and Levine (1997) argues that ethnic heterogeneity 
in African states can explain much of the underdevelopment and instability in the region. Ethnic 
heterogeneity is also said to be one of the causes of poor government policies, which in turn 
leads to a negative development and lack of structural policies like education and infrastructure. 
A higher degree of ethnic polarisation would mean implementing growth-reducing policies and 
increase in political instability, while a higher degree of ethnic diversity leads to the adoption 
of different public policies leading to more policy outcomes if compared to a society with more 
ethnic homogeneity (Easterly and Levine, 1997).  
These intolerances in the society could range from religious differences to language 
and social identity. Aleyomi (2012) states the different types of ethno-religious conflicts in 
Nigeria, the most recent being Boko-Haram insurgencies. The large-scale bomb attacks by the 
movement appear to be escalating. The different ethnic groups in the northern region are often 
used in the political game and are played up against each other to create conflict and more 
power in the hands of the southern power elite (Lindberg, 2013).  
South Africa also suffers from ethnic conflicts that are deeply rooted in inequality and 
uneven development in the country. This has caused ethnic groups (Xhosas, Zulus and even 
Afrikaners) to mobilise to compete for resources along ethnic lines. It therefore suggests that 
multi-ethnic countries are likely to experience distributional conflicts. Niger, Sudan, and Chad 
(among a host of other countries) have also experienced civil wars fought predominantly along 
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ethnic and or racial divisions (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Furthermore, Cote d’Ivoire - the one-time 
economic power house and beacon of stability in West Africa - experienced civil conflict that 
was deeply rooted in ethnic-religious divisions and identity. Aggravated by politics of 
exclusion, the country erupted into a full-blown civil war in 2002 (Annan, 2014). Following 
the explosion of the civil conflict into a violent war, several peace initiatives were adopted, but 
failed to resolve the conflict until the successful signing of a peace accord five years later.  
It is important to note that there may be other underlying root causes to these conflicts. 
Ethnicity and religion are more apparent than the other factors such as land ownership, 
territorial rule, natural resources, politics and inequality. Globalisation is another factor that 
can help explain the many internal conflicts. Different opposition groups and organisations are 
involved in Africa today with economic interests in the area and in profiting from the wars, 
uncertainty, and desperation. These factors may contribute to the grievances or greed which 
leads to conflicts.  
Cardenas et al. (2010) define external conflicts as conflicts between two or more states. 
These conflicts sometimes occur as a result of spill-over effect from another state or disputes 
between two or more states. Occasionally, conflict spill-over results in major disputes between 
two or more states and it become more difficult to manage or resolve. Murdoch and Sandler 
(2002) took the important step of recognising the likely importance of spill-over effects on 
neighbouring countries, considering directly contiguous countries (e.g. those sharing a border). 
Using a basic Solow growth model and adding domestic and adjacent conflicts, they found that 
for a sample of 84 countries during the period 1960 - 1990, civil wars had a significant negative 
influence on the steady-state level of GDP per capita for both the conflict-afflicted country and 
its neighbours. Moreover, while part of the negative civil war effect works on growth through 
the classical channels of capital and labour, the largest effect was found to come through the 
unobserved, country-specific channel. Dunne and Tian (2015) - analysing a panel data of 26 
53 
 
 
African countries for the period 1960 - 2010 - find that there is a negative effect of conflict on 
neighbouring countries as well as host countries on the economy. Using weighted matrices for 
the conflict variable - based on distance measures and distinctive primary and secondary 
neighbours - they find that secondary neighbours are not affected by conflicts. In literature, 
external conflicts are closely linked to external wars.  
Cardenas et al. (2010) find that external wars constituted about 2% of their observations 
for external conflicts while intermediate and minor conflicts were about 1% for each 
observation. Besley and Persson (2008) suggest that external wars may induce a common 
interest across different groups in the society, while internal conflicts or civil wars 
fundamentally reflect conflicting interests. These two forms of conflict may therefore have 
opposite effects on the incentive to build state capacity.  On the basis of these assumptions, we 
ask how these two types of conflict impact on the state capacity in the second empirical chapter.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Perhaps the most important finding of the literature on the economics of conflict is that per 
capita income (proxy for economic growth) is systematically and negatively correlated with 
civil war, whether one studies “incidence” or “onset.” This is a result that recurs in the 
literature, especially in large-scale cross-country studies of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 
2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003a; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Nonetheless, even this seemingly 
robust finding is fraught with difficulties of interpretation. The conclusion of most studies is 
based on cross-country studies. Ray and Esteban (2017) argue that overall growth is made up 
of two kinds of changes: one that creates a larger pot to fight over - therefore increasing conflict 
- and another that raises the opportunity cost to fighting - therefore decreasing conflict. Whether 
54 
 
 
conflict is positively or negatively related to growth will therefore depend on the type of growth 
- specifically, how uneven it is across sectors or groups.  
With regards to state capacity and conflict, the theoretical implication is that a proper 
examination of the role of greed in the onset of civil war needs to explicitly account for the 
impact of state capacity. Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) extend the lootable resource theory by 
looking at the capacity of the state to extract revenue and maintain future tax revenues. 
Researchers often contrast grievance explanations of conflict onset with those that emphasise 
greed. While Collier and Hoeffler (2000) discount the effect of grievances because they are 
more susceptible to collective action problems, the quantitative research into conflict onset has 
found support for grievance-generated civil wars. Hegre et al. (2001) found that the form of 
government significantly affected the risk of conflict.  
While the recent quantitative literature examining the impact of conflicts can be 
grouped into greed versus grievance, another angle of conceptualisation would be to divide the  
arguments of conflict onset into willingness versus opportunity (Most and Starr, 1989), or 
opportunities and motives (Taylor, 2003). Regardless of how one categorises the literature, 
there has been a noticeable emphasis on the rebels – their motivations, capacities, or physical 
environments. In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, it is assumed that conflicts arise 
as a result of one or more of the arguments above. Conflicts in this region could be because of 
greed, grievance, poverty, inequality, natural resources, land acquisition, and opportunity cost 
to take up arms among other root causes.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Effects of Economic Growth on Conflict: An Empirical Analysis 
on Nigeria 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years the phenomenon of conflicts and economics has gained increasing attention 
from academics and policy-makers alike. This concern is understandable, since conflict is one 
of the major causes of economic downturn; between 1960 and 1995, nearly 18.5 million people 
were estimated to have died from internal conflicts, with over 80% occurring in low-income 
countries, while half of these took place in Africa (Stewart et al., 2001). Conflicts constitute 
one of the greatest challenges currently facing the West African sub-region (Annan, 2014); 
issues of identity, resource allocation, power struggle, governance, and state sovereignty - 
sometimes combined with the personality question - have all combined to cause staggering loss 
of life, destruction of property, and environmental degradation (Bakwesegha, 1997).  Conflicts’ 
being unfavourable to development is one of the major findings in the empirical literature, 
although the reverse may well be the case. This has triggered a growing body of research that 
highlights the association between economic growth and conflict.   
Bolhken and Sergenti (2010) suggest that the effect of economic growth on conflict can 
be determined by three plausible mechanisms. For the purpose of this study, the third 
mechanism is used as main focal point.26 Sambanis (2001) surveys the literature on economic 
studies of civil wars and conflicts, showing that there is a consensus of a robust empirical 
relationship between poverty, slow growth, and increased likelihood of conflicts and 
prevalence.  However, the existing literature does not adequately address the possible 
                                                          
26 The third mechanism posits that growth can reduce the number of conflicts if the opportunity cost of engaging 
in a conflict is lower during slow growth. Such periods may be associated with fewer job opportunities, low wages 
while the benefits of looting or participating in a conflict may appear more attractive.  
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endogeneity of these economic variables to conflict, and thus does not convincingly establish 
a causal relationship (Miguel et. al, 2004).  
Only a handful of studies examine economic growth and conflicts in Nigeria. Iyoboyi 
(2014) finds that there is a long-run equilibrium between conflict, inflation, poverty, 
unemployment and economic growth. Specifically, they found a positive and significant 
relationship between economic growth and conflict at the national level. The empirical results 
also show a direct relationship between conflict and other macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation, poverty, unemployment and real gross domestic product (GDP). The author employs 
the dynamic OLS methodology without exploring the potential endogeneity issues associated 
with economic growth. This study contributes to existing literature by investigating the 
possibility of endogeneity and heteroscedasticity when analysing conflict and economic 
growth. This would be analysed by using IV, GMM and PVAR estimation method.  
Consequently, this chapter investigates the causal effect of economic growth and 
conflict using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) database, 
Canback database, and the World Development Indicators (WDI). In doing so, the following 
contributions are added to the literature:  1). addressing the possible endogeneity in order to 
establish the causality between these two variables; and 2). the conflict is measured at the state 
level and not national in contrast to the extant literature, particularly Iyoboyi (2014).  To 
address the possible effect of growth being endogenous in the model, yearly rainfall data is 
used as an instrumental variable for GDP growth to estimate the impact of economic growth 
on conflict. Rainfall is a plausible instrument for GDP growth in economies that largely rely 
on rain-fed agriculture. The instrumental variable method suggests there may exist a causal 
relationship between economic growth and conflict, rather than a correlation. As such, this 
study relates to the approach taken by Bohlken and Sergenti (2010), who also employ an 
instrumental variable estimation method in the context of country-specific empirical growth 
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research. Furthermore, this study further contributes to the literature by using the PVAR in 
analysing the relationship between economic growth and conflict. Also, the total number of 
conflicts in each state in Nigeria at a given year is being measured, which is different from 
Bohlken and Sergenti, (2010); the authors only considered the ethnic violence between Hindus 
and Muslims in India.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: following the introduction, section 3.2 
reviews the theoretical and empirical literature; section 3.3 describes the methodology, data 
specification and estimation procedures; empirical results are presented and discussed in 
section 3.4; section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2 Brief Review of Relevant Literature  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) suggest that slow economic 
growth and low-income levels are important in predicting which countries will experience a 
conflict; for example, armed civil conflict is more likely to occur in poor countries than in 
rich27. This can be the result of frustration and grievances, ease of recruiting rebels when even 
modest compensations to the rebel and his/her family exceed their present income, or a lack of 
military and state capabilities to prevent and suppress armed conflicts.  The political and social 
unrest that often precedes the onset of armed conflict often erodes economic institutions, 
causing economic havoc and making it more difficult to maintain peace.  
A few contemporary growth studies have taken a keen interest in conflicts in Sub-
Saharan Africa. For example, Merrouche (2008) argues that demining programs in 
Mozambique has generated positive economic effects. Another line of argument in the 
literature stresses the importance of neighbourhood effects in Africa (Brock and Durlauf, 
                                                          
27 Armed civil conflict is regarded as violent conflict. 
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2003). Research on the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on conflicts in Africa has also shed light 
on the mechanisms underlying the incidence. Paul Collier in his book The Bottom Billion, 
writes about the conflict trap, where past conflicts increase the probability of future ones. In 
such environments, negative association between conflict and growth would be an ongoing 
relationship.  
Combining rich household data with unique data on violence in Rwanda, Serneels and 
Verpoorten (2012) find that households and localities that experience more intensive conflict 
lag behind in terms of consumption and growth, relative to those that experienced less intensive 
conflict. Their study suggests that lower economic performance in some areas causes the onset 
of conflict. Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) find that economic growth reduces the incidence of 
conflict. They examine 15 states in India, with particular reference to the Hindu-Muslim 
community; they find economic growth has a negative and significant effect on ethnic riots. 
They postulate three possible mechanisms through which growth can affect the incidence of 
riots. All three mechanisms suggest the need for increased growth in the reducing the 
occurrence of riots. They also addressed the endogeneity problem associated with economic 
growth with Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation, using percentage change in rainfall as an 
instrument for growth. The results of the IV estimation are similar to the non-IV estimations, 
and the authors conclude that the negative effect of economic growth on conflict is not due to 
reverse causality or omitted variable bias.  
Iyoboyi (2014) examines the impact of economic growth on conflicts in Nigeria. Using 
annual data for the period 1981 - 2011 and employing the dynamic OLS methodology, the 
author finds evidence of a direct relationship between Nigeria’s economic growth and conflict. 
The author argues that the results are not surprising; given the mono-cultural tendency of the 
country in terms of crude oil production from which the country gets a bulk of its revenue, this 
revenue has had a short-lived impact on many conflicts that has occurred in the country. He 
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argues that violent conflicts in the country are partly due to the drive for control of the nation’s 
wealth. Controlling for other macroeconomic variables, the author finds that poverty, 
unemployment and inflation are significant variables influencing the nature and dynamics of 
conflict in the country. The study, however, does not address potential endogeneity with the 
growth variable. Theoretically, it is assumed that growth variables suffer from endogeneity 
issues in which causality may be reverse or bi-directional. The author, however, acknowledge 
the need for the relationship between economic growth and conflict studies at the state level.  
Estimating the effect of economic growth on the likelihood of civil conflict is difficult 
because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. It is probable that our key explanatory 
variables - Growth and Lagged Growth - are endogenous. Conflict can cause damage to 
physical properties, thus lowering economic growth. Therefore, endogeneity could result from 
the fact that changes in economic growth in a state may be a result - rather than a cause - of 
ethnic or religious violence. The expectation of conflicts could deter investments, thereby 
leading to lower growth. Changes in economic growth could also be correlated with other 
omitted variables such as weak rule of law, political competitiveness, and income inequality to 
mention a few, which could not be included in our data due to lack of availability of this data 
at the state level. Not addressing the potential of reverse causality and omitted variables into 
account could induce bias in our estimate of the effect of economic growth on conflict. 
Overcoming the endogeneity problem, Miguel et al. (2004) include the use of 
instrumental variables: rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa as an instrument for GDP per capita 
growth. They find that a 1%-point decrease in rainfall raises the likelihood of a country 
experiencing conflict incidence by about 2% points and conflict onset by 3%-points. Given that 
rainfall causes exogenous economic growth shocks, the 2SLS instrumental variable approach 
indicates not only how growth correlates with conflict, but also justifies the causal assertion. 
They also argue that weather shocks, or abrupt declines in rainfall per capita, provide plausible 
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instruments for economic growth in economies that depend primarily on rain-fed agriculture, 
as is the case in most of SSA. Their empirical study suggests a robust negative relationship 
between economic growth, instrumented by rainfall and conflict incidence in SSA. However, 
despite the pioneering instrument for economic growth, the paper used coding for conflict by 
including states that participate in civil wars in other countries.  This measure might give 
misleading estimates of the effect of growth on conflict. Jensen and Gleditsch (2009) argue 
that including external participation can give misleading estimates of the impact of growth 
shocks on conflict, seeing as droughts tend to jointly affect neighbouring countries and 
countries primarily intervene in neighbouring civil conflicts; common geographical clustering 
in rainfall and war participation may overstate the causal effect. They re-analyse Miguel, et 
al.’s (2004) proposed model using conflict data restricted to location and the results show a 
smaller impact and much less robust evidence for a negative impact of growth on the incidence 
of civil conflict.  
Bernauer et al. (2012) on the other hand, use deviation in temperature and rainfall (from 
long-run averages) as instruments for economic growth in a global dataset for the period 1980 
- 2004. They find no significant link between climate variability, economic growth, and the 
risk of conflict onset. Their conclusion remains robust for a subsample including only African 
countries, which contradicts the results of Miguel, et al. (2004). The article by Miguel et al. 
(2004) is further challenged by Ciccone (2011), who argues that a misspecification of rainfall 
measures may explain the observed negative relation between rainfall and conflict. Some 
studies focus solely on the reduced-form relation between climate and the risk of conflict. For 
example, Burke et al. (2009) - using panel data on African countries between 1981 and 2002 
by means of fixed-effects and transformed models - find that a one degree Celsius increase in 
temperature increases the risk of armed civil conflict by as much as 4.5 percentage points within 
the same year. However, Buhaug (2010) compares different data and model specifications and 
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concludes that climate variability in terms of temperature is a poor predictor of armed civil 
conflict. This implies a very real endogeneity problem, because the low-income growth may 
be as much a result of an approaching armed conflict as of a conflict itself.  
 
3.2.1 Research Question and Hypothesis 
Previous studies on the economic causes of conflict have suggested that economic growth could 
have a beneficial effect (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 
2004; and Olzak, 1992), an adverse effect (Ake, 1974; Harms and Zink, 2005; Huntington, 
1968; Olzak, 1992), or no effect at all (Horowitz, 2001) on violence. As earlier stated, one of 
the mechanisms through which economic growth could influence the occurrence of conflicts is 
that the opportunity cost of engaging in a conflict may be lower during periods of slower 
growth. Such periods may be characterised with fewer job opportunities, lower wages and/or 
lower profits for an ordinary citizen. In terms of foregone wages, therefore, the costs of 
participating in a conflict may also be lower, while the benefits from looting and/or monetary 
compensation for participating may appear more attractive (Cameron and Parikh, 2000; 
DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998). Consequently, the hypothesis below is developed: 
H1: lower rates of economic growth should lead to increase in the onset of conflicts. 
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3.3 Empirical Methodology 
3.3.1 The Model 
The starting point of our empirical analysis is based on the linear equation employed in Bohlken 
and Sergenti (2010):   
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3.1) 
 
 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the measure of conflict, α is constant term,  𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the GDP per capita for each state 
(i) at time (t); 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is represented by control variables while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the unobservable error term 
which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the other regressors. The basis for using a linear 
model is to investigate the direct relationship between economic growth and conflict. The 
coefficient of interest is 𝛽0, which captures the effects of GDP growth on conflict. Previous 
macro-level studies on the economic impacts of conflict have in large part relied on pooled 
OLS estimation (Bozzoli et al., 2008). In this setting, however, the underlying assumption of 
independent and identically distributed errors   is likely to be violated. When factors that 
affect a society’s economic outcomes and its vulnerability to conflict at the same time are 
omitted, OLS estimates are inconsistent. Cultural attitudes, for instance, are hard to measure, 
but potentially drive both growth and conflicts. Given the panel structure of the data, one way 
to deal with such unobserved heterogeneity is the introduction of state fixed effects (FE) to 
control for those state characteristics that do not change. 
 
3.3.1.1 Estimation Strategy 
It is relatively plausible that the key explanatory variables - current and lagged growth - are 
endogenous. Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) find that conflict reduces economic growth in 
both low-level and high-level income countries. Consequently, endogeneity could result from 
the fact that changes in economic growth in a state may be a result - rather than a cause - of 
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violence. Also, the expectation of violence could deter investment, thereby leading to lower 
growth. These results imply that investment decisions are frequently made on the basis of 
expectations of conflict.  
 
Negative Binomial Model: As the dependent variable is an integer count with high variance 
and a high number of zeros, the regression analysis starts off with negative binomial model. A 
log-linear model is presented, which is a good approximation to the negative binomial model. 
However, with negative binomial model, the assumption is that the number of conflicts is a 
function of the exponential of the beta coefficients multiplied by the 
covariates 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ~ exp (𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽); with the log linear model, the assumption is that the log of the 
number of conflicts multiplied by the covariates, log𝑦𝑖𝑡 ~𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽.  
 
Fixed Effects (FE) Estimation: There is the assumption that there will be unobserved cross-
sectional heterogeneity across states; to control for this possibility, state fixed effects are added 
to the base specification using the log-linear model and estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Fixed effects and state effects have been added to impose time-independent effects for 
each state that is possibly correlated with the regressors and for variables that are time-
invariant, so as to capture the characteristics of these variables to the specific state. This 
specification allows for examining the determinants of the intertemporal variation in the 
occurrence of conflicts. This is significant because while bivariate plots of the variation of 
growth and conflict may show that there is a relationship, this might be different when 
examining as a cross-section. Fixed effects have also been included to examine the concerns 
related to nationwide shocks, like the ethno-religious conflict in Jos in 2009 - which killed 
several Christians and destroyed lots of houses and schools - and the Kaduna riots in 2000. 
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Hausman test is carried out to determine the appropriate estimation method between the fixed 
and random effects.   
 
Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation: Conflicts can cause major damage to physical 
property and loss of lives, thereby lowering economic growth. The aftermath of violence or 
expectations of violence may discourage investments and investors, leading to lower growth. 
Another reason for controlling for endogeneity is that changes in economic growth in a state 
may also be correlated with other omitted variables, such as weak community ties, lack of 
strong rule of law, or weak government, among many others. It is therefore necessary to 
account for potential reverse causality and omitted variables to avoid bias in our estimation of 
economic growth on conflicts. The dependent variable is modified by taking the log of the 
original values as follows: Log (0.1 + number of conflicts). 0.1 is added to avoid taking the log 
of 0, which is undefined, while rainfall is used as an instrument for growth.  
 
Panel Vector Autoregression: Time-series vector autoregression (VAR) models originated in 
the macro econometrics literature as an alternative to multivariate simultaneous equation 
models (Sims, 1980). With the introduction of VAR in panel data settings (Holtz-Eakin, Newey 
and Rosen, 1988), VAR models have been used in multiple applications across different fields. 
All variables in a VAR system are usually treated as endogenous, although identifying 
restrictions based on theoretical models or on statistical procedures may be imposed to separate 
the impact of exogenous shocks onto the system.  
In VAR models, all variables are treated as endogenous and interdependent, both in a 
dynamic and in a static sense, although in some relevant cases, exogenous variables could be 
included (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998). A panel-data is used as another estimator for the analyses. 
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This method is used to test the robustness of the finding. A first order VAR model is specified 
as follows:  
ttciitit edfzz   ,110     (3.2) 
where itz is either a three-variable vector (conflict, GDP, and conflict in adjacent states) or a 
four-variable vector (conflict, GDP, conflicts in adjacent states, and literacy rate). The 
dependent variable is conflict, while growth is the key explanatory variable. Literacy rate and 
conflict in adjacent states capture the effects these variables have on conflict if there is a shock 
to these variables. It is assumed that literacy rate can be endogenous and therefore added to the 
model with four-variables. The literacy rate in a country can affect the GDP and conflict levels 
in the economy.  
In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, there is a need to impose the restriction 
that the underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this constraint is 
likely to be violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction on parameters is to allow 
for ‘individual heterogeneity’ in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed effects, denoted 
by if  in the model. The model above also allows for state-specific time dummies; tsd , .  
 
3.3.2 Variable definition and Sources 
This study uses a panel dataset for 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in Nigeria 
from the period 1997 - 2013. The sample period of some control variables has been restricted 
to availability of data; country fixed effects are included in some specifications to capture time-
invariant country-characteristics that may be related to conflict and growth. 
Dependent Variable 
Number of conflicts: 
The dependent variable is the number of conflicts occurring in a particular state in a given year. 
The variable - number of conflicts - is calculated by the number of religiously and ethnic 
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motivated conflicts that occur in each state in a given year. Conflict data is sourced from 
ACLED database. The database consists of armed conflict for different countries from 1946 - 
present. The dataset codes locations, dates, and additional characteristics of individuals, battle 
events in states affected with wars, protests, or violent riots. The dataset also records one-sided 
violence on civilians by both government or rebel actors and conflicts between rebel groups.  
Conflict events are typically categorized into six major events - they are: 
a) Riots/Protest;  
b) Violence against civilians; 
c) Non-violent transfer of territory; 
d) Remote violence;  
e) Violent interaction between military and rebel groups;  
f) Non-violent activity by a conflict actor, this includes rallies, peace talks and peaceful 
protests. 
The sixth category above was not used in the analysis due to its non-violent nature. 
Boko-Haram inspired conflicts have also been excluded from the sample for this chapter due 
to the large outlier.28  
 
Independent Variables 
Growth: 
The independent variable of interest is Economic Growth; this is the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita in a state. GDP data is from www.canback.com  and is in constant 2005 
prices.29  
 
                                                          
28 Boko-Haram insurgencies have been taken out in order to study this in a different paper 
29 Canback Global Income Distribution Database (C-GIDD) is a database with comprehensive and detailed GDP 
and household income data for all countries in the world. The data is available both at the national and sub-national 
level.  
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Rainfall:  
To account for the possibility of endogeneity, rainfall is used as an instrumental (IV) variable. 
The expectation of violence could deter investment, thereby leading to lower growth. Not 
taking the potential reverse causality issue could induce bias in the estimation of the effect of 
economic growth on conflict.   
In the regression analysis, rainfall enters as a percentage change in rainfall as an 
instrument for growth and lagged percentage change in rainfall as an instrument for lagged 
growth.  Miguel et al. (2004) reports that relative change in rainfall was a robust predictor of 
growth only for Sub-Saharan Africa, however, across Indian states, Bohlken and Sergenti 
(2010) find that it is the relative change in rainfall that is a predictor for growth. Data from 
rainfall took a lot of time to gather as Nigeria is a country with inadequate database. The rainfall 
data is extracted from KNMI climate report.30 The data was downloaded by inputting the 
latitudes and longitudes of each Nigerian state to generate average daily rainfall in millimetres. 
This is then multiplied by the number of days in each year in the sample and for each state to 
get the yearly rainfall data for all states in Nigeria.  
 
Control Variables 
Log of GDP per capita: The level of wealth in a state could influence not just the democratic 
stability - the occurrence of social unrest (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) - but also could affect the 
occurrence of ethnic conflicts (Harms and Zink, 2005). To control for this possibility, the 
variable GDP per capita is measured; this is the log of GDP per capita in a state at the 
beginning of the sample period. This variable also serves as a measure of the state capacity, 
which could influence growth rates and the occurrence of violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
                                                          
30 KNMI climate change atlas is a website where climate data can be extracted by inputting longitude and 
latitude of a specific location (https://climexp.knmi.nl/) 
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This is also to control for the possibility that violence between groups is less likely in states 
with higher levels of socio-economic well-being.  Bohlken and Seregenti (2010) find that their 
variable for level of wealth is not significant at the OLS estimation method, whereas growth 
has a negative effect on the occurrence of conflict.  
 
Literacy rate: Literacy has been identified as an important instrument through which any 
country can attain development (Ladan et al., 2013).  It is on this belief that government and 
people of Nigeria have taken the issue of how to increase literacy rates among children and 
adults as an important one.  To account for the possibility that violence between groups is less 
likely in state where the majority of its citizens are literate or educated to the university level, 
included in the estimation are the level of literacy in a state using the percent literate rate in 
each state. Literacy data, which measures the percent of literate adults31 and tertiary enrolment 
- comes from the 1991 and 2006 Census of Nigeria and is time-invariant.  
 
Population: The state’s population size is controlled for by including the variable Log 
(population). This accounts for the possibility that more populous states may be more likely to 
experience conflicts. Population data is sourced from the National Population Commission and 
from Canback Database for the 36 states in Nigeria, including the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT).  
 
Number of conflicts (lagged): Next, in order to capture the time dependence in the occurrence 
of conflicts, a lagged dependent variable – is taken into account. This variable is included 
mainly for technical reasons; it is likely to remove serial correlation in our residuals, which 
allows us to satisfy the conditional independence assumptions required for our estimation 
                                                          
31 Literate adults are defined as citizens 15 years and above who can read and write  
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procedures. However, this variable could have a substantive interpretation as well. Conflicts 
may also follow previous conflicts, as each one strengthens existing fears and hatreds and 
creates new desires for revenge, leading to a vicious cycle of continual rioting (Posen, 1993). 
The limitation, however, is that the level of aggregation at which this variable is measured may 
not be appropriate for testing this hypothesis unless the conflicts tend to occur in the same 
towns within a state. 
 
Number of conflicts in adjacent states: Following Bohlken and Sergenti (2010), the number 
of conflicts in adjacent states is included in the estimation to control for spatial dependence in 
the form of conflict spill-overs. This accounts for the total number conflicts in adjacent states 
during the same year.  
 
3.3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for all the variables that are employed in the analysis. 
The mean number of conflicts is 1.81 per state-year, with a standard deviation of roughly 5. As 
is the case with other datasets of violent events, our sample consists of many state-year 
observations where no events occurred. Regarding growth, from Table 3.1, we see that the 
mean growth rate is 0.038 with a standard deviation of 0.045 and growth rates range from 6% 
to 22%. 
Table 3.2 presents the cross-sectional variation of conflicts and growth by state. The 
state with the highest mean number of conflicts is Lagos, with 11.529, and the states with the 
fewest are Kebbi and Gombe, with 0.118. With respect to growth rates, Ogun state had the 
highest rate of growth at 6.15% and Jigawa had the lowest at 0.74%. Lagos state has the highest 
mean number of conflicts with a relatively low average growth rate. On the other hand, Ogun 
is a state with a high average growth rate and relatively low mean number of conflicts. It 
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appears that for a given state, years characterised by higher growth rates relative to the average 
growth rate for that state, are characterised by fewer conflicts than years with relatively lower 
rates of growth. 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics (1997 - 2013)  
Variable 
Number of 
Observations     Mean Std. Dev.        Min           Max 
Panel A: Conflicts     
Number of conflicts 629 1.812 4.345 0    53 
Lagged Number of 
conflicts 628 1.81 4.359 0    53 
Log(0.1+  number of 
conflicts) 629 -0.860 1.716     -2.303       3.972 
Lagged (Log(0.1+ number 
of conflicts) 628 -0.863 1.715     -2.303       3.972 
Number of conflicts in 
adjacent states 612 6.570 11.040 0      104 
Panel B: Growth     
Growth 592 3.814 4.475   -6.381        22.232 
Lagged Growth 591 3.814 4.475    -6.381        22.232 
Growth (log) 628  -0.00072 0.268    -2.375     0.876 
Lagged Growth,(log) 627 -0.00076 0.268    -2.375      0.876 
Log (population) 629 15.06026  0.429     13.424      16.276 
Panel C: Control Variables     
Percent Literate 629 61.183    19.667   16.82       95 
GDP per capita, 1997 629 22.076   0.698   20.896      24.159 
Panel D: Rainfall     
Rainfall 628 -0.00197      0.242 -1.03834 1.7072 
Lagged Rainfall 627 -0.00153     0.242 -1.03834 1.7072 
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Table 3.2 Average number of conflicts and economic growth for all states in Nigeria 
(1997 - 2013).  
State Years 
Average 
number of 
conflicts 
Annual 
average 
growth (%) 
Abia 17       0.471 4.79 
Adamawa 17       0.765 2.09 
Akwa Ibom 17       1.000 4.79 
Anambra 17       2.824 3.44 
Bauchi 17       0.941 2.77 
Bayelsa 17 2.000 3.44 
Benue 17 1.176 3.44 
Borno 17 0.412 3.78 
Cross River 17 0.765 5.47 
Delta 17 4.706 4.46 
Ebonyi 17 0.353 4.12 
Edo 17 2.706 4.79 
Ekiti 17 1.294 2.77 
Enugu 17 1.588 4.12 
Federal Capital Territory 17 6.412 4.12 
Gombe 17 0.118 2.77 
Imo 17 1.765 4.79 
Jigawa 17 0.353 0.74 
Kaduna 17 3.353 4.79 
Kano 17 2.118 4.12 
Katsina 17 0.471 3.44 
Kebbi 17 0.118 2.77 
Kogi 17 0.706 1.42 
Kwara 17 0.941 2.09 
Lagos 17 11.529 2.09 
Nasarrawa 17 0.941 3.1 
Niger 17 0.588 2.77 
Ogun 17 2.059 6.15 
Ondo 17 1.588 3.44 
Osun 17 1.941 4.79 
Oyo 17 2.765 5.47 
Plateau 17 2.941 3.1 
Rivers 17 3.647 4.46 
Sokoto 17 0.412 3.44 
Taraba 17 0.824 3.44 
Yobe 17 0.235 2.09 
Zamfara 17 0.235 3.44 
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3.4 Results and Discussion 
Results from the base specification are presented in Table 3.3. In the first column, all control 
variables are included in the estimation to capture the overall effect of the variables on conflict 
and economic growth. The coefficient estimate on growth is negative, -0.028, and not 
statistically significant. However, with the inclusion of state effects, the growth variable 
becomes statistically significant at 90% interval. On the contrary, adding the year fixed effects, 
there is a positive and significant effect of growth on number of conflicts. This suggests that, 
the estimations without year effects suffer from aggregated trend bias, but it is found that the 
sign changes to negative with lagged growth variables. It therefore shows that there is a time 
effect in growth reducing the incidence of conflicts in SSA.  
All the control variables are significant. The lagged number of conflicts is positive and 
statistically significant at 99% confidence interval. Number of conflicts in adjacent states is 
also positive and significant. Hence, we find qualified support for both of the arguments that 
previous violence begets current violence and that violence may diffuse across state borders 
through contagion effects. These results also indicate that conflicts are more likely when groups 
are more evenly matched. With regard to the level of economic development, GDP per capita 
is significant at conventional levels and reduces the incidence of conflict. It can therefore be 
argued that growth appears to have a negative effect on the occurrence of conflicts. To control 
for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity across states, state fixed effects are added to the 
base specification. This specification takes into account the determinants of the intertemporal 
variation in the occurrence of conflicts. This is important because while bivariate plots of the 
variation of growth and conflicts over time in a state generally show a clear relationship 
between the two variables, this relationship is not observed in the cross-section analysis. 
Instead, the results are driven by the strong association between growth and conflicts that is 
observed within a state over time. In addition, the explanatory variables that are time-invariant 
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– percent literate and GDP per capita, 1997 – must be dropped. The results are presented in 
Table 3.3, Column 2. The coefficient estimate on Growth is significant at the 99% level and in 
the expected direction. Likewise, the estimate is not too far off to the estimate for the base 
specification. This indicates that much of the effect of growth can be attributed to its impact on 
the intertemporal variation in conflicts.  
 
Table 3.3 Economic growth and Conflicts 
                                Dependent Variable: Number of Conflicts 
Explanatory Variable 
Base  
(1) 
With state fixed effects 
(2) 
With state & year 
fixed effects  
(3) 
Growth 
-0.028  
(0.021) 
-0.029*  
 (0.016) 
0.321** 
(0.138) 
 
Lagged Growth 
 
0.006  
(0.022) 
 
-0.008  
(0.015) 
 
-0.269*** 
 (0.061) 
 
Lagged Number of conflicts 
 
0.148***   
(0.027) 
 0.039** 
 (0.017) 
-0.016  
 (0.021) 
 
Number of conflicts in 
adjacent state 
0.038*** 
(0.010) 
  0.029*** 
  (0.008) 
 0.014** 
(0.006) 
 
Percent Literate 
 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
  
Log (population) 
0.625*** 
(0.159) 
 4.511***  
 (1.326) 
0.182 
(0.459) 
 
GDP per capita, 1997 
 
-0.240** 
(0.117) 
  
State fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No  No Yes 
Log Likelihood -850.9 -782.04 -627.39 
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are clustered by state in parentheses. Effects are significantly 
different from zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
 
Regarding the control variables, the variables lagged number of conflicts and number of 
conflicts in adjacent states remains positive and significant. Including state fixed effects, the 
value of the variables - except for log (population) - does not change much and the direction of 
each variable stays the same.  Finally, to address concerns related to nationwide shocks, year 
fixed effects are added to the specification. As can be seen from Table 3.3, Column 3; the effect 
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of Growth changes substantially from the first two regression results. The coefficient enters 
with a positive sign.  This suggests that the national shocks predict a higher level of conflict 
occurrence, with the coefficient estimate being statistically significant at 95% interval. The 
positive coefficient could also be as a result of potential endogeneity when state and year effects 
are included in the specification.  The log of population remains positive, but insignificant, 
with the addition of year fixed effects. Collier (2006) argues that diversity can make a society 
safer because rebellion becomes more difficult. The coming together of any organisation is 
regarded as the formation of a little army, which faces problems of organisation cohesion and 
motivation. For any group to fight effectively, individuals must overcome their individual 
instincts to avoid danger and must take risks to help other members of the team. Nigeria as a 
country has diverse ethnicity. This could be advantageous in line with Collier’s (2006) 
statement above. 
 
 
3.4.1 Endogeneity Concerns 
 
It is possible that our key explanatory variables – growth and lagged growth - are endogenous. 
First, conflicts can cause significant damage to physical property and thus lower economic 
growth. According to Newsom (2011), property damage to communities in the Niger-Delta 
area as a result of multiple conflicts has led to lower economic stability and growth in the 
region. Also, the expectation of violence could deter investment, thereby leading to lower 
growth. These results imply that investment decisions are frequently made on the basis of 
expectations of conflict. Furthermore, changes in economic growth in a state may be correlated 
with other omitted variables - such as weak civic associations and rule of law which could not 
be included in the analysis due to lack of data. Not taking the potential of reverse causality and 
omitted variables into account could also induce bias estimates of the effect of economic 
growth on conflicts. In order to deal with these potential problems, the specifications are 
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estimated using instrumental variables (IV). Given that the properties of IV estimation are best 
understood with a linear model, the dependent variable is altered by taking the log of the 
original values as follows: log (0.1 + number of conflicts).32 This log-linear model serves as a 
good approximation to the negative binomial model. Table 3.4, Columns 1 and 2, shows the 
results for the base specification and for the specification with state and year fixed effects using 
the log-linear model, estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS).  
The coefficient estimates for growth in both specifications are significantly different to 
the ones estimated with the negative binomial model, -.028 to -.501 and -.029 to -.250. These 
results explain that the log-linear model does provide a good linear approximation to the 
negative binomial model for our specifications. These estimations provide a better linear 
approximation for the IV specification.  Percentage change in rainfall is our instrument for 
growth and the lagged percentage change in rainfall, for lagged growth.33 The rest of the control 
variables are instruments for themselves.  
In Table 3.4, Columns 3 and 4, presents the results of IV estimation of the log-linear 
model for both specifications. The results are almost identical to those from the OLS estimation 
of each specification. Except for lagged (number of conflicts), the coefficient estimate goes 
from -.023 to .80 significant at 90% confidence interval. With the random-effects estimator, 
we find coefficient estimates for growth similar to the OLS estimation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 The addition of 0.1 is needed to avoid taking the log of 0, which is undefined. 
33 In Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004), the authors report that relative change in rainfall was a robust 
predictor of growth only for Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Table 3.4 Economic Growth and Conflicts 
                            Dependent Variable: Log (0.1+ Number of conflicts)  
Explanatory Variable 
OLS  
(1) 
OLS with state & 
year fixed effects  
(2) 
IV Base 
(3) 
IV with state 
& year fixed 
effects (4) 
Growth -0.501 -0.250**    -0.577* -0.019* 
 (1.105) (0.111) (0.303) (-0.01) 
Lagged Growth -0.691 0.203***   -0.078 -0.001 
 (1.105) (0.05) (0.094) (0.012) 
Lagged (Log (0.1 + Number 
of conflicts) 
0.285*** -0.023 0.107 0.080* 
 (0.058) (0.049) (0.117) (0.042) 
 
Number of conflicts in 
adjacent state 
0.039*** 0.035***   0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.01) (0.008) (0.007) 
Log (population) 0.518* 2.497***   1.216** 3.350*** 
 (0.281) (0.567) (0.48) (0.469) 
Percent Literate 0.006  0.033***  
 (0.004)  (0.011)  
GDP per capita, 1997 0.355**    
 (0.162)    
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are clustered by state in parentheses. Effects are significantly 
different from zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
 
3.4.2 Robustness Checks 
The study tests for the robustness of results in different ways; the sensitivity of the results to 
alternative estimation method is analysed. First, rainfall specification of absolute value is 
replaced with relative monthly changes. Results obtained are somewhat different from the 
results in Table 3.4. The growth variable is positive and insignificant but lagged growth is 
negative and significant, showing there is a time period delay of growth reducing the incidence 
of conflict using rainfall as an instrument.  The results in Table 3.5 also shows a significant 
difference in the size of the coefficients with and without year effects. Panel regressions which 
fail to control for year effects may pick up the influence of aggregate trends which have nothing 
to do with the causal relationships of the two variables. Year effects or year dummies capture 
the influence of aggregate (time‐series) trends. Specifically, panel regressions which fail to 
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control for year effects ‐ pick up the influence of aggregate trends which have nothing to do 
with causal relationships. In the Table 3.5, the first column does not include year effects and 
the estimate for growth is much lower than when year effects are included in the second 
column. This suggests that any omitted variable bias has been controlled for by adding year 
dummies therefore a considerably larger coefficient and significance in the estimates with year 
effects. 
 
3.4.2.1 Panel Vector Autoregressive Estimation (PVAR) 
To also control for endogeneity and further robustness checks in the specifications, we use the 
PVAR estimation to analyse the relationship between economic growth and conflict.  All 
variables in a VAR system are typically treated as endogenous, although identifying restrictions 
based on theoretical models or on statistical procedures may be imposed to disentangle the 
impact of exogenous shocks onto the system. PVAR analysis is based on choosing the optimal 
lag order in both panel VAR specification and moment condition. The estimates are fitted by 
using a multivariate panel regression of each dependent variable on lags of itself, lags of all 
other dependent variables and exogenous variables, if any. Using a PVAR model, allows 
analysing the extent to which changes in economic growth impact on the number of conflicts. 
In addition, it also allows accessing the spill-over effect of conflicts in neighbouring states. 
The estimation result is presented in Table 3.6. We find that lagged growth has a 
negative effect on conflict and significant at 99% interval. Lagged conflict also reduces growth 
at time t. The result shows a causal relationship between the two variables. Number of conflicts 
in adjacent states remains positive, but not statistically significant in the first column. The 
reverse relationship in column 3 shows a similar value with a significant effect. In other words, 
there is some spill-over effect on conflicts in neighbouring areas. Percent literate reduces the 
incidence of conflict. This follows the argument that the more people that are educated in a 
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country, the less there is the opportunity to carry arms or be involved in violence. This stems 
from the argument that educated citizens should be gainfully employed and also that the more 
people are educated, the higher the understanding of tolerance for other ethnicities and beliefs.  
 
Table 3.5 - Relative change in rainfall – Instrumental Variable 
  Dependent Variable: Log(0.1 + Number of conflicts) 
Explanatory Variable 
IV with state fixed 
effects 
IV with state & 
year fixed effects 
Growth 0.016 3.260* 
 (0.07) (1.846) 
Lagged growth -0.190*** -1.370** 
 (0.061) (0.662) 
Lagged (log (0.1 + Number 
of conflicts) 0.114* -0.066 
 (0.06) (0.082) 
Log (Population) 4.683*** 3.324 
 (0.663) (2.69) 
                
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes 
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are clustered by state in parentheses. Effects are significantly 
different from zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
 
Table 3.6 - PVAR Results– Economic growth and conflicts 
Dependent Variable/ Conflict Growth 
Conflict in 
adjacent states Literacy rate 
Explanatory Variable    
Lagged Conflict 0.308***   -0.004***   0.382**    -0.035 
 (0.111) (0.001) (0.165) (0.046) 
     
Lagged Growth -4.071***   0.146***   -15.065***   3.233*     
 (1.274) (0.034) (4.654) (1.743) 
     
Lagged Conflict in adjacent 
states 0.035 -0.002***   0.220*     -0.081***   
 (0.027) (0.001) (0.114) (0.029) 
     
     
Lagged Literacy rate -0.098**    0.001**    -0.633***   1.056***   
  (0.04) (0.001) (0.12) (0.07) 
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are clustered by state in parentheses. Effects are significantly 
different from zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Growth is measured in log for all estimations 
on this table. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This study finds support for evidence of economic growth proxy by change in GDP per capita 
reduces conflicts in Nigeria. The study investigates further by using rainfall as an instrument 
for economic growth to account for endogeneity in the growth variable.  We find that economic 
growth explains a large portion of the intertemporal variation in the occurrence of conflicts and 
that growth has a statistically significant and substantively negative effect on the incidence of 
conflicts. Our results are robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects. Moreover, using annual 
changes in rainfall as an instrument for economic growth, we are able to show that our results 
are not driven by reverse causality or omitted variables, such as weakened civic associations 
or institutional changes.  
Though there is clear evidence of a negative effect of economic growth on violence, the 
IV estimation also enters with a negative effect of economic growth on conflict, suggesting 
that rainfall shocks to economic growth reduces the incidence of conflict; there is no statistical 
support of higher levels of socio-economic well-being in the form of higher literacy rate 
reducing the occurrence of violence, except in the PVAR estimation where percentage of 
literates in each state reduces conflict. In addition to economic growth, our results demonstrate 
that past incidences of violence and conflicts in adjacent states are important factors in 
explaining the variation in conflicts in the country.  
Three mechanisms were posited through which economic growth can influence the 
occurrence of conflicts: by leading governing elites to distract attention from adverse 
conditions, thereby fuelling a riot; by intensifying economic competition between ethnic 
groups; or by reducing the opportunity cost to potential participants. For the purpose of this 
study, the last mechanism is the main focus. More systematic research needs to be conducted 
to investigate the other two mechanisms whether either of these mechanisms can explain the 
link between economic growth and violence in Nigeria. By establishing that economic growth 
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reduces the occurrence of conflict at the state-level in Nigeria, this chapter gives rise to new 
questions which offer promising avenues for further research. The first of these is the validity 
of rainfall as a good instrument for economic growth. However, Sarsons (2015) suggests that 
rainfall is a plausible instrument if the country or region in question is economically dependent 
on rain-fed agriculture, as low levels of rainfall would result in crop failure thereby depressing 
rural income.  
Further research could look at the ability of the judicial arm of the government in 
repressing violent conflicts – rule of law and political affiliations can be considered as 
mitigating factors in the incidence of conflict, as Nigeria is still plagued with sectoral 
distribution and religious affiliations to some political positions. The findings of this study have 
two main policy implications: first, the Nigerian government could identify more ways to grow 
the economy and equally distribute of the gains; second, policies to expand growth should be 
narrowed down to the agricultural and natural resources sector, favouring the rural areas so as 
to foster inclusion among the uneducated, as well as ethnic tolerance and cooperation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Effects of Conflict on State Capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Sub-Saharan African countries have experienced some major conflicts – for example, the Boko 
Haram conflict in northern Nigeria, the Somalia civil war, and the civil conflict in South Sudan 
– in the last two decades that have resulted in humanitarian disasters, destruction of 
infrastructure, and breakdown of political authority. These conflicts have been attributed to 
political and economic factors (Taydas and Peksen, 2012). It is argued that political views are 
factors that create grievances and injustice, including deprivation and inequality, which may 
provide aggrieved groups with the motivation to use violent means against the state (Gurr, 
1974; Regan and Norton, 2005). However, there is also the view that conflicts are not rooted 
in politics alone, but also in economic conditions such as poverty, inequality, and economic 
growth, to mention a few.  
Furthermore, another view is that involvement in rebellion depends on the change in 
the expected payoff from the insurgency; special attention is thereby devoted in the same 
studies to the factors that affect the possibility of these rebellions (Tilly, 1978; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; Regan and Norton, 2005).  Despite the lack of consensus among researchers as 
to the major causes of conflict and its impact on the economy of the state, there is widespread 
consensus in the literature on the importance of state capacity in combatting conflicts (Buhaug, 
2006; Benson and Kugler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Besley and Persson, 2010). 
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State capacity can be defined as the degree of control that state agents exercise over 
persons, activities and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction (Ottervik, 
2013). It is therefore critical for the performance of a political system. On the one hand, high 
capacity states are able to provide public goods such as human security, medical and health 
care, and the social and physical infrastructure that promote human development (Rotberg, 
2003). On the other hand, low capacity states are limited in their ability to provide these goods, 
leading to low social trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), low development levels, or even state 
failure (Skocpol, 1979). Likewise, for democracy to be consolidated and successful over time, 
a high capacity state is critical (Wang 2003; Fukuyama 2005; Carothers 2002). High capacity 
states are also typically characterised as states with a high share of taxes as a percentage of the 
GDP. The proceeds from these taxes are redistributed back to citizens or invested in public 
goods; the military strength of such states is also regarded as very high and there is a high 
degree of trust in politicians and in the functioning of political replacement mechanisms. This 
suggests that a country unable to provide basic economic functions or protect property rights 
may experience an increasing number of conflicts. However, conflicts can arise due to several 
other reasons which can then dampen state capacity in the country. 
The extant literature has considered the effect of state capacity on conflicts (Besley and 
Persson, 2009; Di Guiseppe et al., 2012; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Sobek, 2010). However, 
there are limited studies on the impact of conflict on state capacity. Countries with high levels 
state capacity were found to experience fewer conflicts. While the incidence of conflicts in 
SSA has declined gradually since the early 1990s, the severity of the conflicts is still debatable 
(Gelbard et al., 2015). The general trend is toward peace and improved security, but disruptive 
threats have emerged in recent years as violent groups; some external to the countries affected 
have threatened economic and political stability in a number of countries, most notably in Mali, 
Central African Republic, Nigeria, South Sudan, and, on a more limited scale, in Kenya and 
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Mozambique. These security threats and conflict spill-over are increasingly impacting 
neighbouring countries. Largely, conflict and state capacity in SSA can be classified mainly 
into two categories: the first, and probably extreme, case is where rulers and their rivals see 
great benefits in the creation and maintenance of ‘war economies’ (Jackson, 2002). Many of 
Africa’s conflicts are the direct result of deliberate and rationally-calculated strategies aimed 
at accumulating either power or wealth by the state and non-state elites. The second, and less 
extreme, category is that conflicts are sometimes as a result of risky strategies accepted by 
some African elites to hold on to power – predominantly in times of crisis – to establish 
supremacy or manage political demands. The indiscriminate use of state coercion on civilian 
populations, unleashing ethnic prejudice, or manipulating multiparty elections are all high-risk 
strategies that can lead directly to civil conflicts and war. There are other underlying factors – 
such as grievances, inequality, and greed – that may cause the onset of conflicts. These conflicts 
could disrupt state capacity building or minimise the extent to which the government invests 
in state capacity.   
The consensus in the existing literature is that high levels of state capacity should 
reduce the incidence of conflict. It is, however, plausible that conflict disrupts state capacity 
and reduces the ability of a state to carry out the basic economic functions. This chapter seeks 
to examine this possibility by analysing Sub-Saharan countries. If a government invests in state 
capacity, the likelihood that public goods are destroyed as a result of internal struggles reduces 
incentives to invest more in state capacity. Cárdenas et al. (2013) also show that a similar result 
holds even when the persistence of state capacity building is taken into account. Investments 
in state capacity require the society’s will to build a strong state, because tax revenue is 
necessary to invest in the state. Citizens are unlikely to support these efforts if they see the state 
as illegitimate, either because the state is unable to protect their property or personal security 
or because parts of the state have been captured by illegal forces. The ongoing interstate and 
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intrastate conflicts in SSA and the relatively-accurate measurement of conflict-related events 
offers an opportunity to investigate this unexplored dimension of the relationship between 
conflicts and state capacity in the region.  
Earlier studies examine the effect of state capacity on conflict and found that the 
number of conflicts reduces with high levels of state capacity (Besley and Persson, 2010; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Thies, 2010). A few other studies examine the effect of conflicts on 
state capacity, but – to the best of the researcher’s knowledge – there is no present study on 
how conflicts impact state capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Besley and Persson, 2008; Cardenas 
et al., 2016). This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature. The possibility of any 
significant difference between the effects of internal (civil conflict) and external (interstate) 
conflicts on state capacity is also examined. Understanding the dynamics of the relationship 
between these variables could help policy makers in formulating policies. The empirical results 
show that conflicts have a negative correlation with state capacity if tax revenue is used as a 
proxy for state capacity, but is positively correlated with military expenditure.   
It is possible that there are other indirect factors influencing the relationship between 
conflicts and state capacity – such as foreign aid, inequality, political stability, ethnic 
intolerance and freedom of speech – that could cause a positive or negative impact on state 
capacity. In dealing with conflicts and state capacity, the growth of the economy cannot be 
over emphasised. Theoretically, an economy with a relatively good growth should be able to 
invest more in state capacity and withstand the effects of conflict. However, it is possible for 
an economy to have increased growth and experience a lot more conflict, as the data suggests. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: recent empirical research on the area is discussed 
in section 4.2, as well the gap in literature, research questions and research hypotheses; section 
4.3 describes the data and methodology; empirical results are discussed in section 4.4; section 
4.5 concludes.   
85 
 
 
4.2 Review of Relevant Literature 
In the extant literature, the relationship between conflict and state capacity has been empirically 
analysed with other underlying factors such as wars, credit worthiness, liquidity, military 
spending, taxes, and welfare spending, to mention a few.  The government of a country can 
strengthen the capacity of the state by increasing taxation if there is a potential external threat 
or internal conflicts. State capacity is also strengthened when the government needs to expand 
the markets through property rights. Stubbs (1999) claims that war – or the threat of war – has 
been an important factor in shaping state institutions in the most successful economies of East 
Asia (namely, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and Singapore).  
State capacity in any country is generally affected by violent conflicts. This is as a result 
of destruction of infrastructure, political instability, and high levels of unemployment.  There 
is the possibility that public and private resources are used by incumbent and opposition 
government to maintain or gain control of the state. If this happens, the state is more likely to 
experience increased conflict.  Other root causes of conflict – such as ethnicity, economic 
growth, political institutions, natural resource rents and climate – are subject to large theoretical 
and empirical literature in economics and political science (Blattman and Miguel, 2009; 
Sambanis, 2002). The majority of countries in SSA have been analysed as having either ‘weak’, 
‘failing’ or ‘ineffective capacity’, that is, the countries lack the capacity to create environments 
in which security and markets can function (DiJohn, 2008). The emphasis on the limitation of 
states is somewhat explained by the political drivers of development, such as poverty reduction 
and strong political institution (Mkandawire, 2001; Olukoshi, 2007).  
The data sample used in this chapter is concentrated with states regarded as developing 
by the World Bank, while the methodology follows closely the model developed by Besley and 
Persson (2009). The model assumes an incumbent government in a given country invests in 
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fiscal state capacity to develop the economy and to strengthen the nation’s capacity to fight 
against external threats or external wars by investing in the military. Increasing the size and 
scope of the military is an expensive venture, both monetarily and politically. For a state to 
increase the size of its military, it must obtain new military hardware, increase the number of 
troops, and provide upkeep for both the weapons and personnel. Thus, the costs of increasing 
capacity are both immediate and, potentially, long-term. Strengthening the state’s military 
during peaceful periods will often be difficult and politically unpopular. Building a military 
during an insurgency is also not likely to be a feasible option. Hence, conflict disrupts economic 
growth, and the increased taxation that is necessary to fund the military may itself provoke 
more support for insurgency within the population. 
It is assumed that some form of protest occurs whenever there is a need for a change of 
government. This protest could be peacefully pursued – leading to peaceful transfer of power 
– or through a violent takeover.  If the incumbent government raises an army, this army is 
financed out of the public purse. The opposition can also raise an army which it uses to mount 
an insurgence to take over the government. The group in opposition is assumed to have means 
of taxing its own members (supporters of the opposition) in order to finance a private militia. 
Either the opposition wins and become the new incumbent or the incumbent wins and retains 
power; the probability of whichever group winning is dependent on the resources invested or 
devoted to the struggle for the power change. It is assumed that an opposition rules out the 
possibility of an undefended insurgency. While this is theoretically possible, such cases do not 
seem common in practice. For this assumption to hold, the incumbent uses the government 
budget to finance its army, while the opposition uses its private resources; the incumbent pays 
the real market wage to employ soldiers in its army. Therefore, the government may be more 
reluctant, all things being equal, to raise incomes by investing in legal capacity (or any other 
institutions to raise the wage). 
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If the incumbent government expects no opposition in the change of government, there 
is a higher likelihood of increased investment in fiscal and legal capacity. However, the 
probability that the incumbent stays in power is low and hence affects the political stability of 
the nation. This political instability influences the rate at which the government invests in state 
capacity. A government may, however, strive for investments in legal capacity to raise wages 
so as to generate peace. This is usually less common in weak states, because the government 
is not able to enforce the property and legal rights of its citizens. For a state that redistributes 
its resources, this may lead to competition for state control, as the new incumbent sees himself 
as a residual claimant on public resources. When this happens, conflict is more likely to occur, 
thereby impacting on the state capacity level of the country.   
It is also assumed that the current government chooses the level of investment in fiscal 
and legal capacity, given the political institutions in place and potential risk of conflict if there 
were to be a change of control.  In actual terms, fiscal capacity represents fiscal infrastructures 
such as a set of competent tax auditors, a good tax system; a strong institution necessary for 
collection of tax revenues at source or to impose value-added tax. A good tax system is 
expected to be fair and non-discriminatory. For a tax system to meet these requirements of 
fairness, it must be unbiased across economic activities; it must be visible for all citizens, that 
is, available for all to see that government revenue is being administered properly, especially 
in developing countries. A good tax system should also be easy for the government to 
administer and enforce and be inexpensive for taxpayers to comply with.  
The income received from taxes is expected to be spent on expanding provision of 
public goods for citizens. High fiscal capacity is also believed to be beneficial to a country by 
eliminating costlier forms of redistribution; large governments yield higher production and 
national income than smaller governments. The key point is that redistribution using taxation 
is generally less costly than redistribution through distorting the allocation of market-
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supporting policies. However, a government without sufficient fiscal capacity may choose legal 
protection in an inefficient method. Investments in legal infrastructures - such as building the 
courts systems, training and employing judges and law enforcement and market-supporting 
policies that raise private incomes – and provision of productive physical infrastructures - such 
as roads, ports and bridges and registering property or credit – are assumed not to depreciate in 
the model and are to be enjoyed by all without further payments by members of the society.  
Nonetheless, whether the government decides to extend this protection to every citizen 
or just the supporters of the incumbent government is another policy decision. For the purpose 
of simplicity, it is assumed that every citizen enjoys the same rights, privileges and protections. 
A high legal capacity allows the government to support the private markets better. If it is 
assumed that the opposition government takes over with the probability Ɣ, this parameter then 
becomes a rough measure of political instability.  
Fearon and Laitin (2003) see conflict in developing countries as a reflection of limited 
capacity to put down rebellions by the weak states; Collier and Hoefffler (2004) see it as a 
reflection of lower opportunity costs of being unemployed. Weak states are more likely to 
experience internal conflict than strong states (Jackson, 2002). Weak states are characterised 
by a number of factors, and manifest as problems of legitimacy, unstable politics, social 
cleavages, lack of national identity, lack of state and institutional capacity, economic crisis, 
and external vulnerability to international actors.  
Despite all these issues, a state can remain stable over a long period of time, but be 
prone to experience internal or external shocks, which can easily destabilize the state. In such 
states, the political elites could be dealing continuously with crisis management. When an 
opposition group wants to rebel, it is vital to consider the state’s capacity to either repress the 
rebellion and capture the rebels, or whether the state has the capacity to accommodate the 
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group’s demands through political and social institutions (Hendrix, 2010). However, highly 
authoritarian regimes are found to be the type of regime to have fewest internal conflicts 
(Hendrix, 2010).  The argument for this is that the rebels view the repressive force of the state 
as high, and therefore the cost of rebellion is high. In democracies, one has an additional 
channel of organising through the political system; disputes can be solved in these institutions.  
Mixed regimes (neither fully democratic nor autocratic) are thought to be the type of 
regime to experience the highest level of internal conflict, due to lack of enough repression-
force and missing political institutional channels (Hendrix, 2010). However, a redistributive 
state tax system may lead to competition for state control as the winner of an election (if there 
was one) becomes a residual claimant on public resources. The theoretical model in this chapter 
highlights the key reason for state capacity building as the risk of external conflict. That is, it 
is essential for a country to be able to resist any external threat by equipping the military. But 
not all conflicts are external; internal  conflicts plague many states, particularly in developing 
countries. State capacity building is also necessary for repressing internal conflict and for 
sustainable economic development.  
A nation with low levels of fiscal and legal capacity may experience slow economic 
growth or more conflicts (Besley and Persson, 2010). Likewise, the onset, number, and 
intensity of conflicts may disrupt the capacity of the state. The causality between the two 
variables is unclear (Hameiri, 2007). Hameiri, argues that capacity is a dynamic power and 
reflects current socio-political relationships. Capacity can reside in different institutions and 
with different individuals at different points in time; this is shaped by class and ethnicity, which 
then form the institutions. Even if state capacity is improved with enhanced and more efficient 
policy implementation, conflict can be just as prominent in the society as before the changes 
occur. This is not the case for every state, but shows the unclear relationship between the two 
variables (Hameiri, 2007). Low state capacity - as a result of destruction of infrastructures and 
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low income - would result in less tax revenue income for the government. It could also be that 
persistent conflicts discourage government in investing in state capacity.  
 
4.2.1 Research Questions 
According to Ababu (2015), the practice of state building is known to dampen the onset, reduce 
the duration, and facilitate the resolution of conflicts.34 He found evidence to suggest that 
strong state capacity increases the power of the state to address grievances, which could 
potentially reduce conflicts. However, Besley and Persson (2008) present a model that shows 
that internal conflicts wear down state capacity. Using data for a large cross-section of 
countries, the authors document a negative correlation between internal struggles and the 
capacity of the state several decades later. This, in effect, presents an argument for causality 
running in both directions. While both papers examine the effect of internal conflicts and state 
capacity in developing countries, this study seeks to bridge the gap in literature of the 
significant difference between internal and external conflicts on state capacity, looking at only 
SSA countries. A lot of work has been carried out on cross-countries across the globe and, to 
the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no paper has specifically looked at Sub-Saharan African 
countries. This study also attempts to understand if either type of conflict (internal and external) 
has differing impact in sign and magnitude on how it affects state capacity. As a result, this 
study will attempt to find answers to the following question: 
1. Does conflict significantly affect the state capacity of Sub-Saharan African countries?  
1a. Which type of conflict (internal or external) has a more significant effect on state 
capacity?  
 
                                                          
34 State building is the ability of the state and the institutions of the state to effectively discharge its functions. 
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4.2.2 Research Hypotheses 
It is argued that conflict corrodes the state’s capacity; Besley and Persson (2008) develop a 
model that provides such a result. Using data for a large cross-section of countries, they find a 
negative correlation between internal conflicts and capacity of the state decades later. 
Cardenas, Eslava and Ramirez (2013) show a similar result that holds within countries even 
when the persistence of state capacity is taken into account. Centeno (2002) also argues that 
internal conflict deteriorates the capacity of a state, looking at the history of Latin American 
countries. Typically, many Sub-Saharan governments deal with weak state capacities which 
result from a number of factors, particularly, the high levels of conflict that occur in these 
states. The lack of capacity affects the ability of the states to provide basic services and the 
geographical control needed to repress conflict. Economic and political exclusion also create 
high variation in government services, where political representation and economic 
accommodation is lower for marginalised groups (Peet and Watts, 1996). Thus the question of 
taking up arms as a means of getting a share of the nation’s wealth becomes critical for these 
groups. If the group decides to take up arms - either to protect what they already own or to take 
over from the current government - conflict occurs. This leads to the first hypothesis below: 
H1: Conflicts negatively impact state capacity in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Leaders confronted by a progressive challenge to the state’s territorial integrity are able 
to raise armies, create bureaucracies to manage the armies, and otherwise increase the depth of 
control on society by the regime. Our expectation of the increase in state capacity leads to an 
increase in the repressive capacity of the state, which we conceptualise as the ability for central 
governments to quash regime dissidents swiftly before the operationalised onset of civil war. 
If a group deliberately takes up arms to change the status quo within the economy, that is, when 
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one group attempts to make its situation better by deterring the other group - it is assumed that 
this group has concluded that the state is not capable of redistributing the wealth effectively or 
in a fair manner.  However, if a state is able to deter conflict and maintain peace by repressing 
conflict onset, enforcing contracts and property rights, and also providing a good economic 
wage, then the government might be able to maintain peace across the nation. This leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Potential internal or external threats increase capacity building and the ability of the state 
to repress potential rebel challenges to central authority. 
 
Corruption, lack of research and technology innovations, low morale, and legitimacy 
problems - coupled with shortage of (and outdated) equipment and technology - are among the 
reasons why Sub-Saharan countries are regarded as weak states. Some states fall on the 
borderline of strong and weak. For example, Botswana possesses some characteristics of a 
strong state, such as effective institutions and a strong economy (Jackson, 2002). A country 
that possesses relatively effective state institutions, a growing economy, and participatory 
politics is clearly closer to being a strong state than a country which lacks any of these 
characteristics. A contributing factor to developing strong states is argued in the literature as 
access to foreign credit and aid. DiGiuseppe, et al. (2012) argues that a state that is able to 
access international finance would have more resources to develop state capacity; this would 
otherwise not have been possible if there was no means of external finance. This leads to the 
third hypothesis: 
H3: Improved external finance to the state reduces its risk of conflict and increases state 
capacity. 
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4.3 Data and Empirical Model 
 
4.3.1 Data and Variable Definitions 
As mentioned earlier, this chapter attempts to establish the effect of conflict on state capacity 
in SSA. It employs annual data from 2000 - 2015 for all variables used for 49 countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  The fiscal measures for state capacity variables are tax revenue as a percentage 
of the GDP and military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP. The legal variables are 
perception indexes of the quality of government in each country. State capacity variables were 
sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators. The main explanatory variable - 
number of conflict - measures the number of reported conflicts in the country in a given year. 
This data comes from ACLED and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The control variables 
are also sourced from World Bank Development Indicators, except for the polity variable, 
which is from Centre for Systemic Peace.  
 
Dependent Variables 
State capacity is defined as the “degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, 
activities, and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction” (McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly, 2001). State capacity is critical for the performance of a political system and the 
nation’s development. High capacity states are able to provide public goods such as human 
security, medical and health care, and the social and physical infrastructure that promote human 
development (Rotberg, 2003); low capacity states are limited in their ability to provide these 
goods, leading to low social trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008) low development levels, or even 
state failure (Rotberg 2004; Skocpol 1979). For democracy to be consolidated and successful 
over time, a high capacity state is critical (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2000; Fukuyama, 2005; 
Wang, 2003). 
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A common methodology in measuring the capacity of a state is to look at the amount 
of taxes it collects (Besley and Persson, 2008; Fukuyama, 2013: Lieberman, 2002). This 
approach has its merit. Wang and Hu (2001) argue that the state’s capacity to mobilise and 
extract financial resources is the core of state capacity building and the foundation of the state’s 
ability to realise its other capacities. Along the same line, Schumpeter also notably argues that 
“public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially 
though not exclusively of its political life” (Schumpeter, 1991). Though measuring state 
capacity by taxation as a percentage of the economy is perhaps the most straightforward 
approach, it nevertheless has several caveats (Fukuyama, 2013); first, it measures not only the 
capacity to tax, but also the willingness. The ability to collect taxes increases a state’s degrees 
of institutionalisation, bureaucratic organisation, and perceived legitimacy. The criticism to 
this approach is that a large government is not necessarily a capable government. A small 
government could be more efficient than a large one; even if the state has the ability to collect 
taxes, the issue of corruption, trust and transparency would also affect the way in which these 
tax revenues are allocated.   
In this chapter, state capacity is measured in two distinct ways: fiscal and legal capacity. 
The fiscal capacity variables consist of, total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP as used in a 
number of articles (Campbell, 1993; Chaudhry, 1997; Cheibub, 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; 
Centeno, 2002; Thies, 2010) and military expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Hendrix, 2010). 
The second measure of state capacity is legal capacity, which includes a combination of 
measures; Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Government Effectiveness (Hegre et al., 2001; 
Marshall and Jaggers, 2009).  
Rule of Law - A dimension of the rule of law shown to affect state capacity is the awareness 
and respect of property rights, particularly intellectual property (Hansen et al., 2009). Rule of 
law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
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in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The state’s ability to govern on the basis of legitimate public 
norms and institutions is a strong indicator of the likelihood of long-term political and 
economic stability. This variable is measured as property rights and rule-based governance, 
with -2.5 as the lowest estimate a country can achieve and 2.5 as the highest. Gould and Gruben 
(2001), utilising a cross country data on patent protection, trade regime and country specific 
characteristics, providing evidence that suggests that property protection is a significant 
determinant of economic development.  
Regulatory Quality - Regulatory Quality can have different interpretations, depending on the 
institutional and administrative context in which it is used (Radaelli and De Francesco, 2007). 
In this chapter, regulatory quality is explained as the perception of the ability of government to 
formulate and execute sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. The world average for the variable is zero (0); a country with a value above the 
average is said to be doing very well in terms of regulatory quality, while a country below zero 
is doing very badly. Most African countries have a value below the world average.  
Government Effectiveness - Government effectiveness reflects: perceptions of the quality of 
public services; the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation; and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. It is suggested that countries with high government 
effectiveness are generally also strong economic performers. Also, Government effectiveness 
is among the most direct measures available of the strength and quality of state institutions, 
which are essential for the provision of public goods and the formulation and implementation 
of sound policies. It is assumed that high levels of conflict may disrupt the ability of 
government to provide quality services and implement sound policies. These legal measures 
allow us to capture the quality and effectiveness of state institutions, as well as the 
96 
 
 
government’s legitimacy and accountability to its citizens, which explains the capacity of the 
state.  
 
Explanatory Variable 
Conflicts are complex phenomena that rarely consist merely of a military struggle between the 
state and one rebel group. Therefore, external and internal conflicts can be understood as a 
condition that provides an opportunity to address unresolved issues within a larger conflict 
context. Internal conflicts transform societies into anarchies, with a breakdown of political 
order and lawlessness of which violence tends to be a predictable outcome (Kalyvas, 2007).  
The variable conflict is measured as the number of conflicts that occur in a particular year in 
each country in the sample.  
The number of conflicts is disaggregated into external and internal conflicts; this is to 
capture which type of conflict impacts more on state capacity. Internal conflicts are defined as 
conflicts that occur between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, without 
intervention from other states. External conflicts, on the other hand, are those that involve two 
or more independent states inclusive of wars.  
This study uses the data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(ACLED) and Armed Conflict Data database recently developed by the International Peace 
Research Institute of Oslo, Norway, and the University of Uppsala, Sweden (referred to as 
PRIO/Uppsala). The ACLED data consists of disaggregated conflict analysis and crisis 
mapping. The database consists of armed conflict for different countries from 1997 - present.  
The dataset codes locations, dates and additional characteristics of individuals, battle events in 
states affected with wars, protests, or violent riots.  
The Armed Conflict database also uniquely records all conflicts with a threshold of 25 
battle deaths per year, in addition to classifying conflicts by the standard 1,000-death threshold, 
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thus including more small conflicts in the analysis. An armed conflict is defined in the 
PRIO/Uppsala database as “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” It is possible that the analysis 
has some limitations. This may arise as a result of the definition of ‘conflict’. The conflict 
definition may mean that some types of organised violence that do not directly affect the state 
are not captured; for instance, clashes among pastoralist groups in northern Kenya or crime 
related to the drug trade in Lagos, Nigeria—which are of considerable research interest in their 
own right – might not be captured. This study also does not focus on ethnic violence, which 
may be the underlying cause(s) of internal conflicts in the region.  
 
Control Variables 
GDP per capita - The natural log of GDP per capita is included to account for the assertion 
that countries with high levels of economic development are less likely to experience domestic 
violence (Barbieri and Reuvney, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch, 2002). GDP per 
capita is the most common indicator of a state’s resources or economic wealth. Arguably, a 
state with high levels of GDP should not experience high numbers of conflict because it is 
assumed that citizens have an adequate standard of living, which fosters peace.  Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) characterise armed rebellion to a set of structural conditions that reduce the 
opportunity costs of uprising, thereby increasing its likelihood. Specifically, they find that low 
economic development (proxied by GDP per capita, GDPpc) significantly increases the 
probability of civil war, thereby reducing the state capacity. The dependent variables (in 
particular the fiscal ones) can be affected by global phenomena such as economic crises; this 
is controlled for by including year effects. Likewise, the amount of tax revenue received is 
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dependent on income levels. Generally, state capacity is a function of a county’s level of 
development; this is likely to be more visible in the long run than within-country inconsistency.  
Population - The log of total population is used to control for the expected positive association 
between higher population rates and the likelihood of conflicts. In order for the state to 
accomplish anything, they must satisfy their resource demands; moreover, taxation requires the 
state to invest in the capacity to monitor its population and effectively threaten them with non-
payment. According to Hendrix (2010), a state can also build its military capacity if the 
population is relatively high implying that more people can sign up to join the military.  
Population could either positively or negatively affect state capacity. If the government utilises 
the large population to its advantage by equipping and educating its citizens, it is possible for 
state capacity to increase. However, a state that is prone to conflict and increased population 
will reduce the state capacity. Also, the number of people below the poverty line may increase 
the likelihood of conflict arising; if this number is high; state capacity would be negatively 
affected.  
Foreign Aid (Net ODA received (constant US$) - Access to foreign capital directly increases 
a state’s economic capacity by providing it with resources that it would not otherwise have at 
its disposal if it relied solely on domestic revenue sources. Fjelde and de Soysa (2009), argue 
that the ability of the state to ‘outspend’ potential challengers on public goods significantly 
reduces the probability of conflict by alleviating some of the economic woes that might 
otherwise motivate the aggrieved to take up arms against the state. This study will also attempt 
to test the effect of external support on state capacity - especially repressive capacity - through 
US Greenbook data. The natural log of total economic aid and total military aid from the United 
States - as marked in constant 2011 US Dollars - is included. The credit made available to some 
governments has increased the stock of resources they can utilise, while at the same time 
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constraining governments to the demands of creditors and increasing their exposure to the 
volatility of international business cycles (Wibbels, 2006).  
Political instability (Polity Index) - To control for the impact of regime type on state capacity, 
this study uses the polity index; this index assesses the impact of different regimes on state 
capacity. Typically, democracies and dictatorships are less immune to civil conflict than 
anocracies or semi-democracies. The polity score variable combines the scores on the 
democracy and autocracy indices to a single regime indicator. The score captures the regime 
authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
democratic). It has also been shown that inclusive political institutions are fundamental to 
building state capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009; Cárdenas and Tuzemen, 2010). Therefore, 
country effects and lagged dependent variables will be included in our specifications. It is 
expected that the higher the level of democracy, investment in state capacity should increase 
because of the stability of government. The government might also be inclined to foster peace 
in the nation, thereby creating public goods and property rights enforcement laws. The polity2 
variable is expected to be positive in the model.  The data was collected from Centre for 
Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Institute. 
 
4.3.2 Summary Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 4.1. The average tax revenue 
is about 15.9% indicating that revenue from tax is a small percentage in the overall GDP from 
the sample. This is relatively low, as most countries average 16% to 45% (World Bank Data, 
2016). On average, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is about 2%; this seems to 
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also be the world average.35 Rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness are 
governance indicators, which proxy the legal capacity dimension of state capacity. The world 
average of all indices for the base year is 0, hence a positive value of the index in any country 
suggests that the country’s performance is above the world average. Thus, higher values 
suggest a higher regard for the rule of law, better regulatory environment, and an effective 
government. The means of these variables are all negative, indicating that the quality of legal 
capacity in SSA is substantially below the world average. The conflict variable has an average 
of about 3, suggesting conflicts occur rather frequently in the region. The Centre for Systemic 
Peace analyses the global conflict trend from 1946 - 2016. The institute finds that from the 
mid-2000s there has been an increasing level of conflict. Most of the increase has been in 
Muslim countries concentrated in the North Africa and Middle East (MENA) region. This 
seems to be consistent with the conflict trend in SSA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 An overview of the world’s military expenditure as a percentage of GDP shows an average of 2% to 4%. 
There are however outliers in the earlier years.  
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Table 4.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
       
Obs. 
            
Mean 
Standard         
Deviation 
                                     
Min     Max 
Panel A -Dependent 
Variable:      
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 411 15.91 8.707 0.231 58.28 
Military Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
 
 
673 
 
 
2.040 
 
 
2.262 
 
 
0.146 
 
 
32.66 
Rule of Law 
 
695 
 
-0.692 
 
0.625 
 
-2.114 
 
1.057 
Regulatory Quality 
 
695 
 
-0.663 
 
0.597 
 
-2.261 
 
1.123 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
 
695 
 
 
-0.734 
 
 
0.594 
 
 
-2.171 
 
 
1.036 
Panel B -Explanatory 
Variable:      
Log(Number of 
Conflicts)                                             
704 3.25 1.83 0 8.05 
Log(internal conflicts) 703 3.21 1.84 0 8.05 
Log(external conflicts) 
 
247 
 
1.37 
 
1.34 
 
0 
 
5.08 
Panel C -Control 
Variables:      
Log(GDP per capita) 735 6.981             1.079 5.268 9.912 
Log(population) 748    15.731 1.580 11.303 19.008 
Population (annual 
growth) 
748   2.504 0.877 -2.629 5.598 
Net ODA, (constant 
2013)                                      
            
                                        
      692 
 
   19.70 
 
 
1.351 
 
 
13.25 
 
 
23.26 
Polity2 - Political 
Instability 705 1.905 5.187 -9 10 
Table 4.1 above shows the descriptive statistics of the variables estimated in our model for 
the period 2000 - 2015 for 47 countries. * Refer to Section 4.3.1 for variable explanations and 
measurements.  
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4.3.3 Estimated Empirical Model  
This chapter uses two key regression specifications to study the relationship between state 
capacity and conflict. The conflict literature typically treats state capacity (commonly proxied 
by economic growth) and state capacity as exogenous; however, a few researchers treat income 
as endogenous (Hendrix 2010; Miguel et al., 2004), but the dynamic consequences of conflict 
are likely to be as important. McBride et al. (2011) develop a model in which state capacity is 
treated exogenously, suggesting that states with low capacity where conflict is not very 
destructive should experience more conflict. Their model introduces a channel through which 
income (state capacity) reduces the likelihood of conflict. When state capacity is treated 
endogenously, their model demonstrates that investments in state capacity can bring out peace 
in the state.  
Cardenas et al. (2010) find that conflict in developing countries disrupts state capacity, 
hindering economic development. With high state capacity, there would be a significant 
correlation between early conflicts and current capacity in the data unless initial conditions are 
controlled for. In order to allow for easy comparability, an OLS methodology is used as the 
baseline estimation, not controlling for fixed effects and also not taking into account the 
potential persistent nature of state capacity. The basic regression equation is as follows: 
  tititit DXCSC
''
10                           (4.1) 
where SCit measures state capacity in country i in year t; Cit is the total number of conflicts in 
country i in year t. The conflict variable is a combination of both internal and external conflicts. 
Xit consist of the control variables: GDP per capita (in logs), population, polity (a measure of 
political stability), and Net ODA.  Dt is a composite of variables representing year and country 
effects. The conflict variable is disaggregated into external and internal conflicts. As Besley 
and Persson (2008) argue — theoretically and empirically — the two forms of conflict may 
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have opposite effects on the incentives to invest in state capacity. The estimated model then 
becomes: 
  titititit DXECICSC
''
210                                    (4.2) 
where itIC measures internal conflict and itEC  measures external conflict. Other variables 
remain the same. To take into account the possible effects of initial conditions, the level of 
development in the country, other sources of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, and 
persistence nature of state capacity, the dynamic panel model is used to estimate the models. 
The GMM estimator is also used to control for country-specific effects, which cannot be done 
with country-specific dummies, due to the dynamic structure of the regression equation. Also, 
the estimates for 0 , 1 , 1  and 2  could be biased due to various reasons; they may exhibit 
measurement error, omitted variable bias, or reverse causation. A suitable estimation method 
is therefore needed to obtain unbiased, efficient, and consistent estimates. The dynamic panel 
model takes the following form: 
ittitititiit DXCSCSC   
''
110             (4.3) 
 
ittititititiit DXECICSCSC   
''
2110               (4.4) 
where 1itSC  is the lagged dependent variable; Xit is the same vector of controls as in equation 
(4.3) 
ititit                                                                            (4.5) 
 
and  
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      0 iiii EEE                                                              (4.6) 
 
μi are country fixed effects and vit are idiosyncratic shocks. Equation (4.3) is subject to problems 
of endogeneity for lagged dependent variables, which is standard in dynamic panel data models 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Both state capacity and the probability 
of conflict may be affected by external shocks that are unobserved (e.g. political reforms, 
climate). The issue of reverse causality is a clear possibility that could present additional 
endogeneity problems directly related to our variables of interest. To address these problems, 
the System GMM estimator is employed. Arellano and Bover’s (1995) System GMM method 
makes it possible to take into account simultaneity bias and inverse causality by using the 
lagged dependant variables as instruments. The original GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) yields inefficient estimates, because lagged levels are poor instruments for first–
difference equations. In contrast, the system GMM estimator eliminates this problem by using 
the lagged levels as instruments for first difference equations and the lagged first differences 
as instruments for level equations.  
The system GMM estimator - developed by Arellano and Bower (1995) - combines a 
regression in differences with one in levels. Blundell and Bond (1998) state evidence from a 
study in Monte Carlo that the inclusion of the level regression in the estimation reduces the 
potential bias in finite samples and the asymptotic inaccuracy associated with the difference 
estimator. The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on the validity of the instruments 
and the assumption that the error term is not serially correlated. The first test is the 
autoregressive (AR) test, which examines the hypothesis that the error term is not serially 
correlated in both the difference regression and the system difference-level regression. The 
second test is either the Sargan or Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the 
overall validity of instruments by analysing the sample analog of the moment conditions used 
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in the estimation process. To check the validity of instruments used in the estimation of the 
equations above, I perform the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions introduced by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). 
 
4.4 Estimation Results 
4.4.1 State Capacity and Conflict 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 present the baseline specification result using OLS estimation method of state 
capacity and conflict. State capacity is the dependent variable while the number of conflicts is 
the explanatory variable. Table 4.2 presents the fiscal capacity results, while Table 4.3 presents 
the legal capacity option. The baseline specification explores the initial conditions of the two 
variables without controlling for fixed effects or the persistence of state capacity, but takes into 
account year effects. Year effects have been included to the model to control for omitted 
variable bias and to avoid aggregate rising trends influencing cross-country regressions.   
The results show a strong negative correlation between conflicts and tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP. An increase in conflict reduces the amount of tax revenue contributions to 
the GDP of SSA countries. This submits that increased levels of conflict disrupt the ability of 
the government to ensure revenue from tax is maintained. It could also be that citizens are 
rebelling against the current government and not willing to pay their taxes; this situation is 
often common among African countries with inadequate tax collection organisations or in those 
without robust revenue collection system.  However, using military expenditure as the state 
capacity measure shows a positive relationship with the number of conflicts. This relationship 
is intuitive, as the increase in number of conflicts may cause increase in military expenditure 
if the government attempts to curb conflict growth by investing more in the military.  
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The strength and size of the military can be seen as the most important element in a 
state’s repressive capabilities, specifically, how this affects the onset and termination of civil 
conflict (Hendrix, 2010).  Buhaug (2010) also finds that larger militaries are associated with 
lower risk of conflict onset and shorter war duration, while Fearon and Laitin (2003) stress the 
importance of a state’s repressive capacity and the prospects of civil conflict is dependent on 
the government’s military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas. 
The control variables for both tables (fiscal and legal capacity) indicate a negative relationship 
with state capacity, except for the polity variable, which is positive and significant.   
Table 4.3 below presents the empirical analysis of the legal capacity variables and 
number of conflicts. There is a negative correlation between conflict and legal capacity; 
indicating that an increase in the number of conflicts reduces the capacity of the state to ensure 
property rights and rule-based laws are adhered to in the county. Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
argue that conflicts that limit state capacity usually occur in poor countries or countries that do 
not have ability to repress rebellion. Besley and Persson (2009) see the negative relationship 
of these variables in two ways:  either the government does not want to invest in state capacity, 
due to disruptions to established laws and resource rents in the country; or these conflicts are 
aggravated as a result of people feeling marginalised, and through property rights not been 
protected by the government.   
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Table 4.2 – State Capacity (Fiscal Capacity) and Conflict (2000 - 2015) – OLS 
Estimation 
  Tax Revenue      Military Expenditure 
Variables     ( 1)     (2)     (1) (2) 
Log (number of conflicts) -0.558** -0.567** 0.134*** 0.112*** 
 
 (0.259) (0.264) (0.041) (0.041) 
Log (GDP per capita) -0.958** 
 
0.055 
 
 
 (0.370) 
 
(0.067) 
 
Annual GDP growth  0.065 
 
-0.035*** 
  
 (0.080) 
 
 (0.012) 
Population, growth rate -6.032*** -5.899*** 0.241*** 0.238*** 
 
 (0.583)   (0.585) (0.084) (0.079) 
Net ODA (constant 2013) -1.341***  -1.111** -0.347*** -0.317*** 
 
  (0.475)  (0.48) (0.066)  (0.065) 
Polity2  0.365***  0.349***  0.007   0.007 
 
 (0.075)  (0.075) (0.012)  (0.012) 
Constant 65.939*** 54.252*** 7.490*** 7.544*** 
 
9.228 8.573 1.433 1.139 
Observations 369 374 585 585 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard     
errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.3 – State Capacity (Legal Capacity) and Conflict (2000 - 2015) – OLS Estimation 
Variable Regulatory Quality          Rule of Law Government Effectiveness 
     (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)    (5)     (6) 
Log (number of 
conflicts) -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.087*** -0.087*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
Log(GDP per 
capita) 0.242*** 
 
0.201*** 
 
0.231*** 
 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.021) 
 
Annual GDP growth 0.011**  0.011** 
 
0.011*** 
 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
Population, growth -0.185*** -0.295*** -0.238*** -0.332*** -0.283*** -0.390*** 
 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) 
Net ODA(Const. 
2013) 0.193*** 0.115*** 0.196*** 0.130*** 0.233*** 0.158*** 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) 
Polity2 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant  -5.396*** -2.049*** -4.948*** -2.153*** -6.043*** -2.690*** 
 
(0.513) (0.444) (0.519) (0.437) (0.467) (0.407) 
Observations 579 579 579 579 579 579 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
 
GDP per capita as a control variable is positive and significantly affects the legal capacity 
dependent variables. This shows that an increase in GDP improves the state’s ability to increase 
the quality of government. A strong state capacity is essential for economic 
growth/development. Likewise, economic development is crucial for building state capacity. 
The results obtained suggest that increase in GDP increases legal capacity of the nation. Lucas 
(1993) argues that nations able to lay claim of economic divergence - based on differential 
patterns of learning-by-doing and human capital accumulation related to openness - will have 
a higher economic development and consequently strong state capacity. Countries able to 
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enforce law and order, regulate economic activity, and provide public goods build stronger 
state capacity; however, many states in Africa often lack the ability to build strong states. Net 
ODA and Polity2 also increase the level of legal capacity in the country. However, population 
enters with a negative sign and significant for all regression models except in Table 4.2, where 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the dependent variable. This is plausible 
because increased population may result in the breakdown of law and order if the state is not 
able to provide adequate jobs for those seeking employment (Birdsall and Griffin, 1993).  
Economists also believe that population growth not only affects people, but also 
institutions and their capacity to deal with rapid social and ecological change. The data also 
suggests that population growth does not move in the same direction as the tax revenue, 
supporting the theory that Sub-Saharan African countries - except for Mauritania - may have 
insufficient tax systems. The most fundamental institutions - which are markets, law, property 
rights - evolved with human culture; others - finance system, transportation, formal education, 
public health systems, and international trade, to mention a few - were developed as products 
of state policies and reforms (Young, 1993).  
These institutions are expected to regulate how resources, goods, services and 
opportunities reach people and critically, which people they reach. When institutions function 
well, they can impart flexibility to an economy and transmit widespread benefits. However, it 
is suggested that for institutions to adequately adjust to population growth, countries must have 
a broad array of functional modern institutions (Cincotta and Engelman, 1997). It is believed 
that institutions that function smoothly make it possible for some of the initial adverse effects 
of population growth to be reversed in the long run; when institutions function poorly, the 
likely economic risks of population growth would be depressed levels of output per worker, 
failure to meet society’s goals for allocating goods and services, and stagnation or deterioration 
of assets. These usually occur in poor countries or countries where institutions have yet to reach 
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maturity. Regardless of national income, population growth can degrade renewable natural 
assets where property rights are inadequate or non-existent. These results should be taken with 
caution, as they may be driven by exclusion of initial state capacity conditions. These 
conditions are potential determinants of both concurrent existence of state capacity and the 
probability that a country initially entered a conflict.  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the results of the GMM estimation method. The results 
obtained are similar to the OLS estimation. In the GMM results, the polity variable changes 
sign from being positive in the OLS estimation to negative in the GMM estimation method. 
The GMM results are superior to the OLS as it takes into account omitted variable bias, it 
therefore explains that in SSA countries, high level of democracy do not increase the capacity 
of the state. This is expected as most countries suffer from high corruption levels, bureaucratic 
and inefficient governments – which then impacts on the capacity of the state to collect taxes. 
Also, in Table 4.4, conflict remains negatively correlated with tax revenue, but only significant 
in the second model. Likewise, conflict is positively correlated with military expenditure. GDP 
per capita is also positive and statistically significant in all models except for Model 1. The 
results are therefore robust to a different estimation method, suggesting that higher levels of 
conflict hinder the capacity of a state to collect taxes and invariably reduces the capacity of the 
state.  However, a different conclusion is drawn when military capacity is the proxy for state 
capacity. It appears higher numbers of conflict spur investment in the military thereby 
strengthening the military capacity of the state.  
The level of economic growth is also essential for building a strong state. GDP per 
capita is positive and statistically significant. It is interesting to note that foreign aid negatively 
affects fiscal state capacity, while a positive relationship is obtained with legal state capacity. 
It might be assumed that a country that receives more aid would be able to build up both forms 
of capacity due to extra source of revenue; this however is not the case for fiscal capacity 
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variables. This result suggests that the impact of foreign aid is mainly towards legal capacity. 
It is plausible to assume that aid given to countries reduces the ability of these countries to 
enforce taxes, most especially with countries with weak tax organisations. Savun and Hays 
(2011) find that foreign aid is unlikely to reduce terrorism and state building. Similarly, aids 
extended to corrupt governments increases the supply of large-scale conflicts.   
Table 4.4 – State (Fiscal) Capacity and Conflict (2000-2015) - GMM Estimation 
Variables Tax Revenue Tax Revenue Military Exp. Military Exp. 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Dependent variable, (t-1) 0.590*** 0.669*** 0.237*** 0.377*** 
 
(0.107) (0.100) (0.0751) (0.0685) 
Log (number of conflicts) -0.204 -0.616** 0.122*** 0.0188 
 
(0.266) (0.253) (0.0413) (0.0273) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.353 0.566** 0.079*** 0.139*** 
 
(0.221) (0.227) (0.028) (0.028) 
Population, growth rate 1.998** 2.185** 0.179*** 0.106*** 
 
(0.840) (0.898) (0.038) (0.035) 
Net ODA (Constant 2013) -1.454*** 
 
-0.237*** 
 
 
(0.363) 
 
(0.046) 
 
Polity2 -0.333** 
 
0.000371 
 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.00534) 
 
Constant 29.93*** -2.461 4.794*** -0.116 
 
(7.639) (3.561) (0.912) (0.267) 
Observations 319 324 546 581 
Number of id 30 30 43 43 
AR2 Test  0.112 0.188 0.025 0.003 
Sargan Test 0.005 0.002 0.495 0.548 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.5 –State (Legal) Capacity and Conflict (2000-2015) - GMM Estimation 
VARIABLES Rule of Law Regulatory Quality Govt. Effectiveness 
Dependent variable, t-1 0.665*** 0.730*** 0.845*** 
 
(0.0780) (0.0632) (0.0720) 
Log(number of conflicts) -0.0121** -0.0195*** -0.0113* 
 
(0.00611) (0.00661) (0.00647) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.0677*** 0.150*** 0.0322** 
 
(0.0153) (0.0311) (0.0158) 
Population, growth rate -0.0635*** -0.00712 -0.0397* 
 
(0.0157) (0.0116) (0.0223) 
Net ODA 0.0377*** 0.0663*** 0.0319** 
 
(0.00789) (0.0126) (0.0147) 
Polity2 0.00834*** 0.00825*** 0.00335* 
 
(0.00229) (0.00229) (0.00202) 
Constant -1.277*** -2.474*** -0.853** 
 
(0.248) (0.471) (0.377) 
Observations 499 499 495 
Number of id 43 43 43 
AR2 test 0.486 0.182 0.030 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
4.4.2 State Capacity, Internal and External Conflict  
Turning attention to state capacity, internal, and external conflicts, results of the OLS 
estimation is presented in Table 4.6. The table shows a strong negative correlation between 
internal conflict and tax revenue as the state capacity measure, while external conflict has a 
positive relationship. However, both internal and external conflicts positively affect state 
capacity when military expenditure is used as the measure of state capacity. The first model in 
the table controls for both internal and external conflict. In Model 2, only internal conflict is 
113 
 
 
controlled, for while Model 3 has just external conflict included in the specification. The same 
application applies when military expenditure is the measure of state capacity. Model 4 
presents both internal and external conflict in the specification, while Models 5 and 6 have 
either internal or external controlled for in the specification.  
 
Table 4.6 - State capacity and Disaggregated Conflict – Baseline OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable  
                                                   Tax Revenue            Military Expenditure 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)   
Log (internal 
conflicts) -0.990** -0.806*** 
 
0.0949 0.144*** 
 
 
  
 
(0.416) (0.265) 
 
(0.0955) (0.0408)     
Log (external 
conflicts) 0.631* 
 
0.582 0.185*  
 
0.231** 
  
 
(0.354) 
 
(0.360) (0.103)   (0.091)   
Log (GDP per 
capita) 0.993 -1.102*** 1.120 0.393*** 0.076 
 
0.411*** 
  
 
(0.895) (0.370) (0.910) (0.140) (0.068)  (0.139)   
Population, growth 
rate -3.235*** -5.921*** -3.213*** 0.884*** 0.242*** 
 
0.835*** 
  
 (1.180) (0.570) (1.202) (0.180) (0.0855)  (0.173)   
Net ODA (constant 
2013) 1.059 -1.209*** 0.450 -0.49*** -0.31*** 
 
-0.41*** 
  
 
(0.744) (0.453) (0.711) (0.142) (0.0668)  (0.116)   
Polity2 0.174 0.334*** 0.266* -0.028 -0.002  -0.027   
 
(0.139) (0.076) (0.136) (0.024) (0.012)  (0.024)   
Constant -1.346 64.84*** 5.789 6.31** 6.82***  4.97**   
 
(17.40) (8.823) (17.46) (2.85) (1.43)  (2.51)   
N 146 369 146 204 593  204   
R-squared 0.363 0.412 0.335 0.220 0.065  0.215   
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors 
in parenthesis. 
114 
 
 
External conflict - without including internal conflicts to the regression analysis is 
positively correlated to both fiscal capacity variables, but only statistically significant when 
military expenditure is the dependent variable. However, we see external conflicts in Model 1 
statistically significant when internal conflicts are taken into account. Besley and Persson 
(2008) find that total tax revenue - as a percentage of GDP is higher in countries with greater 
average incidence of external war. The results show that external conflict increases the amount 
that a government spends on its defence while there might not be any bearing to tax revenue. 
The idea that an increase in external conflict leads to more government spending on the military 
is plausible. Aziz and Asadullah (2016) argue that even though armed conflicts in nations have 
declined, countries continue to spend on defence due to various latent external threats to 
counter the nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons amassed by rivals. In 
addition, many countries also face continuous threats of internal conflicts.36 Other economists 
argue that spending boosts business confidence in conflicting countries, which facilitates 
investment and economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Benoit, 1978; Dunn, Smith 
and Willenbockel, 2005; Kennedy, 1974 and Whynes, 1979). 
Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP reduces with the presence of only internal conflicts 
with increasing levels of GDP per capita. Model 2 in Table 4.6 shows a negative relationship 
between GDP per capita and tax revenue. It is plausible that people’s willingness to pay tax 
and/or to support and build the state capacity reduces because of the negative personal 
consequences of internal conflicts; this may undermine the trust citizens have in the state and 
consequently their reasons not to pay taxes. Due to not having any efficient data on local 
statutory tax rates, we cannot establish whether this change associated with conflict is driven 
                                                          
36 There are various political groups that frequently engage in acts of terrorism and/or militancy, thereby 
threatening the domestic economy. In Africa, examples include Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR), Mai-Mai groups, National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and Patriotic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo (FPLC). 
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by changes in tax rates or changes in the degree of compliance with tax regulations. We are, 
therefore, unable to rule out that the reduction of tax revenue in times of conflict-related 
violence reflects a reaction of local authorities, rather than the population. 
The GMM specification considers state capacity as a pre-determined regressor in the 
model and internal conflict as an endogenous variable. External conflict could be either 
endogenous or exogenous, but for the purposes of this study it is considered as an exogenous 
variable because the majority of the external conflicts are spill-overs from neighbouring 
countries and conflicts over land space. It should also be noted that causality can run from state 
capacity to conflict, but to limit the scope of the study this has not been considered. Table 4.7 
shows a negative effect of internal conflict on tax revenue as a percentage of GDP and a 
positive effect on military expenditure.  
The direction of the variables is consistent with the OLS results, but the magnitude of 
the coefficients somewhat differs. The coefficients of internal conflicts are similar to the OLS 
estimates, while the magnitude of the internal conflicts under military expenditure indicates 
that the existence of internal conflict in a given year will reduce its tax revenue and military 
expenditure approximately by 1.0 and 0.05 percentage points respectively. However, there is 
no significant relationship between internal conflict and military expenditure when GMM 
estimation method is used. This relationship does not hold when external conflict is excluded 
from the specification. With the exclusion of external conflict, internal conflict becomes 
positive and statistically significant in Model 5, where military expenditure is the state capacity 
measure. External conflict increases fiscal state capacity, while it decreases the legal state 
capacity. As stated earlier, the presence of internal and external conflicts can increase 
government spending to build military capacity to combat or repress the conflict. In the long 
run, this could positively affect economic growth by shortening the duration of conflict.  
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Table 4.7 - State capacity and Disaggregated Conflict – GMM Estimation 
                                         Tax Revenue                                         Military Expenditure 
Variables  (1) ( 2) ( 3)   (4)  (5)        (6)   
Dependent 
Variable, t-1 0.594*** 0.589*** 0.700*** 0.865*** 0.479*** 0.860*** 
  
 
(0.091) (0.109) (0.073) (0.104) (0.0704) (0.102)   
Log (Internal 
Conflicts) -0.997*** 0.102 
 
-0.0496 0.124***  
  
 
(0.319) (0.197) 
 
(0.149) (0.0368)    
Log (External 
Conflicts) 0.221* 
 
0.0567 0.231***  0.209*** 
  
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.101) (0.0889)  (0.0586)   
Log (GDP per 
capita) -0.555 -0.0541 -1.245 0.766* -0.826*** 0.689* 
  
 
(0.766) (0.765) (0.771) (0.441) (0.211) (0.373)   
Population, 
growth -2.062*** -2.321*** -2.368*** 0.497** -0.231** 0.488** 
  
 
(0.762) (0.714) (0.771) (0.224) (0.0998) (0.221)   
Net ODA 
(constant 2013) 0.346 -0.916*** -0.297 -0.140 -0.399*** -0.179** 
  
 
(0.278) (0.286) (0.205) (0.137) (0.0668) (0.0706)   
Polity2 0.080 0.163*** 0.188** -0.016 -0.001 -0.014   
 
(0.0769) (0.0478) (0.0763) (0.0197) (0.00601) (0.0184)   
Constant 11.23 30.47** 24.59** -3.355 14.85*** -2.197   
 
(10.78) (11.96) (10.69) (4.708) (2.865) (3.156)   
Observations 132 338 132 188 551 188   
Number of id 25 30 25 39 43 39   
AR2 test 0.875 0.099 0.786 0.124 0.002 0.113   
Sargan test 0.265 0.101 0.173 0.097 0.000 0.174   
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
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Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the OLS and GMM estimation for legal state capacity estimation 
respectively; the OLS results indicate both internal and external conflict negatively and 
significantly affects all three legal capacity variables. That is, the higher the number of conflicts 
in a given country, the more the legal capacity of that nation will reduce. This is intuitive, as 
conflicts have the tendency of disrupting rule of law, property rights, and government 
efficiency.  
The government may also lack the incentive to invest in legal capacity if there is going 
to be a civil war outbreak or an on-going civil war. However, the GMM estimates are different, 
as increase in external conflict increases legal state capacity when internal conflict is controlled 
for; however, these estimates are not statistically significant.  With the exclusion of internal 
conflicts in the model, the results differ, as coefficients external conflict changes sign and 
becomes statistically significant indicating both external and internal conflicts reduce the legal 
capacity of nations. This suggests that conflicts can reduce the ability of the government and 
its organisations to operate efficiently. GDP per capita, Polity, and Foreign aid are positive as 
expected, while increase in population reduces a country’s legal capacity in SSA.  
The major points to consider when comparing the system GMM results to the OLS are: 
first, in terms of the effect of internal conflict, the magnitude of the coefficients is reduced, 
albeit they exhibit similar statistical significance and negative and positive signs for both 
measures of fiscal state capacity. This change suggests that dynamic bias and endogeniety were 
present in the OLS results. Second, the system GMM results indicate that in addition to long-
run effects identified in previous work (Besley and Persson, 2008; 2009), there is the possibility 
of short-run effects of internal conflict on state capacity, both on the fiscal and legal 
dimensions. Internal armed conflicts and armed confrontation between governments and 
organised opposition groups are a common occurrence with developing countries, especially 
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in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Collier, 2007). This suggests that the overall economic loss 
owing to conflicts is significant.  
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Table 4.8 – State Capacity (Legal) and Disaggregated Conflict – Baseline OLS Estimation 
 Dependent Variables                Regulatory Quality              Rule of Law        Government Effectiveness 
Exp. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Log (Internal Conflicts) -0.074*** -0.081*** 
 
-0.153*** -0.130*** 
 
-0.075*** -0.085*** 
 
 
(0.026) (0.014) 
 
(0.025) (0.014) 
 
(0.024) (0.013) 
 
Log (External Conflicts) -0.066** 
 
-0.106*** -0.041 
 
-0.123*** -0.101*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.026) (0.028) 
 
(0.026) (0.027) 
 
(0.024) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.301*** 0.227*** 0.285*** 0.251*** 0.196*** 0.217*** 0.296*** 0.209*** 0.279*** 
 
(0.041) (0.023) (0.042) (0.039) (0.023) (0.042) (0.038) (0.021) (0.038) 
Population, growth rate -0.127*** -0.182*** -0.0945** -0.109** -0.228*** -0.0425 -0.161*** -0.285*** -0.128*** 
 
(0.047) (0.029) (0.046) (0.044) (0.029) (0.047) (0.043) (0.026) (0.043) 
Net ODA (constant 2013) 0.223*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.266*** 0.166*** 0.142*** 0.239*** 0.199*** 0.179*** 
 
(0.037) (0.026) (0.031) (0.035) (0.023) (0.031) (0.034) (0.021) (0.029) 
Polity2 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.014* 0.016** 0.024*** 0.014** 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant -6.617*** -4.722*** -5.633*** -7.049*** -4.455*** -5.024*** -6.897*** -5.228*** -5.908*** 
  (0.743) (0.488) (0.666) (0.699) (0.490) (0.672) (0.683) (0.448) (0.615) 
Observations 199 594 199 199 594 199 199 594 199 
R-squared 0.511 0.338 0.490 0.474 0.344 0.370 0.551 0.397 0.529 
 Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.9 - State (Legal) Capacity and Disaggregated Conflict – GMM Estimation 
 Dependent Variables                Regulatory Quality              Rule of Law        Government Effectiveness 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4     5 6 7 8 9 
L.dependent   0.932***   0.864***   0.922***   0.870***   1.087***   0.796***  0.983***  0.946***  0.967*** 
 (0.061)            (0.063) (0.081) (0.116) (0.166) (0.072) (0.080)  (0.084) (0.078) 
Log (Internal Conflicts) -0.066*** -0.014* 
 
-0.069*** -0.048*** 
 
-0.065** -0.054*** 
 
 
(0.019) (0.009) 
 
(0.022) (0.011) 
 
(0.026)   (0.020) 
 
Log (External Conflicts) 0.018 
 
-0.034** 0.027 
 
-0.039*** 0.021 
 
-0.048* 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014)   (0.020) 
 
(0.011) (0.016) 
 
(0.025) 
Log (GDP per capita)     0.081 0.066* -0.014 0.073 -0.059 0.097       -0.044 -0.021 -0.014 
 
 (0.056) (0.038)   (0.069)   (0.100)  (0.091)  (0.079)  (0.053)  (0.074) (0.069) 
Population, growth rate -0.021 -0.0042 -0.021 -0.025 -0.022 -0.037 -0.073** -0.067** -0.023 
 
(0.031) (0.011) (0.030)   (0.039)  (0.014)  (0.078) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) 
Net ODA (constant 2013)   0.088***   0.033***   0.036***   0.073*** 0.033 0.041*   0.071**   0.071** 0.022 
 
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024)  (0.021) (0.023) (0.034) (0.031) (0.017) 
Polity2    0.002 0.005* 0.004   0.025** -0.005   0.031*** 0.002 -0.004 -0.012 
 
(0.003) (0.003)   (0.004) (0.012)  (0.006) (0.010)   (0.008)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant -2.088*** -1.176** -0.609 -1.803* 0.156 -1.617** -0.723 -0.977 -0.208 
 
(0.643) (0.526)  (0.672) (1.096)  (1.171) (0.806)   (0.845)   (0.990) (0.742) 
Observations 171 508 171 171 508 171 171 171 171 
Sargan test 0.393 0.000 0.308 0.044 0.016 0.140 0.006 0.031 0.101 
AR2 test 0.329 0.147 0.428 0.041 0.147 0.001 0.876 0.977 0.879 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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4.4.3 Robustness Check 
The robustness test uses an index for both measures (fiscal and legal) of state capacity. The 
results obtained are presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 below.  First, an index is generated for 
fiscal state capacity by creating an average of the fiscal measures of state capacity. The result 
obtained shows no statistical relationship between conflict and state capacity when both OLS 
estimation and fixed and random effects estimation methods are used. There are similar signs 
- but no empirical basis - to suggest conflict affects state capacity when both measures are used 
as an index. However, there is a negative and significant correlation when the GMM estimation 
method is used, indicating conflict does affect state capacity. Since the GMM method has been 
assumed as the superior methodology, it is believed that higher levels of conflict negatively 
impacts the capacity of the state.  
Looking at the table in detail, the number of conflicts exhibits a negative correlation 
with the fiscal capacity index when the OLS estimation method is used; the relationship 
becomes positive, having no statistical significance when fixed and random effects methods 
are used. The result changes when GMM is used. A percentage increase in number of conflicts 
is seen to decrease fiscal capacity by 0.48%. Compared to the GMM estimation result when 
either tax revenue as a percentage or military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is used, the 
results show that the estimation is robust to conflict reducing fiscal state capacity. 
A legal capacity index is also generated for the three measures of legal state capacity. 
A geometric mean index with equal weights is generated and the results are presented in Table 
4.11. The table highlights very similar results with respect to sign and significance when the 
legal index is used as the dependent variable, proposing the results are consistent and that 
conflicts reduce legal state capacity in SSA.  
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Table 4.10 – State Capacity and Conflict (2000 - 2015) 
Dependent Variable- Fiscal capacity index 
Variable OLS Random effect GMM 
Log(number of 
conflicts) 
-0.089 0.018 -0.480* 
 
(0.123) (0.105) (0.281) 
Lagged Fiscal capacity index 0.504*** 
 
  (0.146) 
Log (GDP per capita) 1.242*** 1.135** 0.275 
 
(0.219) (0.526) (0.606) 
Population, growth 
rate 
-1.192*** 0.161 -0.743 
 
(0.281) (0.31) (0.507) 
Net ODA 0.112 0.577*** 0.13 
 
(0.184) (0.201) (0.147) 
Polity2 0.185*** -0.04 0.101*** 
 
(0.041) (0.062) (0.028) 
Constant -0.736 -13.111** 1.835 
  (4.075) (5.133) (7.145) 
N 603 603 560 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors 
in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
Table 4.11 – State Capacity and Conflict (2000-2015) 
 Dependent Variable is Legal capacity index 
Variables OLS Fixed Effects GMM 
Log(number of conflicts) -0.089*** -0.024***  -0.018*** 
 
 (0.012) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Legal capacity index, t-1   0.909*** 
 
   (0.09) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.186*** 0.217***  0.051 
 
(0.02) (0.04)  (0.042) 
Population, growth rate -0.159*** -0.004  0.007 
 
(0.025) (0.017)  (0.010) 
Net ODA (constant 2013)  0.120*** 0.021*  0.024** 
 
(0.017) (0.012)  (0.010) 
Polity2 0.044*** 0.011***  0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -3.754*** -2.571*** -0.866 
  (0.382) (0.329) (0.540) 
N 594 594 508 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors 
in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.12 - State capacity and Disaggregated Conflict  
Dependent Variable – Fiscal capacity index 
                                                     OLS Estimation      GMM Estimation 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 
L.Fiscal capacity index 
   
 0.724***   0.373**  1.011*** 
    
(0.217) (0.166) (0.119) 
Internal Conflicts -0.458** -0.142 
 
-1.339** -0.499* 
 
 
(0.221) (0.123) 
 
(0.563) (0.271) 
 
External Conflicts 0.706** 
 
0.421*  0.984*** 
 
0.320** 
 
(0.273) 
 
(0.237) (0.361) 
 
(0.128) 
Log (GDP per capita) 2.558*** 1.230***  2.531*** 3.517** 0.380 3.270** 
 
(0.384) (0.219) (0.387) (1.384) (0.569) (1.318) 
Population, growth -0.125 -1.208*** 0.0571 1.145 -0.946*  1.987** 
 
(0.472) (0.281) (0.468) (0.840) (0.495) (0.777) 
Net ODA (constant 2013) 0.827** 0.140 0.579* 0.401 0.137 -0.373* 
 
(0.327) (0.184) (0.306) (0.278) (0.144) (0.214) 
Polity2 0.00784 0.185*** -0.0149 -0.0339 0.125*** -0.109*** 
 
(0.066) (0.041) (0.066) (0.043) (0.032) (0.041) 
Constant -23.10*** -0.971 -19.97*** -28.65*** 2.339 -20.09** 
 
(6.357) (4.048) (6.227) (10.36) (6.736) (7.847) 
Observations 209 603 209 192 560 192 
R-squared 0.322 0.184 0.306 
   
Number of id       40 44 40 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.13 - State capacity and Disaggregated Conflict 
Dependent Variable – Legal capacity index 
                                                   OLS Estimation      GMM Estimation 
VARIABLES (1) (2)    (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal index, t-1 
   
0.860*** 0.871*** 0.694*** 
    
(0.147) (0.085) (0.111) 
Log (internal conflicts) -0.061*** -0.088*** 
 
-0.089*** -0.015** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.012) 
 
(0.0214) (0.006) 
 
Log (external conflicts) -0.082** 
 
-0.120*** 0.058** 
 
-0.031*** 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.023) (0.025) 
 
(0.011) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.231*** 0.187*** 0.226*** 0.372*** 0.083** 0.353*** 
 
(0.039)   (0.020)   (0.039) (0.110) (0.0400) (0.100) 
Population, growth rate -0.096** -0.159*** -0.078*  -0.062 0.020 0.064 
 
(0.044) (0.025) (0.044) (0.073) (0.023) (0.080) 
Net ODA (constant 
2013) 0.162*** 0.119*** 0.128***  0.046*** 0.027** 0.002 
 
   (0.032)  (0.017) (0.030) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) 
Polity2 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.023*** 0.0049 0.0082** 0.0035 
 
   (0.007)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0024) 
Constant -5.210*** -3.771*** -4.758*** -3.074*** -1.222** -2.791*** 
 
(0.622) (0.383) (0.608) (0.843) (0.515) (0.787) 
Observations 209 594 209 180 508 180 
R-squared 0.507 0.446 0.489 
   
Number of id       40 44 40 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
The main contribution of this study is that for SSA countries, internal conflicts reduce fiscal 
state capacity, while external conflicts increase the capacity of the state. This supports existing 
literature on the relationship between external wars and state capacity, highlighting the role that 
major international wars play in the construction of the modern state. External conflicts tend to 
have positive effect on state capacity across countries. For the sample of SSA countries, both 
the OLS and GMM estimations in our analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that internal 
conflict disrupts state capacity. It is assumed that, on average, countries involved in an internal 
conflict have less capacity to collect taxes and govern efficiently than countries not involved. 
Arguably, a country in the midst of an internal conflict will be less capable of collecting taxes 
and governing efficiently compared to a situation where there is no conflict.  
This empirical result follows the existing literature that internal conflicts divide 
societies and make it more difficult for government to reach a consensus in investing in state 
capacity (Cardenas et al., 2010). In other words, a country with weak state capacity intensifies 
conflict thereby generating a negative spiral. From the results obtained, external conflicts are 
important in building state capacity, as it seems there is increase in military expenditure. On 
the other hand, a country that experiences external conflicts periodically will suffer overall 
economic instability and possible displacement of its citizens (Ganegodage and Rambaldi, 
2013).  
The results also suggest that both internal and external conflicts reduce the state 
capacity when the legal variables are considered.  These results are consistent when the 
persistence of state capacity over time and endogeneity is taken into account. Primarily, the 
legal state capacity should promote markets and property rights in the country. The results show 
that both forms of conflict reduce the ability of the government to build this dimension of state 
capacity. The potential reverse causality between state capacity and conflict has not been 
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considered. It is plausible that state capacity could either increase or decrease the onset of 
conflict, most especially internal conflicts.  
Looking at the type of conflict with a greater effect, the results show that both internal 
and external conflicts affect the state capacity with different magnitudes, depending on which 
control variables are considered. For the purposes of this study, the empirical results suggest 
that internal conflict reduces the state capacity, while external conflict increases the fiscal 
capacity of the state. The intensity of each type of conflict was not considered, as it was outside 
of the scope of the study. Further research into the intensity may indicate a bigger negative 
magnitude. Intuitively, probable factors or mechanisms through which internal conflict reduces 
state capacity could include: the deterioration of the tax administration system; the impediment 
of tax collectors to go about their business; a reduction in the willingness to pay taxes by 
citizens who do not feel protected or who feel that the government is being replaced by 
organised opposition groups; reduced trust in the state, making the citizens less willing to pay 
taxes; and reduced incentives for public goods provisions. In turn, attacks committed by armed 
groups undermine the governments’ ability to provide public goods, safeguarding property 
rights, and maintaining law and order.  
Developing the understanding of the consequences of conflict on state capacity is 
important for various reasons. First, effective action towards managing conflict or ensuring 
peace could be costly due to endless negotiations and peace deals; it is therefore important for 
government to understand the impact of conflicts on state capacity and the need to repress the 
conflicts before they occur. Second, a strong state is often recognised as a precondition for true 
development (Cardenas et al., 2016); understanding the reasons why conflicts affect state 
capacity helps shape actions to overcome the negative effects. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Effects of Natural resources on Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the years, growing attention has been devoted to understanding the relationship between 
conflicts and natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; 
Lujala et al., 2005; Ross, 2004). Seven of the world’s eight bloodiest conflicts have been in 
Africa, with natural resources playing a strong role (Kurečić et al., 2015); while some of these 
conflicts are political in nature by their character, natural resources have played an important 
role in almost all of them (Cuvelier et al., 2013). The pioneering works of Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998, 2004)  - further discussed the by Lujala (2010) and Ross (2004) argue that accessible 
resource wealth increases the motivation of rebels to accumulate private gain and provides rebel 
leaders sufficient funding opportunities to organise armed groups, thereby increasing the risk 
of conflict. Intuitively, by their role in financing conflicts, natural resources generally can either 
be the root cause of conflicts or the cause of prolonging conflicts, resulting in economic 
instability.  
Natural resources refer to oil, minerals, forests, and fertile land that occur in nature and 
can be exploited for economic gain. These resources frequently represent an important source 
of income and power; land, in particular, is essential to the livelihoods of millions of people. 
When poorly managed, distributed, or controlled in an unfair or unequal manner, it can be a 
major driver of conflict or instability. The above underscores the importance of natural 
resources in motivating and driving conflicts and how the different types impact on conflict. 
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Resource scarcity or abundance has been a dominant feature in the conflict literature, 
from the vulnerability of resource-rich regions - which is sometimes based on the 
dissatisfaction from resource rents - to the outbreaks of local population embedded in resource 
scarcity (Maxwell and Reuveny, 2000). International powers have often intervened in resource 
disputes in these regions to protect their interest (Kehl, 2010). According to Klare (2004), the 
intensity of a conflict can also be aggravated by the type of natural resources; the authors 
suggest that, in particular, oil reserves have proven to be a major cause of conflicts and civil 
wars. The exploitation of these natural resources sometimes causes resistance, since it is usually 
done without the consent of the local population, who often receive little gains - if any - from 
the resource exports rents. Exploitation of these natural resources by foreign companies 
sometimes destroys the environment and displaces the local population - very often minorities 
and the indigenous - from their habitats (Klare, 2001). Specifically, the consequences of 
resource exploitation often include land expropriation and environment destruction 
(deforestation and oil pollution among several others).  
The approach followed in this study is as follows: first, by understanding if and how 
natural resources relate to conflict in SSA, the study aims to contribute to existing literature; 
second, by analysing duration and onset of conflict specifically for SSA, this research seeks to 
provide a better understanding of the relationship between conflicts and natural resources. The 
rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 and 5.3 present a brief review of 
theoretical and empirical literature; the research questions and hypotheses are discussed in 
section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the data and methodology; section 5.6 discusses the empirical 
results; section 5.7 concludes.  
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5.2  Brief Review of the theoretical frameworks on Conflicts and    
Natural Resources 
5.2.1 Natural resources and the onset of conflict 
The relationship between natural resources and conflict has gained attention in the last decade, 
somewhat due to availability of good quality data and as a result of a more refined theory on 
the “resource curse” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Di John, 2007; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Fearon, 2005; Le Billon, 2001; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). The studies of Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998, 2004) maintain that the abundance of natural resources represents a highly 
profitable opportunity for greedy rebels; thus, resource wealth is the most common source 
motivating and conditioning rebellion. The availability of natural resources increases rebels’ 
incentives to loot resources for private wealth and increases the value of overthrowing the 
government which holds the resource wealth and dominates resource-rich areas. In wartime - 
relative to peacetime, rebels can easily continue to commit criminal activities - such as looting 
or the illegal trading of spoils - to accumulate their own private gains (Keen, 2000). 
When access to these natural resources become the reason for conflict – or, much more 
frequently, are used to fuel a conflict - the situation becomes much more complicated. The rebel 
groups Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (known by its Portuguese acronym UNITA) used revenues derived 
from diamond mining to fund their rebellions against their respective governments. Research 
also indicates that wars appear to be long-lasting; the expected duration of conflict is now more 
than double that of conflicts that started prior to 1980 (Collier, 2003). A possible explanation 
for this could be that it is much easier to sustain and fund conflict than it used to be. Natural 
resources are used either locally or as a form of revenue for the government. More often than 
not, it is the revenue-producing resources that cause the most problems; this is sometimes called 
the ‘resource curse’, which describes the contradiction that countries with abundant natural 
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resources often have less economic growth than those without natural resources (Bannon and 
Collier, 2003). The dependence on these sources of revenue usually discourages diversification, 
leads to overheating of the economy, and increases volatility of prices. The abundance also 
often leads to government mismanagement and corruption. Competition over these resources 
can lead to, intensify, or sustain violence.37  
Violent conflict can also be as a result of non-participation or negligible participation 
of the local population in resource rent spending, which has turned into civil wars in some 
instances. A common feature in all these conflicts is the fact that minority populations at the 
state level represent a majority in the area where resources are exploited. These populations are 
usually on the margin of society, despite the fact that they live in resource-abundant areas. 
Examples of conflicts that have arisen because of these situations are the conflict in the Niger 
Delta- Nigeria, the conflict on Bougainville Island, and the conflict in the Indonesian provinces 
of Irian Jaya (West Papua) and Aceh (on Sumatra Island). Rather than full-fledged war, these 
conflicts usually involve smaller-scale skirmishes, roadblocks, acts of sabotage, and major 
human rights violations by state security forces and rebel groups.  
A number of these conflicts, however, have evolved into political unrest in the countries 
involved (Renner, 2002). Often-times, what was initially a resource conflict has turned into a 
political and ethnic conflicts, in which one population wants to overpower - or at least receive 
full autonomy - from the central government, consequently getting what they consider a fair 
share of resource-rents. What starts out as an internal (intra state) conflict, can become a civil 
war, and can turn into an international (interstate) conflict. Due to the uncontrolled and 
therefore porous borders, rebels often use other states’ territories to conduct military and looting 
operations in order to fight against the government forces. Foreign companies and smugglers - 
                                                          
37 It should be noted here that conflict over natural resources is often part of - and exacerbates - a larger struggle 
over political, economic, cultural, or religious issues in the society. 
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as well as neighbouring states - are also often involved in these conflicts. “Blood” diamonds 
are probably the best example of this practice, which occurred in Angola and Sierra Leone. The 
majority of internal conflicts or civil wars that do not breakout as resource conflicts in the 
naturally resource-rich areas soon become resource conflicts. Natural resources also became 
means of prolonging conflicts, which can be positive for one side - usually the rebels. However, 
government forces are also overseeing and securing resource exploitation - which is usually 
needed to finance warfare - and that is expensive. At the same time, these extraordinary 
conditions represent a very good opportunity for corruption. Regimes that are dependent on 
resources for their financing can become more prepared to negotiate peace if rebels are 
successful in blocking resource exploitation. Humphreys (2005) posits six different 
mechanisms that could explain the relationship between natural resources and conflict:  
 
The Greedy Rebels mechanism with three variants: The first variant argues that domestic 
groups engage in quasi-criminal activity to benefit from resources, independent from the state. 
Another argument of the Greedy Rebels mechanism by Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that 
natural resources could be an avenue for rebels to gain state control, as in the case of Chad or 
the Republic of Congo. Plausibly, the first variant may lead to the second or vice versa, as in 
Sierra Leone, where control of the diamond areas sufficiently weakens the state and state 
capture becomes easier. In a third variant, if natural resources are concentrated in a particular 
region of a country, this may increase beliefs among discontented groups that a seceding state 
could be viable or even prosperous.38 This mechanism does not require that rebels control 
resources directly; it may be sufficient to extract rents from those who do, as has been done 
with oil extractors in Colombia, Cabinda Province in Angola, and Nigeria. 
                                                          
38 Similar arguments have been made for the cases of Biafra in Nigeria, Katanga in Congo, Cabinda in Angola, 
Casamance in Senegal, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and Southern Sudan. 
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The Greedy Outsiders mechanism: Rather than greed from rebels as discussed above, the 
existence of natural resources may be an incentive for third parties – states and corporations - 
to engage in or foster civil conflicts. For example, the escalation of civil war in Democratic 
Republic of Congo has resulted in part from the involvement of neighbouring states seeking 
raw materials (Dashwood, 2000; Meldrum, 2000; Willum, 2001). The secessionist bid in 
Katanga in Congo was supported - if not instigated - by the Belgian firm Union Minière du 
Haut Katanga, and evidence suggests that the French oil corporation Elf took actions that led 
to an escalation of the conflict in the Republic of Congo (Verschave, 2000). 
 
The Grievance mechanism: Natural resource dependence could in fact be associated with 
grievances rather than greed. There are at least four variants of this mechanism: first, countries 
with middling levels of dependence on natural resources may be experiencing transitory 
inequality as part of the development process;39 second, economies that are dependent on 
natural resources may be more vulnerable to trade shocks. These could cause instability and 
dissatisfaction within groups that suffer from the shocks (in this case, the problem is not with 
dependence on natural resources, per se, but that natural-resource-dependent economies are 
likely to be dependent on a small number of commodities for their export earnings);40 third, the 
process of extraction may produce grievances, for example, through forced migration. Ross 
(2004) describes externalities of the extraction process itself in Aceh and Papua New Guinea, 
such as environmental damage and loss of land rights; finally, natural resource wealth may be 
seen as more unjustly distributed than other wealth, as has been claimed in Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria. In Niger, the insurgent groups stress not just that the north receives little investment 
                                                          
39For example, the Kuznets curve hypothesis, which predicts transitory inequality resulting simply from the fact 
that different parts of an economy may develop at different rates. 
40 Vulnerability will also be more likely if the risks associated with the commodities are highly correlated, either 
in terms of price fluctuations or in terms of production conditions, such as the weather. There is no reason to 
expect that an economy exporting a diversified portfolio of natural resources will be particularly susceptible to 
income shocks. 
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from the political centre in the south, but also that the south relies economically on revenues 
gained from the uranium wealth of the north, with no visible returns to the north. Such are the 
fears presently in Chad; with no expectation that any of the oil revenues will accrue to their 
region, local leaders in the Doba area have petitioned to the oil corporations for direct 
compensation in the form of scooters for each village leader. 
 
The Feasibility mechanism: Natural resources could provide a way to finance rebellions that 
have been started for other reasons, thereby increasing the prospects of success. In other words, 
natural resources provide the opportunity - as opposed to the motivation for the conflict. This 
occurs either through control of production during conflict or through the sales of booty futures.  
With this mechanism, natural resources are seen as a permissive cause - and not a root cause - 
of conflict.  
 
 
The Weak State mechanism: The structure of a state may be weaker if it is dependent on natural 
resources. There are two prominent variations of the argument, both of which focus on the 
strength of state-society linkages. One variant focuses on the society side of weak society-state 
relations and holds that when citizens are untaxed by governments, they have less power over 
them; they may have less information about government activity, weaker incentives to monitor 
government behaviour, and fewer instruments at their disposal to withdraw support from 
governments. Accordingly, resource-dependent states may have little compulsion to respond to 
the demands of their citizens or create structures that engage their citizens. The implications of 
these arguments are ambiguous, insofar as they may result in greater insulation, but less 
resilience of the state. The second channel focuses on the state side of state-society relations, 
arguing that governments that rely on natural resources - rather than taxation - have weakened 
incentives to create strong institutions. This argument is based on oil-dependent states and is 
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stressed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), who argue that oil states are more likely to have weak 
structures because they have less need for intrusive organisations to raise revenue (Moore, 
2001). The result may be a state divorced from domestic economy, such as Democratic 
Republic of Congo under Mobutu’s regime.  
 
The Sparse Network: Reasonably, the importance of natural resources may lie in their impacts 
on the daily economic activities of the citizens of an economy, how these in turn affect attitudes 
of the citizens, and how they relate with each other. The sparse network is an indirect route that 
could function in many different ways. First, natural-resource-dependent economies may have 
weak manufacturing sectors - an effect intensified by “Dutch Disease” dynamics41 - and 
correspondingly low levels of internal trade. To an extent internal trade is associated with 
greater levels of social cohesion and interregional interdependence; if manufacturing sectors 
are weak and the economy is fragmented into different production enclaves, this may raise 
conflict risks. The argument that dense trade networks reduce conflict risks is already well 
established in the study of international conflicts. Liberal theorists argue that where trade is 
mutually beneficial, to fight with a trading partner would be to commit “commercial suicide” 
(Angell, 1933). Related arguments claim that trading partners through exchange develop 
greater understanding for each other’s’ cultures. Also, political philosophers suggest that trade 
reduces the risk of conflict because trade alters cultures: that there is something about trade that 
makes people less violent (Hirschman, 1982; Ensminger, 2001). Empirical research 
demonstrates that once proximity is taken into account, states that trade with each other are less 
likely to fight each other (Doyle, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Russett, 2002).42 However, 
                                                          
41 Dutch Disease” describes the effect of a rise in the price of non-tradables relative to tradables that adversely 
impacts on non-boom exporting sectors. The effect may also lower growth if manufactured exports are more 
growth-enhancing than non-tradables. Since growth is negatively associated with conflict, it could be that 
natural resources effect conflict via their impact on growth. 
42 Evidence suggests that when variables such as geographic proximity are controlled for, trade reduces conflict. 
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good cross-national measures of the density of internal trade or the scarceness of internal 
networks do not exist, and so this hypothesis - tested at the international level - is unproven at 
the within-country level.  
 There are many other possible mechanisms underlying the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict that do not suggest that civil war is typically a result of greed. Different 
mechanisms require different sorts of policy responses. It is, however, essential to know what 
response is most appropriate and this requires thinking more carefully about ways to distinguish 
the workings of these different mechanisms. This chapter attempts to empirically examine how 
natural resources affect the onset and duration of conflict.  
 
 
5.2.2 Natural resources and the Duration of conflict 
There are different avenues through which natural resources may affect the duration of conflict. 
Humphreys (2005) points out seven ways this could occur, but only five will be discussed in 
this chapter: 
The Feasibility Mechanism: It is possible that financing from natural resources creates longer 
wars by enabling rebel groups to keep fighting; the marginal effect of local natural resource 
endowments may be to increase duration. The duration of the Angola conflict is in part 
explained by the fact that both sides had access to natural resource financing to support their 
combatants. Across Sub-Saharan African states, there is evidence for this idea; the wars in 
Senegal and Sudan have been long in duration and rebel groups have been able to benefit 
directly from the resources – both commodities and non-traded foodstuffs – around them. 
Conflicts in Niger and Mali have been more difficult to sustain; the regions occupied by 
insurgents in these countries have not been wealthy enough to support a protracted struggle. 
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The Military Balances Mechanism: The financing available to the military is of use not just 
for keeping combatants alive and fighting, but for protecting assets and inflicting damages on 
the opposing side; these are effects that influence the ease of victory and may also influence 
the ease of negotiated settlements. To an extent, the link between natural resources and conflict 
through this mechanism assumes that one side will have more assets available to them, thus 
prolonging the duration of the conflict. The expectation – based on the quantitative study of 
international wars – is that wars with financial asymmetries are likely to be less in duration. In 
this instance, the marginal impact of quantities of natural resources on duration depends on 
whether they tend to produce more symmetric or less symmetric forces. One implication of this 
logic is that changes in international policy and actions on conflict financing – such as the 
regulation of the diamond trade – can increase conflict duration if they lead to greater symmetry 
between combatant sides.  
Ross (2002) suggests that “booty futures” financing – meaning financing to secure 
assets that can be gained after war ends – can be associated with longer wars. However, it is 
not clear why this should be so; as the mechanism requires the ability to make credible 
commitments, it is expected that it works to the advantage of one side only: the government, or 
rather, the side that already has rights that it can sell and that can – in principle – be enforced 
with the help of the international system. This thereby leads to asymmetries and possibly 
shorter wars. In any case, whichever side is financed by booty futures, if benefits accrue only 
after a conflict ends, it is expected that financiers will act only when they expect wars to be 
short or when they seek to ensure that wars are short.  
 
The Fragmented Organisational Structures Mechanism: A new line of research argues that 
that the extent to which the benefits from conflict require joint production may affect rebel 
organisational structures. Le Billon (2001) emphasises on the centralisation of the production 
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process, with concentrated resources – such as oil – requiring more organisational cohesion and 
allowing for more hierarchical organisational structures than diffuse resources such as minerals. 
As Ross (2003) argues, goods also vary in how they can be marketed and this, too, can affect 
group cohesion.  
Weinstein (2005) examines the benefits that can be targeted to individuals in the short 
run and those benefits that accrue only in the long term and are conditional on the success of 
the rebellion. Researchers (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, 2001; Sambanis, 2004) suggest a 
positive relationship between the cohesiveness of a rebel organisation – or its degree of 
hierarchy – and the duration of a conflict.43 The experiences of Senegal and Mali, however, 
both suggest that, if anything, the lack of cohesiveness leads to longer conflicts. While 
cohesiveness may improve the fighting capacity of a group – and thereby delay any military 
victory over the group by the government – in a context where military victory is unlikely, 
cohesiveness may instead lead to an improved ability to reach a negotiated settlement. On the 
other hand, the lack of cohesion can prevent effective negotiation by preventing the formulation 
of a coherent system or set of demands; it may also result in an inability on the part of rebel 
groups to convince the state that they can deliver what they offer. 
 
The Domestic Conflict Premium Mechanism: Groups that benefit during conflict may prefer 
to fight than to win, therefore acting as spoilers to peace processes. Keen (1998) and Collier 
(2000) argue that if natural resource endowments are associated more with greed-inspired 
rebellions, then the fighters in these conflicts may not have an interest in the success of 
negotiations. Weinstein (2005) adds a new element to such domestic conflict premium 
arguments. He argues that the nature of the resources available to a group can structure the 
                                                          
43 More hierarchical structures may lead to longer wars because the leadership is less likely to suffer personally 
from the costs of the conflict and is more likely to gain a large share of benefits. However, if a settlement can be 
negotiated that benefits the leadership; more hierarchical organisations may be better able to guarantee the 
adherence of the organisation to the terms of the settlement. 
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characteristics of the group’s membership. Groups with natural resource wealth may be more 
likely to attract “consumers” that benefit from the rewards that take place during conflict; they 
might be less capable of attracting “investors”, who may be driven by benefits that are realised 
only after successful collective action.  
Humphreys (2005) posited a caveat to the argument above. He argues that in 
establishing a link between the benefits of war and the duration of conflict, it is important to 
know that individuals not only benefit in wartime, but also believe that they benefit more than 
they would in times of peace. The real question, though, is what prevents parties from agreeing 
on a peaceful arrangement that leaves everyone better off? Usual answers to this question focus 
on the ability of agents to make credible commitments to each other to honour agreements made 
in war time. Another possibility is a feasibility constraint on negotiators; individuals may not 
do well out of war because they are engaged in illegal activities that they would not be able to 
undertake during peacetime.  
 
 
The International Conflict Premium Mechanism: This mechanism recognises the pressure 
that third parties can have on conflict and conflict resolution; their incentives can help 
determine the duration of conflicts. Neighbouring states can provide sanctuary for rebel bases 
within their borders and can provide logistical support to one side or another. They can also 
facilitate mediation. Which of these they decide to do may depend again on the optimal benefits 
they can expect to achieve during wartime relative to those they could gain in a negotiated 
settlement, a feature that can often depend on the resource endowments of their neighbours. 
The greatest international influence on the duration of the Mali conflict was probably that 
exerted by Algeria; the Mali conflict took place in a region bordering southern Algeria, home 
to Berber populations living in similar conditions to those of Tuareg groups in Mali. Algeria 
had security reasons for not wanting the conflict drag on, but it also failed to gain economically 
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from the conflict. It used its control over supply routes and over Tuareg exiles and refugees in 
Algeria to place pressure on the rebels. And as a major supplier of oil as well as military and 
economic aid, it placed pressure on Bamako. Countries neighbouring Senegal did not have the 
same fears of a spread of the conflict, with neither Guinea-Bissau nor Gambia having strong 
motivations to bring the conflict to an end. Indeed, both countries have benefited from the war 
economy associated with the conflict; Guinea-Bissau routed cashew exports through the zone 
and acted as a market to areas more isolated from Senegalese markets; Gambia was involved 
with the routing of cannabis and timber exports through the country (Evans, 2002). As a result, 
not only have the rebels not come under pressure from these sources, but they have benefited 
financially and militarily from their relations with them. 
 
5.3 Empirical Literature on Conflicts and Natural Resources 
Researchers have divided the proponents of socio-economic theories of resource conflicts into 
two groups – with regard to the resource abundance or resource scarcity – as the cause of 
conflict. Le Billon (2001) states that according to advocates of the scarce resource wars 
hypothesis, people or nations will fight each other to secure access to the resources necessary 
for their survival: the more scarce the resource, the more bitter the fight. The resource 
abundance conflict literature argues that primary commodities are easily and heavily taxable 
and are therefore attractive to both the ruling elites and their competitors. In the first group are, 
among others, Collier and Le Billon, and in the second Homer-Dixon (1999) and Renner 
(1996). Among the studies of resource conflict, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) analyse 54 large-
scale civil wars that occurred between 1965 and 1999, finding that higher share of primary 
commodity exports in GDP significantly and substantially increases the risk of conflict. They 
compare countries with 10% and 25% of their GDP coming from resources; holding other 
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characteristics constant at the mean for low-income developing countries, the risk of a civil war 
for these countries in the subsequent five years rises from 11% to 29%. They investigate 
whether there were significant differences between groups of commodities and find that oil is 
the only distinctive one. High levels of oil dependence are even more likely to be associated 
with conflict than similarly high levels of dependence upon other commodity exports. Collier 
(2001) estimates that close to fifty armed conflicts active in 2001 had a strong link to natural 
resource exploitation, in which either licit or illicit exploitation helped to trigger, intensify, or 
sustain violence. 
Ross (2003) also finds that resource abundance plays an important role as a cause of the 
conflict. He supports this argument by studying 13 different resource conflicts, mostly from 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, while oil, non-fuel minerals, and illicit drugs appear to 
influence conflict, other types of primary commodities – notably legal agricultural commodities 
– seem to be unrelated to civil war, at least in 13 cases studied. Resource abundance, however, 
does not have such a clear effect on the longevity of resource conflicts, according to Ross 
(2004). When it comes to oil, price increases would exacerbate a mix of “greed” and 
“grievances,” increasing the likelihood of civil war, coup, or even foreign intervention through 
growing nationalism, allegations of corruption, or desire to capture a (greater) share of larger 
revenues (Le Billon, 2009).  
In a study confined to African civil wars, Buhaug and Rod (2006) differentiate between 
territorial conflict that is more likely in sparsely populated regions near the state border – at a 
distance from the capital and without significant rough terrain – and conflict over state 
governance that is more likely to occur in densely-populated regions near diamond fields and 
close to the capital. The authors discover no indications of a systematic relationship between 
oil and gas installations and the location of civil war.  
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Similarly, natural resources in the conflict zone provide rebel groups with greater 
opportunities to loot these resources if they are easily accessible. Sufficient funding 
opportunities from abundant resources enable rebel leaders to procure arms and recruit 
belligerents with the aim of disempowering a government. The empirical results of Buhaug et 
al. (2009) and Lujala (2010) support the argument that the lootability (or accessibility) of 
natural resources increases the feasibility of insurgency and lengthens civil war duration. 
According to Lujala (2010), lootable resources – such as gemstones and secondary diamonds 
– and non-lootable resources – such as oil and natural gas – in conflict zones are strongly related 
to longer duration of conflict.  Central governments very often inflict the violence experienced 
in resource-rich regions through a repressive apparatus. The local populations normally get less 
than 10% of what is left from resource rents, after corruption takes its share. After all, a majority 
of resource-dependent countries rank very high on the scale of corruption perception index, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kurečić, Hunjet, Perec, 2014).  
Collier and Hoeffler (2000) suggest that countries whose wealth is largely dependent 
on the exportation of primary commodities - a category that includes both agricultural produce 
and natural resources - are highly prone to civil violence. In explaining the correlation between 
the primary commodities and conflict, the authors argue that conflict may be explained either 
grievance - such as feelings of ethnic or political marginalisation - or by greed. They conclude 
that civil conflicts can be understood if the focus of study is on the greed mechanism of rebels 
and on the way in which natural resources are traded. The difficulty with this conclusion is that 
the relationship between commodities and conflict does not suggest either that rebels are greedy 
or that they finance their campaigns through trade in natural resources. The correlation could 
arise if conflict or expectation of conflict causes other economic activities - such as tourism 
and manufacturing - to cease, leaving only extractive industries to function (Bannon and 
Collier, 2003). 
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Fearon (2003) examines 128 civil wars that occurred in the period 1945 - 1999 and 
shows that rebel forces mainly obtain financial resources from contraband goods such as opium, 
cocoa, and gems, thereby prolonging the duration of war. Buhaug and Lujala (2005) and Regan 
and Aydin (2006) also find that gemstones and cocoa are related to longer wars. Fearon (2003) 
and other scholars conclude that the easy accessibility of resource wealth leads to a longer civil 
war, as it increases the feasibility of rebel activities. Since it is difficult for rebels to organise 
their own groups and continue an insurgency without adequate financing to procure arms and 
belligerents, wealth from abundant natural resources increases the feasibility of rebellion as it 
provides rebel leaders with sufficient funding.  
Le Billion (2001) and Lujala (2005) indicate the importance of the lootable mechanism 
and the geographical characteristics of natural resources. Since resources are “natural”, factors 
such as where they are mined, and the difficulty of production and transportation play a major 
role in determining if these resources are lootable. In order to provide rebels with the possibility 
of armed conflict, natural resources must be something that can be looted by rebel groups. 
Therefore, even if resources are abundant, they do not influence the duration of civil war if they 
cannot be or are difficult to be looted by rebel groups. On the other hand, because non-lootable 
resources are likely to be controlled by a government, such resources strengthen the power 
basement of government. 
Keen (2000) argues that lootable resources can stimulate rebels’ incentive or motivation 
for continuing civil war, as well as increase the probability of fighting. During conflict, 
individual rebels can more easily continue to commit criminal activities (looting or illegal 
commerce of spoils) in order to accumulate personal gains than they can during peaceful period. 
Rebels can initiate an insurgency against the government in order to obtain ‘wealth’. In other 
words, conflict periods provide rebel groups with the incentive to prolong the duration of 
conflict (Addison, Le Billon; Murshed, 2002). Lujala (2010) interprets the result that lootable 
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resources are positively and significantly related to duration as evidence that rebels prefer the 
continuation of wartime to a decisive military victory or negotiated settlement (i.e., civil war 
termination). However, some studies show the results that natural resources are not related to 
civil war duration. Ross (2006) disaggregates oil and diamonds into offshore oil and onshore 
oil and primary diamonds and secondary diamonds on the basis of the resource lootability and 
finds that there is no statistically significant relationship between lootable or non-lootable 
resources and civil war duration.  
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2010) also show that oil resources have a weak or no 
significant effect on the incentive of continuing an insurgence. Furthermore, Humphreys (2005) 
examines the effect of oil production and reserves and diamond production on the duration of 
civil war; he argues that natural resource production is related to shorter civil war. He interprets 
the results as implying that when the stronger side obtains natural resources, the duration of 
conflict becomes shorter than before and lengthens when the weaker side gains resource wealth. 
Humphrey’s (2005) argument regarding the balance of power between rebe ls and the 
government indicates that when rebels or governments obtain resource wealth, they can 
strengthen their relative power – for example, by purchasing arms and recruiting soldiers – by 
obtaining resources, thereby changing the power equation in favour of the side that has greater 
access and control over natural resources. While lootable resources may increase the 
probability of rebels, non-lootable resources can reinforce the power of government. In essence, 
both lootable and non-lootable resources may have different effects on the onset and duration 
of conflict. Additionally, since resource wealth strengthens the side that controls and exploits 
natural resources, the relative capability between a government and rebel before conflict start 
also plays a significant role in duration and final outcomes.  
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In the last two decades, Sub-Saharan countries have experienced more resource-type 
conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). These conflicts occasionally result in coups and 
regime change. Sudan experienced regime change conflict tied with oil, which finally resulted 
in South Sudan becoming a nation in 2011.  Nigeria has also experienced violent internal 
conflicts that were quite evidently related to natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). 
African economies are somewhat different with respect to culture and ethnicity when 
considering the nature of conflicts and resources. The majority of the countries also have high 
corruption rate index compared to other countries (World Bank, 2015). This approach was 
taken by Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005), who study the effect of diamonds on the onset 
of conflict. They find evidence that secondary diamonds are linked to the onset of larger civil 
wars for the post-1985 period. They are not, however, able to control for whether the rebels 
had access to diamonds. The approach was also taken by Lujala (2010), who studies the effect 
of natural resources on conflict onset and duration and finds evidence that onshore oil 
production increases the risk of conflict onset.  
Fearon (2004) is the first to code conflicts in which rebels are known to have exploited 
lootable resources. He finds that these conflicts tend to last substantially longer. However, he 
fails to account for cases where lootable resources are available in the conflict region but, for 
one reason or another, rebels do not exploit them (or there is no outside knowledge of 
exploitation). It is also possible that the conflict ended before the rebels could or need to utilise 
the natural resources. It is also possible that smuggled goods are involved in prolonged conflicts 
precisely because they are long, and the rebels are forced to exploit natural resources; use of 
natural resources may be merely an indication of prolonged conflict but not the cause. Ross 
(2006) states that, in many cases, the rebel groups do not begin to sell exploited goods until 
several years after the conflict started. Therefore, it would be more correct to identify all cases 
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in which rebels had access to lootable resources and investigate whether these conflicts last 
longer. 
 
5.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Examining the relationship between natural resources and conflict is interesting both from an 
academic perspective – as there are still a lot of unanswered questions – as well as from a policy 
perspective. Understanding how natural resources influence conflict can contribute to 
understanding why resources sometimes go hand in hand with a healthy and wealthy 
democracy (as has arguably been the case in Botswana and South Africa), while in other cases 
they appear to coexist with infiltrating conflict (as in the Republic of Congo). Understanding 
the effects of natural resources – not just on conflict onset, but also on the duration – can help 
to contribute to creating policy initiatives to help build and maintain peace in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
While the data and study of natural resources has developed over the last decade, no 
clear results have emerged on how natural resources influence conflict using only Sub-Saharan 
countries as case studies. This study goes further by empirically examining how natural 
resources – renewable and non-renewable – affect conflict onset. The argument is that natural 
resources impact on conflict indirectly through areas such: as resource scarcity or abundance; 
related ecosystems; ownership allocation; disagreement over the management of these 
resources; ethnic tensions; poor governance; political exclusion; and environmental factors. We 
also test if institutions reduce the risk of natural resource conflicts.  By studying these shifts, 
this study seek answer the following questions: 
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1. Do natural resources cause the onset of conflict?  
2. Does the type of natural resources matter in starting or prolonging a conflict 
 
Research Hypotheses 
Recent studies by Cederman et al. (2011) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) stress the role of 
grievances in promoting conflicts. The authors argue that contemporary research has focused 
almost entirely on the opportunity structure for conflict onset, that is, the opportunities available 
to either extort or finance a rebellion. However, grievances based on resentment may also cause 
rebellion. These resentments often happen when there are comparisons between groups – either 
between the elites and the opposition group or between different ethnic groups – due to resource 
rents inequality. Thus, grievances can facilitate mobilisation. Oil, gas and diamonds may 
produce systematic economic, political, and/or social inequalities between groups, such as the 
unequal distribution of oil rents, forced migration, environmental damage, and the loss of land 
rights (Ross, 2004).  
These social disruptions are effective drivers for the recruitment of insurgents who want 
to fight for an apparently noble cause. Along with grievance, greed is often mentioned as a 
major facilitator of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).44 According to Hoeffler (2011), 
greed can help groups to overcome the “free riding” problem by generating private incentives. 
Natural resources may provide these kinds of selective incentives that encourage participation 
in rebellion. 
The promise of private returns – in the forms of immediate or future resource income – 
may motivate individuals to join in with the rebel cause. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) 
argue that evidence from Truth and Reconciliation Commission suggests that Sierra Leone’s 
                                                          
44 Collier (2000) states, “the true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance, but the silent force of 
greed.” Although this might be important in some cases, it is impossible to tell the true intentions underlying the decisions or 
choice of actions of the rebels.   
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civil defence forces engaged in diamond trading in order to offer material benefits for their 
fighters. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) also find that ‘individuals offered money or 
diamonds were six times more likely to participate in the RUF.”  Participation in rebel activities 
may also be motivated by expectations about future income from resources (e.g. once key 
bodies managing resource revenues have come under the control of the insurgents). Also, 
countries that are dependent on natural resources may be more vulnerable to terms of trade 
shocks (Humphreys, 2005). This could cause instability and dissatisfaction within groups that 
suffer from these shocks.  Therefore, it is expected that: 
H1: Grievances (as a result of inequality in natural resource rents) increase the likelihood of 
conflict onset. 
 
 
In addition to providing a motive for mobilisation in the form grievance, the Greed 
mechanism may be appropriate when resource rents generate income for the insurgents. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) argue that when gains from natural resources posit a higher value than the 
cost to obtain them, individuals will be persuaded to spend time and resources to acquire them. 
In other words, where resources are lootable and obstructable, individuals will seek to obtain 
them, an activity often denoted as “loot-seeking” behaviour. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue 
that due to being geographically fixed, lootable resources are easier appropriable than – for 
example – manufacturing, which can be relocated. What causes insurgency and conflict is thus 
viewed as mainly a matter of business opportunities rather than political motivation based on 
grievances. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also agree that greed – and the possibility of obtaining 
natural resources – can be a motivator for rebel groups, but argue contrary to Collier and 
Hoeffler that this works through bids to gain state control. In states with large amounts of 
resources, the value of capturing the state becomes larger, leading greedy rebels to take up arms 
against the government. Following on from Humphreys (2005), he argues that the “greedy 
rebels” mechanism can be examined by analysing if resource reserves significantly cause 
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conflict onset after controlling for production. If this is the case, he claims, this indicates that 
natural resources cause conflict onset through the “greedy rebels” mechanism. In line with this, 
the second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Lootable natural resources increase the likelihood of conflict onset. 
 
In situations where the resources are lootable and obstructable,45 it could provide ethnic groups 
with the necessary financial means to acquire the essential resources for rebellion, such as 
weapons, know-how, logistic facilities, transportation, or military equipment. When resources 
are ‘‘lootable’’, rebels can extract and sell these themselves. By using the threat of kidnapping 
or blowing up pipelines, they may impose so-called “war taxes” on those who manage the 
resources.  
In addition, internal violence can be financed by selling future rights to extract fuels. 
Ross (2004) highlights the role of “booty futures” in financing rebellion in countries such as 
Liberia, the Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. Having the chance to secure resources in 
future combats, insurgents are able to sell future mineral rights to foreign firms or neighbouring 
governments (Ross, 2004). For example, in the oil-rich Congo, a fierce power struggle emerged 
in 1997 between incumbent President Patrice Lissouba and former head of state Denis Sassou-
Nguesso. Sassou-Nguesso, in particular, was able to draw on external support from Angola and 
France, the latter being keen to avoid Lissouba potentially selling oil licenses to US 
multinational companies and not French Elf Aquitaine (now Total, Plc), which had traditionally 
dominated the oil sector in the former French colony (Englebert and Ron, 2004). This suggests 
that conflict and its persistence require motivation and opportunity. Both ethnic diversity and 
natural resources can provide such conditions. While it is possible that ethnic fractionalisation 
                                                          
45 Lootable resources are resources that are easily accessible to rebels and can be extracted for financial or 
welfare gains. Non-lootable resources cannot be extracted by rebels or other organised groups. 
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is a conflict risk on its own – particularly when based on politically relevant groups – there is 
the possibility that the combination of ethnic fractionalisation and natural resources further 
increases the risk of the onset of conflict between ethnic groups. Also, extraction of natural 
resources sometimes produces forced migration, which leads to environmental damage and loss 
of land rights (Humphreys, 2005). When this occurs, ethnic intolerance may develop leading 
to conflicts. 
H3: Increase in ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of conflict onset.  
 
 
Resource conflicts could escalate depending on several factors, including internal power 
struggles between government elites – or between elites and the rebels – or regional dominance 
ambitions. When resources are scarce or abundant, political instability makes countries much 
more vulnerable to conflict. The political instability influences not only the governance 
structure, but also all other infrastructures that depend on government control and oversight, 
such as national oil-production facilities, highways, and ports (Kahl, 2006). Population growth, 
environmental degradation, and resource inequality can combine to weaken an already unstable 
government capacity to address the needs of the populace, thus fuelling conflicts. These 
conflicts can often result in destruction of the environment and infrastructure, increasing the 
scarcity of resources and, in turn, further increasing the potential for violent conflict or the 
duration of conflict (Gleditsch, 2007).  
Conflicts also often destroy infrastructure – such as pipelines or oil fields – and decrease 
productivity of mining, thus furthering the downward spiral in economies affected by conflict. 
Furthermore, poor management of resources could accelerate the economic decline of a 
country. Societies involved in conflict may find that governments, businesses, and other groups 
have sometimes profited by the instability of a government, thereby engaging in illegal sale or 
control of natural resources. Resource capture by powerful groups leads to an increase in the 
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wealth gap between the elites and marginal groups. This gap not only causes grievances among 
the local population, but also increases the vulnerability of the most disadvantaged people and 
groups. This leads to the next hypothesis: 
H4: Political instability (level of democracy) increases the duration of conflict.  
 
5.5 Methodology, Data and Variables 
Earlier studies of the relationship between natural resources and conflicts have arrived at 
different and often contradicting results. This is partly due to different methodological 
approaches employed by different scholars. The difference in approach has been mainly due to 
the difficulty in establishing a common mechanism through which natural resources impact on 
conflict. One or more of the mechanisms could also be operating at the same time.   
The model in this study follows the work of Reuveny and Maxwell (2001). In their 
model, it is assumed that there are two groups of population sizes N1(t) and N2(t) in period t. 
Each group can access the same natural resource. It is assumed that each group also gets 
resource rents allocated to them. In this model, parties fight over natural resources not only 
because of greed or grievance, but also for the ability to invest their spoils for financial gains 
both in the present and future. The duration of the conflict is affected by factors such as 
international organisations involved in the country or future financial gains if the conflict is 
ongoing; that is the International Conflict Premium mechanism, where pressure from third 
parties can impact on conflict duration. Shelter, manpower, weaponry, and financial support 
could be given to either of the groups, potentially putting an end to the conflict or prolonging 
it, depending on the optimal benefit that the third parties intend to achieve during these 
conflicts.  
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Furthermore, the groups that benefit the most during conflict may prefer to keep fighting 
than to win because of the gains of ongoing conflict; the group therefore acts as a spoiler to 
peace processes and resists any peace agreement. The military base of a country could also 
affect the duration of conflict. In this case, if the other group is the government and the military 
is acting on its behalf, it is essential that the military is fully equipped to deal with the rebels 
and take territorial powers over the natural resource. Several mechanisms – both direct and 
indirect – that determine the relationship between natural resources may work simultaneously 
(Lujala, 2010). It is somewhat accepted that natural resource dependence and exportation are 
related to conflict onset (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Humphreys, 2005; de Soysa and Neumayer, 
2007). It is therefore difficult in empirical analysis to distinguish the different mechanisms 
linking natural resources to conflict. There are only a few choices to measure the resource base 
of a country; the most widely used measures commonly take the export value of natural 
resources or specific resource type and standardise it with respect to the size of the economy or 
total exports (Ross, 2004). Others use rent estimates instead of export value (de Soysa and 
Neumayer, 2007). These measures are used either directly or with a dummy created for 
countries that score above a specific cut-off point.  
 
5.5.1 Discrete Choice Models (DCM) 
In order to have a clear understanding of the relationship between resources and conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to employ a robust method of research. The study uses the 
logistic regression models. The DCM models analyse data that represents either a decision or a 
choice.  Extant literature assumes that the variable yi is a continuous random variable. However, 
with discrete choice models, the dependent variable can be limited. Two separate models can 
be generated from the limited variation of the dependent variable. They are the discrete 
dependent model and the continuous dependent model. The discrete dependent variables have 
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the discrete choice models and the Duration (hazard) model, while the continuous dependent 
variable has the truncated censored models.  
To model discrete choice models, a discrete variable y is observed and a set of variables 
is connected with the decision xi. The model highlights the fundamental choice problem and 
how to maximise utility for each individual. Sometimes it is a single choice, then the data is 
binary, with ‘1’ representing a decision to do something, while ‘0’ represents a decision not to 
do something, or there could be several choices to choose from. Then the data may come as 1, 
2,…J, where J represents a number of choices. An individual will make a decision based on 
available information and the choice that gives maximum satisfaction.  
Discrete Dependent Variable  
The two standard binary outcome models are the logit model and probit model. The models 
specify different functional forms of predicting the probability of participation in a given 
situation as a function of regressors. The models are fit by maximum likelihood (ML); 
sometimes a linear probability fit by ordinary least squares (OLS) is also used.  The dependent 
variable y takes only two values.  
Y = ‘1’ with probability p or ‘0’ with probability of 1 – p. Given that p is a function of regressor 
x, the outcome values are set to 1 and 0. 
The probability mass function for the observed outcome y is 
yy pp  1)1( with pyE )( and 
)1()( ppyVar         (5.1) 
A regression model can be designed by p being dependent on an index function ,
'x where x  
is a K x 1 regressor vector and   is a vector of unknown parameters. In these models, the 
conditional probability usually takes the form: 
)()|1Pr( 'iii xFxyp        (5.2) 
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where F(.) is a specified parametric function of ,
'x this ensures that the bounds 10  p  are 
satisfied. The four commonly-used functional forms of )( 'ixF are logit, probit, linear 
probability, and complementary log-log forms. 
As conflict onset is a dichotomous variable, the logistic regression is applicable. When 
dealing with count dependent variables, most of the techniques derived from regular linear 
regressions become unsuitable (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Powers and Xie, 2008). Hence, 
special techniques are required for regression analysis of dichotomous dependent variables. 
Logistic regression is among the more developed and most widely used techniques for 
estimating models with dependent binary variables (Long and Freese, 2006). 
In other words, logistic regressions are therefore appropriately suited for this analysis. 
Likewise, the quantitative literature on natural resources and conflict has mainly used logistic 
regression models. While logistic regression is not the only technique suited to analyse count 
variables, the flexibility and robustness it provides makes it useful for the purposes of this 
study.46 Additionally, analysing the different mechanisms through interaction effects is fairly 
straightforward in logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Therefore, logistic 
regression appears to be a well-suited method of approach for studying the relationship between 
natural resources and conflict onset. 
 
5.5.2 Duration (Hazard) Model 
Hazard-based duration models characterise a set of analytical methods that are appropriate for 
modelling data and have as their focus an end-of-duration occurrence, given that the duration 
has lasted for some specified time (Hensher and Mannering, 1994; Kiefer, 1988). This concept 
                                                          
46 Other methods of analysis are the Cox model, Weibull model, and the rare events analysis.  
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of conditional probability of an end to duration recognises the dynamics of duration; that is, it 
recognises that the likelihood of ending the duration depends on the length of elapsed time 
since the start of the duration.  
There are two important features of the duration data: first, it is possible for the data to 
be censored in one form or the other; second, that exogenous determinants of the event times 
characterising the data may change during the event spell. The hazard-based approach to 
duration modelling can accommodate both of the distinguishing features of duration data – that 
is, censoring and time-varying variables – in a fairly simple and flexible method. The hazard 
function could be explained mathematically by taking a non-negative random variable T 
representing the duration time. T may be continuous or discrete. For the purposes of this study, 
we focus on a continuous T. The hazard at time u on the continuous time period (u) is defined 
as the probability that the duration under study will end within a small time period h after time 
u, given the duration has not elapsed until time u.  A detailed mathematical definition for the 
hazard in terms of probabilities is: 
h
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This definition makes it possible to relate the hazard to density function f(.) and cumulative 
distribution function F(.) for T. Subsequently, the probability of the duration ending in within 
a small time period h after time u is given as f(u)*h and the probability that duration does not 
end before time u is 1-F(u). The hazard rate can therefore be written as: 
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where S(u) denotes the endurance probability or the survivor probability. This represents the 
probability that the duration did not end prior to u, that is, the duration ended at the appropriate 
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time u. The shape of the hazard function, therefore, has implications to the dynamics of the 
duration. It is possible to adopt a parametric shape or a non-parametric shape. For this study, 
the focus is on the parametric shape. 
 
Parametric Shape 
The parametric shape takes the continuous time form  )(u for all u, where  is the constant 
hazard rate. This implies that there is no duration dependence or dynamics; the conditional exit 
probability from the duration is not associated to the time passed since start of the duration. 
The constant-hazard assumption corresponds to an exponential distribution for the duration 
distribution. A generalisation of the constant-hazard assumption is a two-parameter hazard 
function, which results in a Weibull distribution for the duration data. The hazard rate in this 
case allows for monotonically increasing or decreasing duration dependence and is given by: 
 ,)()(
1  uu    0,0    
The type of the duration dependence is based on the parameter α. If α > 1, then there is 
positive duration dependence (suggesting a “snowballing” effect, where the longer the time has 
elapsed since start of the duration, the more likely it is to exit the duration soon). If α < 1, there 
is negative duration dependence (suggesting an “inertial” effect, where the longer the time has 
elapsed since start of the duration, the less likely it is to exit the duration soon). If α = 0, there 
is no duration dependence (which is the exponential case). The Weibull distribution allows only 
monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard duration dependence. However, a distribution 
that permits a non-monotonic hazard form is the log-logistic distribution. Several other 
parametric distributions may also be adopted for the duration distribution, including the 
Gompertz, log-normal, gamma, generalised gamma, and generalised F distributions (Hensher 
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and Mannering, 1994; Lancaster, 1990; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002). This study does not 
go into detail in explaining these methods, as it is out of the scope of the study. 
To analyse the effect of natural resources on conflict duration, it is important to consider 
exogenous factors that may influence this relationship. Incorporating exogenous factors or 
external covariates into the hazard models usually involves two parametric forms; they are the 
proportional hazards form and the accelerated form. These parametric forms accommodate the 
effect of the covariates on hazard at any time u.  
The proportional hazard form specifies the effect of external covariates to be related to an 
underlying hazard function: 
),,(),,,( 00  xxu        (5.5) 
where 0 is a baseline hazard, x is a vector of explanatory variables and  is a corresponding 
vector of coefficients to be estimated. In proportional hazard models, the effect of external 
factors is to shift the entire hazard function either up or down, but the hazard function profile 
remains the same for every country.  
The second parametric form – known as the accelerated form – assumes covariates 
rescale time directly. There are two types of accelerated forms: a) the accelerated life time 
effect and b) the accelerated hazards effect. In the accelerated lifetime models, the probability 
that the duration will go beyond time u is given by the baseline endurance probability function. 
This endurance probability is also a function of external covariates, otherwise known as 
external factors. The role of the external factors is to accelerate (or decelerate) the termination 
of the duration period. In the accelerated hazard effect models, the effects of the covariates are 
such that the hazard rate at time u is given by the baseline hazard rate calculated at a rescaled 
time value (Chen and Wang, 2000). The difference between the accelerated lifetime models 
and the accelerated hazard effect is that, in the former, the covariates rescale time in the 
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endurance probability function; in the latter, the covariates rescale time in the underlying hazard 
function.  
 
5.5.3 Data and Variables 
In order to investigate the relationship between natural resources and civil conflict onset, data 
from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data (ACD) is used to identify civil conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for the period 1980 - 2016.47  This dataset is preferable to others for two main reasons: 
first, the data consists of information about the onset and duration of each government-rebel 
dyad; second, the dataset is arguably the most robust and comprehensive conflict dataset and 
well suited to studying the relationship between natural resources and conflict. As highlighted 
by Nathan (2005), the availability of data in developing countries remains a major concern 
when studying conflict; since conflict mostly occurs in these countries, accurate data such as 
GDP, population, income are often lacking (Nathan, 2005).  
 
Dependent Variables 
Conflict onset 
The dependent variable is civil conflict onset. This is defined as an intrastate conflict in which 
at least 25 battled related deaths (civilian and military) occurred per year. Civil conflict onset 
is coded from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and covers the period 1980 - 2016. The 
dataset includes Sub-Saharan African countries with simultaneous civil conflicts. For example, 
Republic of Congo had several ongoing conflicts in the 1990s, with six conflict onsets in total.  
 
 
                                                          
47 Civil conflict is here taken to mean organized armed conflict between collective actors within a sovereign state. 
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Conflict Duration 
The duration is measured in days, although the year is kept as the observation unit because no 
other variable is measured for a shorter period. A recurrence of a conflict that has been inactive 
for more than two calendar years is treated as a new conflict. A new conflict is also coded if 
there has been a total change in the opposite side.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
For the purposes of this chapter, natural resources have been classified as: Oil, Solid Minerals 
and Land.  
Land could be said to be the most important natural resource in Africa (Alao, 2007). 
Consequently, every society in Africa sees land as a natural resource that is held in trust for 
future generations, and this trust lies behind most of the conflicts over land in the continent. 
What further makes land essential to conflict literature is that it is the habitat of most other 
natural resources, a characteristic that means the controversies surrounding these resources 
often manifest through conflicts over the ownership, management, and control of land.  
Conflicts over land can be summarised as clashes among “groups” for “spaces.” 
“Groups” in this context come in different forms: ethnic or racial groups; local communities; 
nation-states; professional groups such as pastoralists and agriculturists; gender; or age groups. 
“Spaces” are defined as the geographical boundaries within which these groups have to 
compete for coexistence. The argument on conflicts over land in Africa are rooted in the 
inability of the government to manage the conflicting legacies left by the different land tenure 
practices that have existed in the continent over the precolonial, colonial, and post-
independence periods, and the determination of governments and political elites to ensure 
effective grip over the ownership and control of land (Alao, 2007). 
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Natural resources – such agricultural and arable land – are not commonly used in 
literature on how it impacts on conflict onset or duration. In recent years the concentration of 
natural resources has been towards diamonds (Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, 2010).  
  Agricultural land in the data is the percentage of land area; it is referred to as the share 
of land area that is arable, under permanent crops and under permanent pastures, that is, land 
that can be used for agricultural purposes. Land constitutes a basic productive resource to the 
people of Africa. In Ghana, contestation over land is particularly acute and seems likely to 
intensify over time. The pressures of population growth, cash-crop led marketisation, large 
scale migration, and rapid urbanisation have produced increased competition; land scarcity has 
resulted in increasing politicised conflicts over land (Yelsang, 2013). Therefore, whether as a 
resource to a nation, urban, or rural area, land requires careful management for the 
maximisation of benefits derived from its utilisation (Bebelleh, 2007). Amanor (2006) states 
that land as a natural resource is acknowledged as part of the property that belongs to the people 
in a particular community or district. In other words, most conflicts in SSA are motivated by 
land laws and territorial jurisdiction over a particular land area. As a communal property 
resource, it is considered the economic, social, and political backbone of their survival as a 
people. 
Oil as a natural resource is argued to influence the resource conflicts in most nations 
(Besley and Pesson, 2009; Klare, 2001; Yu-Hsiang and Michaels, 2014). Oil could have the 
capacity to induce the onset of conflict or serve as a catalyst in affecting the duration of conflict.  
Klare (2001) projects that resources such as water, diamonds, minerals, and oil are mostly likely 
to be fought over; this analysis by Klare highlights the problem of the resource curse. Oil is a 
valuable natural resource and, over the years, countries that possess oil as a natural resource 
have protected this asset. The competition for accessing the natural resource has also increased 
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due several factors such as greed, grievance, and booty futures (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Le 
Billion, 2001; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2005).  
In examining oil’s influence on conflict onset, this study examines oil as the country’s 
primary export commodity. In addition to the arguments supporting the position that the oil can 
act as a catalyst capable of contributing to the onset of conflict, another area of literature 
presents a set of theories arguing the potential role oil serves as a variable capable of affecting 
the duration of a conflict. The general notion guiding this type of resource conflict literature is 
that because oil is a valuable – and strategically in demand – commodity resource, it can be 
sold for significant amounts of money, generating considerable rents. Whoever is capable of 
accessing those oil rents, theoretically, has at their disposal a significant level of wealth.48 Rents 
from oil can lengthen the duration of conflict if they are used to finance armed groups, whether 
they are the national military or an organised rebel group (Humphreys, 2005).  
Oil as a natural resource could also prolong the duration of conflict if it is auctioned as 
a “booty future”.  The term “booty futures” was developed by Ross (2005), who argued those 
booty futures – or selling of future exploitation rights of natural resources – contribute to the 
duration of the conflict. In this situation, the owners of the natural resource (oil) – which is 
usually the state – will sell the future rights of the resource to a buyer. This usually goes to the 
highest bidder. Depending on the specifications of the agreement, the highest bidder wins the 
right to explore, extract, produce, and sell the derived oil. It could also be argued that if oil is 
lootable, it will increase the onset or duration of conflict. In this case, it generates significant 
amount of revenue to the looters, which can be used to finance a conflict or to accumulate 
wealth. This hypothesis is tested by examining the onshore and offshore production of oil and 
how this affects conflict onset and duration.  
                                                          
48 Because oil is a valuable natural resource and internationally demanded as well, it is likely that the resource 
rents will continue to enrich whoever controls or ‘owns’ the right to the oil as it is consistently pumped, produced, 
and exported over several years. Oil as a natural resource is therefore a consistent source of income. 
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Solid Minerals have, in recent years, been considered to fuel conflicts, especially in 
African countries (Lujala, 2010). Several recent studies of civil war argue that natural resource 
endowment is a factor that facilitates and even generates conflict (Berdal and Malone, 2000). 
Some of these studies claim that resource abundance is a more important factor in civil conflict 
than resource scarcity (de Soysa, 2000). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posit the contrast of greed 
versus grievance, where greed refers to rebels initiating conflicts in order to maximise their 
personal income through wartime looting of resources such as diamonds, gemstones and other 
minerals. Other versions of this argument speak of economic opportunity, or how resource 
abundance may fuel rebellion regardless of initial motivation or ideological justification.  
The civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaıre), and 
Angola seem clearly to have been fuelled by the sale of “conflict diamonds” (Olsson, 2007). It 
has been argued that access to wealth from diamond mining was critical to the expansion of the 
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone in the early 1990s (Weinstein, 2005). These and 
other brutal civil wars in the 1990s – in which solid minerals seem to have played a central role 
– have emphasised how solid minerals can provide economic opportunity for conflict. Solid 
minerals have also been known to fuel ethnic and land ownership conflict. If minerals are 
identified to be on a particular land, this sometimes leads to conflict over who has right 
ownership to the land.  
Ross (2004) argues that case study evidence supports the concept of availability of 
lootable natural resources facilitating rebel effort once a conflict has started. Diamonds are 
especially known to cause conflict onset. This is because of the associated wealth related to 
diamonds. In analysing solid minerals as an explanatory variable, the variable is decomposed 
into diamonds, natural gas, gold and other precious metals. This is to take into account if there 
are any difference in these natural resources and how they impact on conflict onset.  
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The chapter also considers the effects of aggregated natural resource rents on conflict 
onset. This is measured by using the total resource rents as a percentage of GDP. Other 
explanatory variables used are mineral rents, which is difference between the value of 
production for a stock of minerals at world prices and their total cost of production. Minerals 
included are tin, lead, zinc, copper, iron, silver, bauxite, and phosphate.  Oil rents are the 
difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total cost of 
production. Coal rents signify the difference between the value of both hard and soft coal 
production at world prices and their total cost of production. Total reserves comprise holdings 
of monetary gold, special drawing rights, and holdings of foreign exchange.  These 
variables are included in the analysis to examine if natural resource wealth causes the onset of 
conflict. Collier (2000a) stated that resource-wealthy nations are at a higher risk of conflict 
onset because of motive and opportunity by rebel organisations. Motive is the private gain or 
greed that can be attained from exploiting the resource and the opportunity is the finance 
available to fund a large rebel organisation through lootable resources. The finance provided 
by natural resources might explain the long duration of civil wars, even in cases where the start 
of conflict had nothing to do with natural resources and might have instead been caused by a 
‘grievance’. Unequal distribution of natural resource rents may also create severe grievances, 
especially if a region with abundant natural resources is deprived of revenue flows while still 
bearing extraction costs such as pollution and degradation of land (Lujala, 2010). 
 
Control Variables 
Several factors affect the onset of conflict and its duration. The control variables considered 
that can predict the characteristics of a country are: economic performance; population size; 
level of democracy; forest area; linguistic fractionalisation; Gini coefficient; percentage of 
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country covered in mountains; percentage of countries covered in forest; and ethnic 
heterogeneity.  
To control for economic performance, growth in GDP per capita income is included in 
the empirical analysis. It is argued that countries with a higher level of economic development 
indicate higher opportunity costs of rebellion. GDP per capita income is expected to have a 
negative impact on civil war duration. Population size is included in the analysis and may be 
positively related to duration. The level of democracy in a civil war country may have 
significant influence on the dynamics of civil war duration and onset. The Polity democracy-
autocracy scale is adapted to measure the level of democracy during civil war. The forest area 
is expected to benefit the rebels, for example, by providing hiding places, thus increasing the 
length of conflict.  
To control for social fractionalisation, data is extracted from Lujala’s (2010) data on 
linguistic fractionalisation, which gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals 
are not from the same linguistic group. The measure varies between 0 and 1, 1 indicating a 
totally heterogeneous country. The degree of social heterogeneity could impact on democracy, 
which would indirectly cause a conflict onset. The Gini coefficient measures income inequality. 
Cramer (2003) states that is almost a universal assumption that an inequitable distribution of 
resources and wealth will provoke violent rebellion. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) use a Gini 
coefficient measure of inequality, applied to data from Deininger and Squire (1996) widely 
seen as the most reliable available data on inequality. This analysis explicitly claims that the 
evidence supports “objective grievances” contributing to war and humanitarian emergencies. 
Rough terrain is also expected to benefit the rebels, thereby lengthening the conflict duration. 
Finally, in order to control for ethnic diversity, the ethnic fractionalisation index is employed, 
which is measured by the probability that two randomly chosen persons in a country belong to 
different ethnic groups, and ranges between 0 and 1.  
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5.5.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics (1980-2016) 
Variable Observation      Mean 
Std.     
Dev 
             Min              Max 
War 1477 0.61 0.488 0 1 
Gas production 1568 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Oil production 1568 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Oil reserves 1554 0.294 0.456 0 1 
Oil rents (% of GDP) 793 7.016 13.484 0 60.452 
Diamond Production 1597 0.402 0.490 0 1 
Democracy score 1568 4.632 2.99 0 10 
GDP per capita 1513 0.835 6.458 -50.23 91.648 
Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
1568 0.649 0.236 0.0355 0.925 
Total Reserves, log 1321 19.216 1.996 12.498 24.694 
Mineral rents (% of 
GDP) 
1480 1.871 4.871 0 44.644 
Gas rents (% of 
GDP) 
757 0.044 0.17 0 1.88 
Population, growth 1603 15.799 1.253 12.791 19.041 
Forest rent 1480 7.011 7.761 0 74.73 
Coal rent 1392 0.148 0.594 0 7.852 
Landarea, log 1578 12.399 1.617 7.616 14.681 
Agricultural land 1492 48.267 18.815 7.938 82.671 
Arable land 1492 12.325 12.307 0.043 49.261 
Resource rents 1480 12.80253 12.469 0 82.589 
Linguistic 
fractionalisation 1531 0.678 0.241 0.020 0.923 
Ongoing war 1009 0.214 0.410 0 1 
Duration Analysis         
Oil discovery 526 0.255 0.436 0 1 
Oil production 526 0.226 0.419 0 1 
Gas discovery 526 0.348 0.477 0 1 
Gas production 526 0.023 0.149 0 1 
Forest area 507 -3.141 2.531 -11.343 -0.199 
Gini coefficient 1504 44.908 8.643 28.9 65.76 
Linguistic 
fractionalisation 
496 -0.433 0.751 -3.425 -0.08 
All gemstone pro. 526 0.409 0.492 0 1 
% of country covered 
in mountains 
1568 -3.932 2.565 -6.908 12.685 
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Dependent Variable: Armed conflict is the dependent variable which is measured by a binary 
outcome of either 0 if no conflict occurred in that year or 1 if a conflict occurred, with the mean 
given as 0.6; this indicates a considerable high amount of conflict in the region. The conflict 
variable is defined as the occurrence of armed conflict in a given country in a given year.  
Independent variables: Oil production occurred in 22% of country-years in the period. The 
average amount of oil production is 28% and standard deviation is 0.45, which shows variation 
across the mean. Gas production is an average mean of 8%, which indicates low gas production 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This supports the statistics for gas rents as the average mean is 4% and 
a standard deviation of 0.17. Oil rents as a percentage of GDP has a low observation, as there 
are more non-oil producing countries in the region. However, mineral rents have a larger 
observation, suggesting more countries in the region have solid minerals that are being 
exported. Gas rents maximum value is about 2% of GDP; this supports gas production average 
mean.  
Control Variables: The ethnic fractionalisation index has a mean of 0.65, with a standard 
deviation of 0.24. The average polity score – represented as political stability – has a negative 
average, suggesting countries in the region have values between 0 and -10. The polity score 
index takes a value between -10 to 10, but it has been scaled up to between 0 and 10.   
Growth rate of GDP per capita has a mean of 0.84, with the minimum number being negative 
50% from Liberia in 1990, while the maximum number of 91% is also from Liberia. The 
standard depreciation of 6.5 shows a large dispersion around the mean. Population growth has 
a mean of 2.7% and a standard deviation of 1. The country with the least population growth is 
Rwanda; this is probably due to the civil war and genocide experienced in the country in the 
1990s.  
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5.5.5 Empirical Models 
The empirical model for conflict onset takes the following form:  
𝐶𝑖𝑡= 𝑓(𝑋0)         (5.6) 
where conflict is a function of X0 variables. This is a global variable that consists of the 
independent and control variables. The independent variables are oil production, gas production 
and diamond productions (DIAP). These variables independently could cause an incidence of 
conflict through the mechanism discussed in Section 5.3. The control variables are population 
growth (POP), GDP per capita growth (GDP), percentage of country covered in mountains 
(PCM) and ethnic fractionalisation (EF) 
The basic regression model is therefore as follows: 
𝑂𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
𝛾7𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                             (5.7)   
     
Renewable natural resources and resource rents in relation to conflict behaviour are 
often appropriated to a grievance mechanism (Collier and Hoefller, 2005; Humphreys, 2005). 
The scarcity of renewable natural resources can affect everyone in the society equally, but 
scarcity can also be structural, which is caused by the policy of a state. When scarcity is 
structural, it has the potential to be used against opponents of the state. An example of this is a 
policy that makes ownership of water rights or farmlands illegal for a certain group. This group 
is now deprived of one of the necessary elements of life. This sort of deprivation is a grievance, 
which can lead to conflict onset.  
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Ross (2004) suggests that agricultural commodities may cause onset of conflict if there 
is resource degradation occurring in the country. In studying the effects of resource degradation 
on conflict, Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) and Klare (2001) each point out the negative effects of 
resource degradation on the welfare of a society. Homer-Dixon particularly notes the causal 
relation of resource degradation to conflict onset. These scholars have also focused on 
renewable natural resources as sources of conflict. Of the renewable natural resources 
considered by scholars studying the relationship with conflict, freshwater, arable land, 
agricultural land and forested land are often considered to have a strong relationship with 
conflict (Baechler, 1998; Hauge and Ellingsen, 1993; Ross, 2004).  
Countries dependent on primary commodities and resource rents are also at a high risk 
of experiencing conflict. Reliance on primary commodities is generally associated with a large 
share of location-specific “rents” in national income. In turn, rents are associated with large 
nontax income for the state or any other organisation that can control the territory on which the 
rents are generated. Reliance is also associated with exposure to shocks; the global prices of 
primary commodities are much more volatile than other prices and this is compounded by 
quantity shocks due to climate, discoveries, and exhaustion. These shocks may involve volatile 
growth rates and difficulty in managing the economy; these factors can confuse citizens’ 
comprehension of government performance. Natural resource rents could create multiple routes 
that may be linked to the risk of conflict. Large resource rents are not intrinsically a curse. They 
obviously have the potential to accelerate peaceful development and this potential has 
occasionally been realised, as in Botswana. On the other hand, resource rents cause conflict 
onset or prolong conflict, for example in Nigeria, where resource rents have been a cause of 
conflict in the country. There is also the argument of poor management of natural resources 
and corruption of resource rents in developing countries (Herdiansyah et al., 2014). To examine 
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if resource rents and renewable natural resource increases the risk of conflict onset, Equation 
5.8 below is estimated: 
𝑂𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑6𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑7𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜑9𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                 (5.8) 
where TR is total reserves, LA is Land area, MR is Mineral rents, FA is Forest area in the 
country, AGL is Agricultural land, INQ is GINI coefficient, and DEM is Democracy score 
variable.  Control variables from Equation 5.7 are also included in the analysis.   
 
Duration Analysis 
The empirical analysis uses conflict data for the period 1970 - 2016 from the annually updated 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict. The dataset has a relatively low inclusion criterion (25 battle-
related deaths during a year). Therefore, low-intensity conflicts are included in the analysis. 
The duration is measured in days, although the year is kept as the observation unit because no 
other variable is measured for a shorter period. Conflicts that were active in 2016 are censored 
as having ended 31st December of the year recorded as having 25 battle related death. A 
reoccurrence of a conflict that has been inactive for more than two calendar years is treated as 
a new conflict. A new conflict is also coded if there has been a total change in the opposite side. 
In total, dates are available for 61 distinct conflicts for the period 1970 - 2016. 
  
The estimated duration model takes the following form: 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡)  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (5.9)                   
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The regression analysis above argues that the duration of conflict is affected by natural 
resources and other control variables such as level of democracy, forest area, and the intensity 
of conflicts. There are other factors that could affect the duration of conflicts, but for the 
purposes of this study, the control variables have limited to these four. 
 
5.6 Discussion of Estimated Results 
 
5.6.1 Conflict Onset Analysis 
The onset analysis studies whether natural resources contribute to conflict onset. Table 5.2 
below presents the results. The results are shown in coefficients and odd ratios for logistic 
regressions; this provides an easy interpretation of independent variables, which are mostly 
dummy variables.49 The resource curse literature suggests that countries with natural resources 
become poorer because of the natural resources they have, especially developing countries with 
crude oil (Gelb, 1988; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Humphreys et al., 2007; Sachs, 2007; Kim and 
Lin, 2015). These countries tend to fight more conflicts, which may be due to factors such as 
low opportunity cost of joining a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) or low state capacity 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The level of democracy has been shown to be related to conflict 
onset in a parabolic way (Lujala, 2010); the most autocratic and democratic states are less likely 
to experience a conflict onset, while governments that have characteristics of both types have 
more conflict onsets (Herge et al., 2001). Other control variables included in the analysis are 
population size, percentage of mountainous terrain in the country, growth rate of GDP per 
capita and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation.  
 
                                                          
49 The odds ratios show how many times the risk of conflict increases for one unit of change in the independent 
variable. 
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Table 5.2 – Onset of armed conflict, 1980 – 2016 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Oil prod.   1.487***  1.586*** 0.506**   
  [4.426]  [4.884] [1.659]   
 (0.261) (0.28) (0.225)   
Gas prod. -4.275***   -4.300***    -4.162***  
   [0.014]   [0.014]   [0.016]  
 (0.662) (0.674)  (0.645)  
Diamond prod. -0.771*** -0.547** -0.388* -0.404* -0.343 
  [0.462]   [0.579]  [0.678]   [0.668]    [0.710] 
 (0.233) (0.255) (0.211) (0.223) (0.21) 
Population, log   0.379*** 0.221* 0.239** 0.309** 0.225** 
  [1.460]   [1.248]  [1.270]  [1.362]  [1.253] 
 (0.121) (0.129) (0.104) (0.124) (0.107) 
GDP per capita -0.072*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.085*** -0.055*** 
 [0.931] [0.934]       [0.945]         [0.919]   [0.947] 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Linguistic fractionalisation 2.651** 5.277*** 3.697*** 3.065*** 4.295*** 
   [14.17] [195.7]  [40.32] [21.43]   [73.33] 
 (1.211) (1.438) (1.161) (0.57) (1.231) 
% of country covered in mountain 0.373*** 0.454*** 0.299*** 0.262*** 0.296*** 
   [1.452]   [1.575]   [1.348]   [1.300]   [1.344] 
 (0.060) (0.068) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Polity (democracy score) 0.103*** 0.165*** 0.071** 0.033 0.062* 
   [1.108]    [1.179] [1.074]  [1.034] [1.064] 
 (0.038) (0.043) (0.035)  (0.040) (0.035) 
Ethnic fractionalisation -1.041 -1.691 -2.638** -2.334*** -3.020** 
   [0.353]    [0.184]    [0.072]  [0.097]  [0.049] 
  (1.243)   (1.382)   (1.188) (0.821) (1.237) 
Inequality coefficient  -0.030**    
   [0.971]    
  (0.015)    
Gas reserves    1.835***  
       [6.263]  
    (0.251)  
Oil reserves      0.443** 
      [1.557] 
     (0.220) 
Constant -7.315*** -5.108** -5.006*** -6.025*** -4.983*** 
  (1.914) (2.189)      (1.635)        (1.856)    (1.663) 
Observations 769 739 769 769 769 
Log likelihood -309.194 -268.458 -349.265 -297.841 -349.738 
The table shows the odds ratios in square brackets. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In Model 1 in Table 5.2 above, the baseline regression is presented excluding oil and gas 
reserves. Oil production significantly increases the risk of conflict onset. Oil-producing 
countries are about 4 times more likely to experience conflict than non-oil-producing countries. 
This is true for countries such as Nigeria, South Sudan, and Congo. The result is in line with 
earlier studies that find that oil producers and exporters are more likely to experience conflict 
onset, especially if the resource is easily accessible. The results are different when gas 
production is considered. Gas production is seen to reduce the incidence of conflict. Very few 
countries in SSA have gas production.  
Only 4 countries out of the 44 countries in the sample produce gas commercially, while 
10 countries have gas reserves, but are not producing commercially. This might be the reason 
for the negative correlation. Diamond production also reduces the incidence of conflict, but 
with a small magnitude. In literature (Lujala, 2010), a differentiation is made between 
secondary and primary diamond production, but for the purposes of this study, diamond 
production has been aggregated. In the sample, 16 out of the 44 countries produce diamonds. 
Botswana, South Africa, and Angola are the top diamond producers in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
these countries experience relatively low levels of conflict. Though in the late 1990s, diamonds 
were used to fuel rebel movements in Angola and Sierra Leone (Le Billion, 2008). The 
likelihood of gas and diamond production triggering a conflict is very low, as the odd ratios 
(see Table 5.2) are less than 1. Population, percentage of country covered in mountains, polity, 
and linguistic fractionalisation all increase the likelihood of countries experiencing a conflict 
onset. Models 2-5 are versions of the baseline regression in Model 1.  
In Model 2, the Gini coefficient proxy for inequality is added to the model and the 
changes are not too different from Model 1. The variable itself is statistically significant and 
negatively affects the likelihood of conflict onset. It therefore suggests that in Sub-Saharan 
African countries, income inequality does not necessarily cause conflict incidents. Mitchell 
173 
 
 
(1968) and Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch (2003) also find a negative relationship with 
conflicts onset and inequality. It is important to note that this chapter has considered inequality 
in the total population. It is plausible that inequality between certain groups of people 
(horizontal inequality) increases the likelihood of conflict onset. Model 3 excludes gas 
production and the inequality variable; the results show that the likelihood of a conflict onset 
is reduced with oil present in the country. All other variables exhibit similar results. Models 4 
and 5 include gas reserves and oil reserves respectively; the presence of oil and gas reserves 
increase the likelihood of conflict onset by at least 6 times for countries with gas reserves and 
2 times more for countries with oil reserves.  
The income level proxied by growth rate of GDP per capita has the expected negative 
sign and significant in Models 3, 4 and 5. The polity variable captures the level of democracy 
in each country, with a strong democracy represented as 10 and strongly autocratic as 0.  The 
relationship is significant and positive, which shows that civil war onsets are no less frequent 
in democracies. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also find that level of democracy positively impacts 
on conflict onset.  
Table 5.3A and 5.3B presents the results of conflict onset and total reserves as the main 
explanatory variables, with land, forest area, and rents from natural resources as other 
explanatory variables. Total reserves as a percentage of GDP has a negative but significant 
effect on conflict onset, which suggests that the level of reserves in the countries does not 
increase the risk of conflict. However, coal rents, land area, agricultural land, and forest rents 
increases the likelihood of a conflict onset. This advocates that countries receiving rents from 
coal and forest area are 1.2 times more likely to experience conflict; the higher the percentage 
of agricultural land available to a country, the more likely the country experiences conflict 
onset. This is plausible in most African countries, as some conflicts stem from arguments of 
rights of land and grazing area for cattle. In the case of Nigeria, conflicts between herdsmen 
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and farmers claimed the lives of at least 168 people (Adekola, 2018). The herdsmen are 
predominantly Fulanis, a primarily Muslim people, while the farmers are mostly Christians. 
Therefore, when violence erupts between the two groups – with symbolic results like churches 
being burnt down – it is anticipated that the dominant narrative in Nigeria and abroad is that 
this is a conflict motivated by religion and ethnicity. 
Mineral rents surprisingly reduce the risk of conflict onset; mineral rents in the data 
include minerals such as tin, gold, lead, iron, zinc, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and 
phosphate. The rationale to this result could be that there is no incentive for rebels to raise 
money with these types of commodities and they are therefore not classified as important 
compared to oil and diamonds. In addition, very few countries produce these minerals 
commercially in the sample. Examining the Gini coefficient, there is a negative and significant 
relationship with conflict onset in Table 5.2; the negative relationship is maintained in Table 
5.3A but with no statistical significance. This result indicates that inequality reduces the 
likelihood of conflict onset in the countries examined.  Collier and Hoeffler (1996) find that 
greater inequality significantly reduces the risk and duration of war, which is similar to the 
result obtained in this chapter. The authors find that inequality is inversely related to conflict 
and this could be argued from a political view; that is, a high degree of inequality reveals the 
existence of dominant elite, whose attachment to the status quo means they will allow 
temporarily high taxes from the government to raise funds to protect the status quo. On the 
other hand, prospective rebels will calculate that the government has a greater capacity to 
finance a military campaign against them, thereby reducing the chances of a successful 
rebellion. 
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Table 5.3A – Onset of armed conflict, 1980 – 2016 
VARIABLES Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Log(Total reserves) -0.377*** -0.386*** -0.391***   
      [0.685]        [0.680]          [0.676]   
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.0938)   
Land area, log 0.589*** 0.675*** 0.689***   
 [1.929] [1.965] [1.992]   
 (0.153) (0.145) (0.144)   
Forest rents 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.085*** -1.097*** -0.747** 
 [1.104] [1.085] [1.088] [0.334] [0.474] 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.286) (0.312) 
Mineral rents -0.227** -0.211** -0.214** -1.916*** -1.371*** 
 [ 0.747] [0.810] [0.807] [0.147] [0.254] 
 (0.104) (0.096) (0.099) (0.458) (0.498) 
Forest area -0.0096 -0.0111 -0.0111   
 [0.987] [0.989] [0.989]   
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)   
Coal rents 0.511     
 [1.793]     
 (0.425)     
Agricultural land 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.042***  0.023** 
 [1.040] [1.046] [1.043]  [1.024] 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.011) 
Gini coefficient -0.003 -0.005    
 [1.001] [0.995]    
 (0.024) (0.021)    
Polity(democracy score) -0.0754 -0.0461  0.0307 0.0294 
 [0.909] [0.955[  [1.031] [1.030] 
 (0.069) (0.062)  (0.067) (0.067) 
% country covered in 
mountains 
0.0485   0.0582 0.116 
 [0.987]   [1.060] [1.123] 
 (0.078)   (0.088) (0.091) 
Ethnic fract. -5.319** -5.078** -4.462**   
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.012]   
 (2.079) (2.081) (1.984)   
Linguistic fract. 3.464** 3.397** 2.992**   
 [28.64] [29.88] [19.93]   
 (1.353) (1.367) (1.301)   
Notes: Odds ratios in square parenthesis, Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Table 5.3B – Onset of armed conflict, 1980 – 2016 
VARIABLES Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
GDP per capita -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.0764*** -0.0168 -0.0295 
 [0.929]* [0.930] [0.926] [0.983] [0.971] 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) 
Arable land    -0.200*** -0.185*** 
    [0.819] [0.831] 
    (0.039) (0.037) 
Population, log    1.536*** 1.309*** 
    [4.647] [3.704] 
    (0.263) (0.271) 
Resource rents    1.014*** 0.686** 
    [2.757] [1.985] 
    (0.290) (0.312) 
Oil rents    -1.022*** -0.687** 
    [0.360] [0.503] 
    (0.290) (0.313) 
Constant 2.022 0.407 -0.633 -23.12*** -20.55*** 
 (3.054) (2.738) (2.668) (4.266) (4.244) 
Observations 375 384 391 406 406 
Log likelihood -155.962 -158.400 -162.690 -141.433 -139.329 
Notes: Odds ratios in square parenthesis, Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
5.6.2 Duration Analysis  
Table 5.4 presents the results for the duration analysis. Model 11 includes a dummy for oil 
production, oil reserves, diamond production and hydrocarbon production. Oil production does 
not seem to prolong the length of conflict. However, diamond production, oil reserves, and 
hydrocarbon production increases the duration of conflict. In Model 12, mountainous terrain 
and forest area are included in the estimation, these variables are expected to benefit rebels; the 
mountainous terrain variable is statistically significant, which is consistent with the theory that 
a country with a high percentage of mountainous terrain will experience an increase in duration 
of conflict, as this terrain provides hiding places during conflict. Also, it is theorised that the 
larger the forest area, the more rebels can find hiding places to strategise and plan rebellious 
activities. The polity variable reduces duration of conflict; it is therefore impossible to say 
categorically that democracy prolongs conflict. Oneal and Russett (1999) find that democratic 
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countries experience a reduction in violent conflicts. This view is supported by Lucina (2005), 
who suggests an explanation to this may be that parties engaged in conflict are less likely to 
use overly brutal methods to bring rebellion to an end. However, the variable territory increases 
the duration of conflict.50 Therefore, this suggests that territorial conflicts last longer than any 
other conflicts in the region. In Model 13, oil reserves, territory, and Gini coefficient are 
excluded to check the robustness of the main explanatory variables; the results show no 
significant changes to the coefficients and time ratios.  
In Model 14, gemstones variable, gas reserves, and gas production are included in the 
analysis and the results are quite similar to Model 11 estimations. However, there is no 
statistical significance relationship between gas reserves and gemstones production to the 
duration of conflict. Similar to Table 5.3A, gas production reduces the duration of conflict for 
countries producing gas, or a 73% lower hazard rate. Model 15 is similar to 14, but excludes 
gas reserves because it is insignificant. All the other variables exhibit similar results except for 
gas production. In the model, gas production is no longer statistically significant to reducing 
the duration of conflict; there is a lower hazard rate, but it cannot be scientifically justified.  
These results imply that the presence of oil lengthens the conflict. It therefore seems 
that duration is lengthened not only by the financing available to rebels, but also by the promise 
of future revenue of oil reserves in the region. For the rebels, the exertion and investment in 
fighting could be justified by the chance of winning control over resources located in the area. 
The rebels may want outright independence to overthrow the present government or local 
authority, or else to strengthen their position in negotiations over how revenues from the 
resources should be shared (Lujala, 2010). The issue of revenue sharing from oil exploitation 
has been central to most African countries, for example, in Sudan, Nigeria, and Chad 
                                                          
50 The territory variable is a dummy variable that carries 1 if the conflict is fought over territories and 0 
otherwise 
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(Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, 2010). Therefore, it is possible to imply that resources – either 
located in a conflict area or outside a conflict area - lengthen the duration of the conflict. These 
effects may work through the feasibility mechanism and the domestic conflict premium 
mechanism (Humphreys, 2005). 
 
Table 5.4 Duration of armed conflict, 1970 - 2016 
VARIABLES Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Oil production -3.084*** -2.234*** -2.049*** -3.113*** -3.175*** 
   [0.046] [0.107] [0.129] [0.045] [0.042] 
   (0.836) (0.471) (0.428) (0.790) (0.805) 
Oil reserves   1.715*** -0.0942    1.906*** 1.965*** 
   [5.557] [0.0942]  [6.728] [7.138] 
   (0.653) (0.541)  (0.673) (0.695) 
Diamond production   1.072** 1.084** 1.118*** 1.096 1.102 
   [2.921] [2.956] [3.059] [2.991] [3.011] 
   (0.486) (0.453) (0.425) (0.671) (0.672) 
Hydrocarbon production    0.991* 1.088***  1.010*** 1.188** 1.215** 
    [2.693] [2.968] [2.747] [3.279] [3.371] 
    (0.549) (0.352) (0.334) (0.565) (0.561) 
Mountainous terrain, log  0.180*** 0.126**   
  [1.198] [1.134]   
  (0.0698) (0.064)   
Forest area, log  0.146 0.131   
  [1.157] [1.140]   
  (0.093) (0.090)   
Polity  -0.208*** -0.176***   
               [0.812] [0.838]   
  (0.057) (0.062)   
Territory   1.063**    
  [2.895]    
  (0.416)    
Gini coefficient  0.00592    
  [1.006]    
  (0.029)    
Gemstones production    -0.104 -0.320 
    [0.901] [0.726] 
    (0.691) (0.688) 
Gas reserves    0.514  
    [1.673]  
    (0.357)  
Gas production    -1.344* -1.072 
    [0.261] [0.342] 
    (0.807) (0.745) 
Constant 1.057*** 2.176* 2.608*** 0.976*** 1.187*** 
 (0.346) (1.232) (0.436) (0.362) (0.331) 
Log likelihood  -116.236 -94.151 -99.343 -115.460 -115.741 
Observations 218 199 202 218 218 
Notes: The table shows the time ratios in square parenthesis for duration analysis. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the effect of natural resources on conflict onset and duration focusing on 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The natural resources analysis was divided into rents from 
resources and the availability and production of solid minerals. The results from the duration 
analysis show that natural resources prolong the duration of conflict. However, it is found that 
not all resources prolong duration of conflict. Oil production does not seem to seem to affect 
duration, whereas oil reserves and gas production lengthen duration. Gemstones production and 
gas reserves have no significant relationship with duration of conflict, while diamond 
production significantly increases the hazard rate of conflict. This could be as a result of 
exploitation of these resources; if rebels have easy access to the natural resources it becomes 
easier to use the money from extraction and exploitation to finance rebellious activities. In the 
duration analysis, the results suggest that there is no evidence of any effect of gemstones 
production and reserves on the length of conflict. These results are comparable to those in 
Humphreys (2005) and Lujala (2010).  
On the other hand, for the onset analysis, the results show that both production and 
reserves increase the risk of conflict onset. Revenues from total reserves, mineral rents, and 
ethnic fractionalisation reduce the risk of conflict onset, whereas, forest rents, land area, 
agricultural land, population, and linguistic fractionalisation increase the risk of conflict onset. 
The onset analysis also reveals that a country with diamond production is susceptible to conflict 
arising. The income inequality analysis - using the Gini coefficient - shows that inequality does 
not increase the risk of conflict onset. This suggests that conflicts in SSA are not started as a 
direct result of income inequality, but may be the result of grievances about low income 
between groups and escalated with ethnic or religious fractionalisation. The conventional 
theory holds that inequality triggers conflict and violence, most especially inequality among 
different groups (Bahgat et al., 2017). This does not seem to hold for countries in the sample. 
180 
 
 
However, it is plausible that inequality may trigger conflicts at the sub-national level in these 
countries.  
The results from the estimation suggest that natural resources are related to conflict 
duration and can prolong the duration of conflict.  There are several possible explanations for 
this: first, rebels may simply want to prolong conflicts - even if they are not able to exploit the 
resources during conflict - if the benefits of increasing the duration of conflict outweigh the 
exploitation; second, rebels may be able to sell the extraction of the natural resources to finance 
ongoing conflict (Ross, 2005). Oil reserves may also be a way for rebels to gain financially 
through the greedy or grievance mechanisms. As Nigeria shows, oil production is potentially 
lootable and a good revenue source for rebels.  
In Nigeria, crude oil is looted from pipelines in the Niger-delta region and sold often in 
the black market (Human Rights Watch, 2003; 2007). The Niger Delta’s people have also had 
to cope with the environmental impacts of a poorly regulated oil industry. The link between 
hydrocarbons and duration is relatively new. Earlier studies conclude that oil is not linked to 
conflict duration (Ross, 2004; Sambanis, 2004) or that production makes conflict shorter 
(Humphreys, 2005). However, none of these studies look into the link between hydrocarbons 
and conflict duration. This study thus provides evidence that non-lootable resources 
(hydrocarbons) may have a great impact on rebel groups and their viability. There are several 
possible explanations for this: rebels may simply be willing to engage in long conflicts even 
when they are not able to exploit the resource base during the conflict if the future prize is large 
enough; rebels may also be able to sell future extraction rights – “booty futures” – to finance 
the conflict (Ross, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 6 
Summary of Findings, Policy Implication and Future Research 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis and presents the author’s final reflections. It summarises the 
findings of the empirical chapters and highlights the thesis’ original contribution to knowledge, 
the limitations of the research, and areas for further research. There are three independent 
empirical chapters which examine the relationship between conflict, economic growth, state 
capacity and natural resources. Although, the ongoing debate on the impact of conflict on 
economic conditions and vice versa remains. This thesis contributes to the existing literature 
by extending the methodological dimensions and analysing country-specific, state level data to 
study the effect of economic growth on conflict. Most studies on economic growth and conflict 
are cross-country based, which more often than not are likely to be biased due to the differing 
levels of income and the economic and social backgrounds of these countries.  In addition, the 
research analysis examines the relationship between state capacity, natural resources, and 
conflict across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
6.2 Summary of Findings  
The overall objective of the first empirical chapter is to examine the relationship between 
economic growth and conflict in Nigeria. The chapter provides some answers to the research 
question: Does economic growth have an effect on conflict? The study employs the negative 
binomial model in estimating the 36 states in Nigeria including the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT) - for the period 1997 - 2013. The findings suggest that economic growth has a 
statistically significant negative effect on conflicts, but this effect is delayed by at least a year, 
showing there is a time effect in growth reducing the incidence of conflicts. Hence, in line with 
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the findings of Bohlken and Sergenti (2010), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), and Miguel, 
Satyanath and Sergenti (2004), this study finds that economic growth reduces the number of 
conflicts at the state level in Nigeria. The other explanatory variable - number of conflicts in 
adjacent states – is also positive and significant. There is, therefore support for both of the 
arguments that previous violence begets current violence and that violence may diffuse across 
state borders through contagion effects. These results also indicate that conflicts are more likely 
when groups are more evenly matched.  
Similarly, using annual changes in rainfall as an instrument for economic growth, the 
findings of this research are not driven by reserve causality or omitted variables such as 
weakened civil associations or institutional changes. The findings support the conventional 
wisdom that higher levels of socio-economic development - in the form high GDP per capita 
reduce the occurrence of conflict.  
 
The research on the effect of conflict on state capacity shows that conflicts deteriorate 
the capacity of the state. African countries are generally considered as having weak institutions 
or as fragile states; conflicts experienced will further deplete the state capacity, which could 
lead to a failed state (FundforPeace, 2018; OECD fragility report). The thesis finds that internal 
conflicts are a source of destruction of state capacity, even after addressing potential 
endogeneity. However, external conflicts have a positive effect on state capacity on one of the 
measures of state capacity across countries, but it could be over a much longer time horizon 
than considered in this chapter. The System GMM estimations are also consistent with the 
hypothesis that internal conflict does matter greatly for state capacity. On average, countries 
involved in an internal conflict have less capacity to collect taxes and govern efficiently 
compared to a situation where there is no conflict. Probable factors behind this relationship 
include the deterioration of the tax administration system; the obstacle to tax collectors to go 
about their business; and a reduction in the willingness to pay taxes of a citizenry that does not 
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feel protected or feels that the local government has been captured by illegal groups. In turn, 
attacks perpetrated by illegal armed groups undermine the governments’ ability in the provision 
of public goods. It is likely that in regions where such armed groups are present, governments 
are either unable or unwilling to spend in public goods. This empirical fact supports the 
argument that internal conflicts divide societies and make it more difficult for countries to reach 
a consensus on whether to invest in state capacity. In turn, weaker state capacity likely 
exacerbates conflict, generating a negative spiral.  
The third empirical chapter sets out to answer these questions: “Do natural resources 
cause the onset of conflict?” and “Does the type of natural resources matter in starting or 
prolonging a conflict?” Given the abundance of natural resources in countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa - with the exception of a few countries - this chapter examines if natural resources 
increase the risk of conflict onset or lengthen the duration. In assessing the findings of this 
chapter, it is important to note that natural resources in the literature are classified according to 
the geographical and social features inherent in their status as commodities. These 
classifications are identified as lootability, legality and obstructability. Lootability denotes how 
easily an individual can extract a resource; while obstructability signifies how easily a 
resource’s transportation can be hindered. Legality refers to a resource´s legal status as an 
international commodity or in other words, how easily a commodity can be sold on international 
markets. Conjointly they provide a means of identifying a resource according to its physical 
and social properties, allowing for a more unambiguous view of the relationship between 
natural resources and conflict onset and duration. 
Earlier studies conclude that oil is not linked to conflict duration (Ross, 2004; Sambanis, 
2004) or that production makes conflict shorter (Humphreys, 2005). However, none of these 
studies look into the location or presence of hydrocarbons in relation to conflict. The findings 
of this study show that the mere presence of hydrocarbon in SSA lengthens conflict. The 
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presence of hydrocarbons could affect the rebel groups directly, because the revenue flows that 
potentially could affect the state are not always present. It also suggests that rebels are forward 
looking and engage in conflicts with promise of future revenues which may be as a result of 
resources being lootable. Ross (2004) argues that oil production is relevant for conflict onset, 
but not for duration.  He further argues that evidence suggests that lootable resources affect 
only duration but not the risk of conflict onset. Similarly, this study finds that in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, oil production does not prolong conflict. However, diamond production, oil reserves, 
and hydrocarbon production all lengthen conflict duration. There are several possible 
explanations for this: first, rebels may simply be willing to engage in long conflicts - even when 
they are not able to exploit the resource base during the conflict - if the future prize is huge, 
rebels may also be able to sell future extraction rights - ‘booty futures’ - to finance the conflict 
(Ross, 2005).  
The results indicate that the mere presence of natural resources increases the risk of 
conflict onset. A detailed look into the types of natural resources shows that oil-producing 
countries are at a higher risk of conflict onset; this is true for countries such as Nigeria, South 
Sudan, and Congo. The results suggest that rebel access to resources crucially shapes armed 
conflict. A country with diamond reserves is also at a higher risk of conflict onset. However, 
this study finds that diamond production reduces the risk of conflict onset. In the literature, a 
differentiation is made between secondary and diamond production (Lujala, 2010) but for the 
purposes of this study, diamond production has been aggregated. There are a total of 16 
countries out of the 44 in the sample that produce diamonds. Botswana, South Africa and 
Angola are the top diamond producers in SSA. These countries experience relatively low levels 
of conflict, which could therefore explain why there is a negative effect for diamond 
production.  
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6.3 Main Contributions and Implications of the Study 
Several implications and contributions arise from the three empirical chapters in this study. The 
thesis largely contributes to conflict and economic growth literature.  While it is the contention 
by many researchers (Bates, 2001; Harold, 1997 and Murdoch and Todd, 2002) that the 
relationship between economic growth and conflict is positive, others maintain that it is the 
reverse (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Herge and Sambanis, 2006; Zuk, 1985). In the case of 
Nigeria, there are only a handful of empirical analyses on economic growth and conflict. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the limited empirical literature in the country. The analysis 
shows a strong link negative relationship between economic growth and conflict at the state 
level; that is, economic growth reduces the number of conflicts at the state level.  
This is, however, contrary to what can be observed at the national level. Nigeria is 
experiencing increased economic growth as well as a rise in conflicts, particularly in the 
northern region. Theoretical and empirical reasons have been advanced as to why this may 
happen. The argument is that if economic growth leads to an increase in the value of assets that 
a country possesses, this may induce higher predisposition by individuals and groups to have 
control over the productive resources. This argument - which seems highly plausible in the 
context of many developing countries - is advanced by Bates (1973); he contends that growth 
and modernisation may be an incubator of violence - in that a positive correlation between 
increased economic growth and violence is related to the process of economic development - 
which is capable of generating a radical re-organisation of political structures that can 
subsequently engineer conflict. Consequently, development policies must seek to integrate 
conflict-lessening measures that specifically address groups, communities and organisations. 
The growth experienced should also trickle down to the rural areas to avoid greed or grievances 
that can spring up rebels.  Furthermore, it is certain that economic growth reduces conflict in 
the case of Nigeria; the government should, therefore, have the gains of growth distributed 
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among the varied sectors of the society. Policies could be targeted more towards income 
distribution than higher growth, so as to diffuse rebel uprising and increase employment. 
Additionally, the growth process is crucial; in an environment where growth is not inclusive 
and embracive - such as appears to be the case in Nigeria where the “Dutch Disease” has been 
preeminent (Iyoboyi, 2014) - there needs to be a deliberate effort to target youth employment 
through incentives such as apprenticeships and job creations. 
For the second empirical chapter, the thesis contributes to literature by showing that 
diverse forms of conflict impact on state capacity differently. Two types of conflict were 
considered: internal and external conflict. In SSA, internal conflicts tend to disrupt both legal 
and fiscal capacity, while external conflicts have a positive effect on fiscal capacity, but a 
negative effect on legal capacity of the state. Conflict prevention could be enhanced by 
government focusing on investing in tax institutions and systems to generate more revenue for 
the government. Internal conflicts have shown to reduce state capacity; the government could 
target development policies that will repress the incident of internal conflicts. This could be 
achieved by alleviating grievances among different ethnic backgrounds. 
Ethnic fractionalisation is one of the mechanisms through which conflict arises and then 
disrupts the capacity of the state to function effectively. To counter this, policy options may 
include: regional integration programs; political systems that promote broad based political 
representation; and education. During periods of conflicts, additional support should be given 
to the legal system to minimise the impact on property rights and private markets (see Tables 
4.5, 4.8, and 4.9). Foreign aid received by African nations could be used in further developing 
further the military capacity of the states. The results obtained show that foreign aid positively 
affects legal capacity, but has a negative correlation with fiscal capacity. The government can 
ensure that aid received is channelled into building the military capacity of the state or in 
improving the literacy and school enrolment rate of its citizens. Lastly, there is a need for 
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government transparency to enable citizens build trust towards the government’s actions and 
inactions. 
The third empirical chapter analysis suggests that access to natural resources increases 
the duration of conflict in SSA. The type of natural resource also influences the risk of a conflict 
onset. Oil production is seen not to affect the duration of conflict, but oil reserves increase the 
onset of conflict. In SSA, solid minerals tend to increase the risk of conflict, while duration of 
conflict is dependent on the type of solid minerals and if rebels can gain financially from looting 
the natural resource. Arguably, natural resources are linked to conflict onset and duration 
through their effects on rebels’ motivations and opportunities. As earlier mentioned, if citizens 
are gainfully employed with basic economic and social services provided for by the 
government, it is plausible that the motivation to loot these resources or the greedy mechanism 
will be eliminated. Therefore, it is important for governments to ensure an improvement in the 
living standard of its citizens. Public institutions also need to be developed to repress any 
intending obstructions or looting of these resources. Government transparency and 
accountability is paramount in reducing or preventing an uprising among citizens. Government 
could also increase investment in the defence sector to avoid exploitation since sometimes 
conflicts arise as a result of future gains or “booty futures”.  
 
6.4 Limitations of the Research 
Each research study - regardless of how well conducted or constructed - suffers some 
limitations. Hence this study acknowledges some limitations, which by no means undermine 
the analysis or the findings. The foremost limitation with the research is the issue of data. The 
first chapter is constrained by lack of robust data at the state level in Nigeria. It is impossible 
to find state level data on unemployment, income inequality, or percentages of Muslims and 
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Christians in each state, which is intended to measure any religious intolerance and its impact 
on conflict. However, the study is able to use the available data with different estimation 
methods to check for robustness. Second, in measuring the effect of conflict on state capacity, 
cross-country study of African countries is carried out using panel data. These countries are at 
different fragility indexes, in other words, there might be better results if countries within a 
specific sub-region or in a country-specific study were analysed, but due to low quality data, 
this was impossible to achieve. Lastly, natural resources location and distance to the nearest 
urban city could be important in analysing its impact on conflict onset or duration. This research 
is not able to measure the accessibility and transportation cost of both onshore and offshore 
production of these resources. 
 
 
6.5 Directions for Further Research 
 
This thesis analyses the relationship between economic growth and conflict in general terms, 
specifically looking into the relationship between conflict, state capacity, and natural resources. 
First, a more robust weak state index could be constructed following one put forward by Rice 
and Patrick (2008). The new index could be more robust in adding more indicators to each of 
the 4 sector indicators of state weakness. Countries could then be grouped and analysed based 
on the new index. Countries identified as critically weak can be grouped together and analysed. 
This could potentially add more knowledge to the existing literature. Furthermore, inclusion of 
additional measures of both natural resources and state capacity could improve the research 
analysis. It seems likely that natural resources differ in their effect on armed conflicts.  
Likewise, further disaggregation of the concept of armed conflict would be beneficial. 
This could be done by conceptualising armed conflict as inherently multilevel. Thinking 
multilevel is conceptually beneficial since it’s becoming increasingly accepted that conflicts 
are inherently local in their nature. Studying conflict at multiple levels - for instance, by 
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examining factors at the local, national, and international level - could provide new and 
important information on how conflicts are initiated, and how they can be ended. The intensity 
of these conflicts could also prove to be favourable to the research.  
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Appendix A 
Table A.1 - World Bank list of economies (June 2017) 
  Economies Income group 
1 Angola Lower Middle Income 
2 Benin Low Income 
3 Botswana Upper Middle Income 
4 Burkina Faso Low Income 
5 Burundi Low Income 
6 Cabo Verde Lowe Middle Income 
7 Cameroon Lower Middle Income 
8 Central African Republic Low Income 
9 Chad Low Income 
10 Comoros Low Income 
11 Democratic Rep. of Congo Low Income 
12 Republic of Congo Lower Middle Income 
13 Cote d'Ivoire Lower Middle Income 
14 Djibouti Lower Middle Income 
15 Equatorial Guinea Upper Middle Income 
16 Eritrea Low Income 
17 Ethiopia Low Income 
18 Gabon Upper Middle Income 
19 Gambia Low Income 
20 Ghana Lower Middle Income 
21 Guinea Low Income 
22 Guinea-Bissau Low Income 
23 Kenya Lower Middle Income 
24 Lesotho Lower Middle Income 
25 Liberia Low Income 
26 Madagascar Low Income 
27 Malawi Low Income 
28 Mali Low Income 
29 Mauritania Lower Middle Income 
30 Mauritius Upper Middle Income 
31 Mozambique Low Income 
32 Namibia Upper Middle Income 
33 Niger Low Income 
34 Nigeria Lower Middle Income 
35 Rwanda Low Income 
36 Sao Tome and Principe Lower Middle Income 
37 Senegal Low Income 
38 Seychelles High Income 
39 Sierra Leone Low Income 
40 Somalia Low Income 
41 South Africa Upper Middle Income 
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 Economies Income Level 
42 south Sudan Low Income 
43 Sudan Lower Middle Income 
44 Swaziland Lower Middle Income 
45 Tanzania Low Income 
46 Togo Low Income 
47 Uganda Low Income 
48 Zambia Lower Middle Income 
49 Zimbabwe Low Income 
 
 
Appendix B   
Table B.1 - Conflict Events Types 
 
Conflict 
Categories 
Definition 
Riots/Protest A protest describes a non-violent, group public demonstration, often 
against a government institution. Rioting is a violent form of 
demonstration.  
 
Violence against 
civilians 
Violence against civilians occurs when any armed/violent group 
attacks civilians. By definition, civilians are unarmed and not engaged 
in political violence, Rebels, governments, militias, rioters can all 
commit violence against civilians.  
Remote Violence Remote violence refers to events in which the tool for engaging in 
conflict did not require the physical presence of the perpetrator. 
Remote violence notes that the main characteristic of an event is that 
a spatially removed group determines the time, place and victims of 
the attack. These include bombings, IED attacks, mortar and missile 
attacks, etc. Remote violence can be waged on both armed agents (e.g. 
an active rebel group; a military garrison) and civilians (e.g. a roadside 
bombing).  
Battle-No change 
of territory 
A battle between two violent armed groups where control of the 
contested location does not change. This is the correct event type if 
the government controls an area, fights with rebels and wins; if rebels 
control a location and maintain control after fighting with government 
forces; or if two militia groups are fighting. These battles are the most 
common activity and take place across a range of actors, including 
rebels, militias, and government forces, communal groups.  
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Battle Non-state 
actor overtakes 
territory 
A battle where non-state actors win control of location. If, after 
fighting with another force, a non-state group acquires control, or if 
two non-state groups fight and the group that did not begin with 
control acquire it, this is the correct code. There are few cases where 
opposition groups other than rebels acquire territory.  
Battle-Government 
regains territory 
Battle in which the government regains control of a location. This 
event type is used solely for government re-acquisition of control. A 
small number of events of this type include militias operating on 
behalf of the government to regain territory outside of areas of a 
government direct control (for example, proxy militias in Somalia 
which hold territory independently but are allied with the Federal 
Government).  
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Table B.2 - INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
Bottom Quintile 
2nd Quintile 
3rd Quintile 
4th Quintile 
5th Quintile 
 
Rank Country Overall 
score 
Economic Political Security Social 
Welfare 
1 Somalia 0.52 0.00 0.00 1.37 0.70 
2 Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
1.67 4.06 1.8 0.28 0.52 
3 Burundi 3.21 5.01 3.46 2.95 1.43 
4 Sudan 3.29 5.05 2.06 1.46 4.59 
5 Central Africa 
Rep. 
3.33 4.11 2.9 5.06 1.25 
6 Zimbabwe 3.44 1.56 1.56 6.81 3.84 
7 Liberia 3.64 3.39 3.91 6.01 1.25 
8 Cote D’Ivoire 3.66 5.23 2.12 3.71 3.56 
9 Angola 3.72 5.42 2.67 5.32 1.45 
10 Sierra Leone 3.77 5.04 3.87 5.43 0.76 
11 Eritrea 3.84 3.09 2.78 7.01 2.48 
12 Chad 3.90 5.80 2.42 6.18 1.21 
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Rank Country Overall 
score 
Economic Political Security Social 
welfare 
13 Guinea- Bissau 4.16 5.22 3.83 5.96 1.69 
14 Ethiopia 4.46 6.14 4.03 5.91 1.75 
15 Congo, Rep. 4.56 5.08 2.77 6.45 3.95 
16 Niger 4.60 5.45 4.69 7.33 0.94 
17 Guinea 4.67 5.00 2.64 7.43 3.61 
18 Rwanda 4.68 5.33 4.26 6.62 2.51 
19 Equatorial 
Guinea 
4.77 7.51 1.73 7.95 1.91 
20 Togo 4.80 4.78 2.68 7.38 4.38 
21 Uganda 4.86 5.78 4.55 4.89 4.23 
22 Nigeria 4.88 5.39 3.51 5.37 5.24 
23 Cameroon 5.12 5.78 3.09 7.54 4.07 
24 Comoros 5.20 4.24 4.20 8.18 4.20 
25 Zambia 5.23 5.08 4.59 8.15 3.11 
26 Mauritania 5.30 6.23 4.34 6.38 4.24 
27 Djibouti 5.31 5.05 3.69 8.21 4.29 
28 Mozambique 5.32 5.60 5.33 8.35 1.98 
29 Swaziland 5.33 5.57 3.65 8.28 3.80 
30 Burkina Faso 5.51 6.30 4.87 8.30 2.59 
31 Malawi 5.60 5.68 4.83 8.11 3.77 
32 Madagascar 5.65 5.24 5.95 7.65 3.76 
Rank Country Overall 
score 
Economic Political Security Social 
Welfare 
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33 Kenya 5.65 5.77 4.72 6.95 5.15 
34 Gambia 5.79 5.26 4.54 8.29 5.06 
35 Mali 5.85 6.33 6.16 8.49 2.43 
36 Lesotho 5.88 4.59 6.40 8.35 4.18 
37 Tanzania 5.94 6.38 5.41 8.08 3.89 
38 Sao-Tome & 
Principe 
6.17 4.86 5.77 7.95 6.12 
39 Gabon 6.18 6.51 3.93 8.36 5.94 
40 Senegal 6.28 6.38 5.97 7.96 4.82 
41 Benin 6.36 6.25 5.82 8.51 4.86 
42 Namibia 6.66 5.21 7.26 8.93 5.23 
43 Ghana 6.72 5.92 7.02 8.44 5.48 
44 Botswana 7.27 6.59 8.41 9.29 4.78 
45 South Africa 7.50 6.89 8.07 7.72 7.33 
46 Cape Verde 7.96 6.60 8.46 9.49 7.30 
47 Seychelles 8.23 7.33 6.54 9.52 9.55 
48 Mauritius 8.79 7.34 8.49 9.67 9.68 
Source: Brookings Global Economy and Development 
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Appendix C  
 
List of countries and natural resource endowments  
Angola 
Petroleum, Diamonds, Iron Ore, Phosphates, Copper, Feldspar, Gold, Bauxite, Uranium 
Benin 
Small Offshore Oil Deposits, Limestone, Marble, Timber 
Botswana 
Diamonds, Copper, Nickel, Salt, Soda Ash, Potash, Coal, Iron Ore, Silver 
Burkina Faso 
Manganese, Limestone, Marble, Small Deposits of Gold, Phosphates, Pumice, Salt 
Burundi 
Nickel, Uranium, Rare Earth Oxides, Peat, Cobalt, Copper, Platinum, Vanadium, Arable Land, 
Hydropower, Niobium, Tantalum, Gold, Tin, Tungsten, Kaolin, Limestone 
Cameroon 
Petroleum, Bauxite, Iron Ore, Timber, Hydropower 
Cape Verde 
Salt, Balsalt Rock, Limestone, Kaolin, Fish, Clay, Gypsum 
Central African Republic 
Diamonds, Uranium, Timber, Gold, Oil, Hydropower 
Chad 
Petroleum, Uranium, Natron, Kaolin, Fish (Lake Chad), Gold, Limestone, Sand and Gravel, Salt 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Cobalt, Copper, Niobium, Tantalum, Petroleum, Industrial and Gem Diamonds, Gold, Silver, Zinc, 
Manganese, Tin, Uranium, Coal, Hydropower, Timber, Arable Land, Water 
Congo, Republic of 
Petroleum, Timber, Potash, Lead, Zinc, Uranium, Copper, Phosphates, Gold, Magnesium, Natural 
Gas, Hydropower 
Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 
Petroleum, Natural Gas, Diamonds, Manganese, Iron Ore, Cobalt, Bauxite, Copper, Gold, Nickel, 
Tantalum, Silica Sand, Clay, Cocoa, Beans, Coffee, Palm Oil, Hydropower 
Djibouti 
Geothermal, Gold, Clay, Granite, Limestone, Marble, Salt, Diatomite, Gypsum, Pumice, Petroleum 
Egypt 
Petroleum, Natural Gas, Iron Ore, Phosphates, Manganese, Limestone, Gypsum, Talc, Asbestos, 
Lead, Zinc 
Equatorial Guinea 
Petroleum, Natural Gas, Timber, Gold, Bauxite, Diamonds, Tantalum, Sand and Gravel, Clay 
Eritrea 
Potash, Gold, Zinc, Copper, Salt, Possibly Natural Gas and Oil, Fish 
Ethiopia 
Small Reserves of Gold, Platinum, Copper, Potash, Natural Gas, Hydropower 
Gabon 
Petroleum, Natural Gas, Diamonds, Niobium, Manganese, Uranium, Gold, Timber, Iron Ore, 
Hydropower 
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Gambia, The 
Fish, Titanium (Rutile and Ilmenite), Tin, Zircon, Siliva Sand, Clay, Petroleum 
Ghana 
Gold, Timber, Industrial Diamonds, Bauxite, Manganese, Fish, Rubber, Hydropower, Petroleum, 
Silver, Salt, Limestone 
Guinea 
Bauxite, Iron Ore, Diamonds, Gold, Uranium, Hydropower, Fish, Salt 
Guinea-Bissau 
Fish, Timber, Phosphates, Bauxite, Clay, Granite, Limestone, Petroleum 
Kenya 
Limestone, Soda Ash, Salt, Gemstones, Fluorspar, Zinc, Diatomite, Gypsum, Wildlife, Hydropower 
Lesotho 
Water, Agricultural and Grazing Land, Diamonds, Sand, Clay, Building Stone 
Liberia 
Iron Ore, Timber, Diamonds, Gold, Hydropower 
Libya 
Petroleum, Natural Gas, Gypsum 
Madagascar 
Graphite, Chromite, Coal, Bauxite, Salt, Quartz, Tar Sands, Semiprecious Stones, Mica, Fish, 
Hydropower 
Malawi 
Limestone, Arable Land, Hydropower, Uranium, Coal,  Bauxite 
Mali 
Gold, Phosphates, Kaolin, Salt, Limestone, Uranium, Gypsum, Granite, Hydropower, Bauxite, Iron 
Ore, Manganese, Tin, Copper 
Mauritania 
Iron Ore, Gypsum, Copper, Phosphate, Diamonds, Gold, Oil, Fish 
Mauritius 
Arable Land, Fish 
Morocco 
Phosphates, Iron Ore, Manganese, Lead, Zinc, Fish, Salt 
Mozambique 
Coal, Titanium, Natural Gas, Hydropower, Tantalum, Graphite 
Namibia 
Diamonds, Copper, Uranium, Gold, Silver, Lead, Tin, Lithium, Cadmium, Tungsten, Zinc, Salt, 
Hydropower, Fish, Coal, Oil, Iron Ore 
Niger 
Uranium, Coal, Iron Ore, Tin, Phosphates, Gold, Molybdenum, Gypsum, Salt, Petroleum 
Nigeria 
Natural Gas, Petroleum, Tin, Iron Ore, Coal, Limestone, Niobium, Lead, Zinc, Arable Land 
Rwanda  
Gold, Cassiterite (Tin Ore), Wolframite (Tungsten Ore), Methane, Hydropower, Arable Land 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Fish, Hydropower 
Senegal 
Fish, Phosphates, Iron Ore 
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Seychelles 
Fish, Copra, Cinnamon Trees 
 
Sierre Leone 
Diamonds, Titanium Ore, Bauxite, Iron Ore, Gold, Chromite 
Somalia 
Uranium, Iron Ore, Tin, Gypsum, Bauxite, Copper, Salt, Natural Gas, Oil 
South Africa 
Gold, Chromium, Antimony, Coal, Iron Ore, Manganese, Nickel, Phosphates, Tin, Uranium, Gem 
Diamonds, Platinum, Copper, Vanadium, Salt, Natural Gas 
Sudan 
Petroleum, Iron Ore, Copper, Chromium Ore,  Zinc, Tungsten, Mica, Silver, Gold, Hydropower 
Swaziland 
Asbestos, Coal, Clay, Cassiterite, Hydropower, forests, Gold, Diamonds, Quarry Stone, Talc 
Tanzania 
Tanzanite, Gemstones, Hydropower, Tin, Phosphates, Iron Ore, Coal, Diamonds, Gold, Natural Gas, 
Nickel 
Togo 
Phosphates, Limestone, Marble, Arable Land 
Tunisia 
Petroleum, Phosphates, Iron Ore, Lead, Zinc, Salt 
Uganda 
Copper, Cobalt, Hydropower, Limestone, Salt, Arable Land, Gold 
Zambia 
Copper, Cobalt, Zinc, Lead, Coal, Emeralds, Gold, Silver, Uranium, Hydropower 
Zimbabwe 
Coal, Chromium Ore, Asbestos, Gold, Nickel, Copper, Iron Ore, Vanadium, Lithium, Tin, Platinum 
 
 
